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Chapter 1 
Introduction
This dissertation is a collection of thm ; papers in empirical international macroeco­
nomics. All throe papers explore a common theme: what are some of the issues that 
economic policymakers in a developed, small open economy have to deal with? In 
this respect, the last ton years or so have yielded substantial research progress and 
new insights in many areas for the (macro)economies profession.
In monetary economics, the introduction of Inflation Targeting (IT) as a monetary 
policy regime has spurn'd a great deal of interest, especially from smaller economies — 
as has, more broadly, reintegration theory from an empirical perspective. Chapter 
2 brings these two areas of research together. It analyzes; the effects of adopting 
Inflation Targeting on the monetary policy rule and on money demand for three early 
inflation targeters, Australia. Canada, and New Zealand, by comparing the pre-IT 
period with the period after the new framework was introduced.
The main result of Chapter 2 is that the post-IT periods offer less evidence of 
stable cointegration relationships than the pre-IT periods. In fact, the monetary 
regime switch might have had profound effects not only on tin* policy rule but also 
on money demand, and equilibrium relationships become, therefore, harder to detect 
in the data. In this sense, the adoption of a new policy regime may have been 
a preemptive strike to counter the breakdown of a stable money demand. More 
specificall)r, the following results emerge. First, the output variable is to a large
1
extent unaffected by the other variables in all three countries, especially the interest 
rates; in other words, it is often “weakly exogenous." Monetary policy seems to 
have limited real effects. However, output tends to be “less exogenous" after the 
introduction of IT. Furthermore, the short-term interest rate; becomes exogenous in 
Canada after the introduction of IT. This surprising finding is interpreted as evidence 
of increasing monetary integration between Canada and its large neighbor, the United 
States. Second, the cointegration analysis reveals that, especially in New Zealand 
and Australia, money demand but also central bank rule-like relationships an? more 
pronounced/stable in the first period than in the second. Third, for New Zealand 
and Australia, the inflation rate cannot be removed as an “exogenous'' variable from 
the policy rule before the introduction of IT. This result is interpreted as proof of the 
attention that the two reserve1 banks already devoted to inflation before the actual 
introduction of the more1 explicit targeting framework. In Canada, instead, the switch 
to inflation targeting can be clearly detected in the data: the Monetary Conditions 
Index plays—as expected—a non-negligible role in the first period, while in the second 
period the (core) inflation rate cannot be removed from the (»integrating relationship.
In international economics, the surge of the New Open Economy Macroeconomics 
research agenda is about to provide a new workhorse model of international macroe­
conomics. taking over from the Mundell-Fleining framework. Based on sophisticated 
theoretical models ricli in empirical implications, this literature also describes the 
behavior of the current account and its reactions to monetary/nominal shocks—the 
Dornbusch experiment—as one of its main points of interest. However the empiri­
cal literatim1 has b(*?n slow to catch up with theoretical developments. In Chapter 
3, I try to close parts of this gap by extending the empirical analysis of the small 
open economy cast; in the literature to a broader sample of OECD countries, paying 
particular attention to the 0 -7  economies.
The main result of Chapter 3 is that there is no consistent response of the current 
account to nominal shocks across the sample of G-7— and OECD—economies. More 
specifically, the following results emerge from the analysis of the G-7 economies: F irst,
■ J t f f  t ru ?  f i  Tr:  r : ; f  ( :  t  r  kU  S :  f i  l !  fT^TiTTTTTTTiT?
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short-run current account imbalances after nominal shocks arc* pronounced. Second. 
countries7 current accounts are found to react differently to nominal shocks. The 
current account surplus predicted by classical theory is not robust across countries. 
While Japan, Italy, and probably the United States reveal a J-curve effect, other 
countries manifest purely cyclical behavior. Hence, the results obtained in the liter­
ature for the United States cannot be confirmed for a broader sample. Third, while 
tlit' positive effect on the current account- (normalized by its standard deviation) is 
the highest in Canada and Japan, the relative contribution of a nominal shock in 
explaining current account variance is maximized in France, the Unit (id States, and 
Italy. There is strong evidence of nominal shocks having short-run real effects, but 
this evidence is heterogenous across countries. Finally, extending the sample to other 
(non G-7) OFIC'D countries confirms the conclusion reached for the G-7 economies 
that then* is no consistent reaction of the current account to a nominal shock across 
count ies.
Finally, gauging the slack in the economy is crucial to sophisticated policymaking, 
both in monetary and fiscal matters. In fact, the cyclical position of the economy 
has recently (re-)gained a substantial amount of attention, not least due to the dis­
cussion about monetary policy rules, the formulation of fiscal rules in the European 
Union, and the global slowdown in the early years of the new millennium. The output, 
gap- -which measures the deviation of GDP from its potential- is a frequently used 
indicator for the cyclical position of the economy. Defined as the difference between 
actual and unobservable potential output, the output gap is. however, itself an un­
observed variable. Moreover, there are numerous ways to calculate potential output, 
and the corresponding output gap. In the fourth and last chapter, I estimate a set of 
output gap measures for a small sample of European countries to evaluate whether 
the output gap is a concept on which economic policymaking can be based (not only 
in a small economy of course), and what are the major pitfalls in doing so.
The main results of this last chapter are that output gap measure's can yield very 
different outcomes for a given country depending on the method used to determine
potential output and that care should be exercised when dealing; with output gap 
measures—and devising policy recommendations based on them. Moreover, there 
appears to be little a priori reason to prefer one measure over another. The evaluation 
of a simple forecasting model based on the Phillips curve confirms that the output gap 
is not always a useful measure to gauge domestic inflationary pressures, and that no 
specific gap measure consistently dominates all other measures or a simple univariate 
forecast in this sample of European countries.
1
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Chapter 2
The Effects of Inflation Targeting: 
Evidence from the Early Movers
2.1 Introduction
During the 1090s, a sizable number of central banks around the world modified their 
monetary policy framework. They moved away from intermediate targets such as a 
monetary aggregate and focused directly on the ultimate goal of monetary policy, low 
and stable inflation. This approach is referred to as Inflation Targeting (IT). Ever 
since the Reserve Dank of New Zealand (RIINZ) led the implementation of this new 
type of policy framework in 1089, a lively academic discussion has set in, focusing on 
the theoretical foundations of IT  as well as on empirical issues.1
It is well known that the 1090s was a decade of rather smoothly declining inflat ion 
rates in a large number of countries, including most OECD member states. In fact, 
the average inflation rate in industrialized countries declined slowly from 5.1 percent *
'For overviews see Bernanke ( t  ni. (1999), Leiderman and Svensson (1993), Haldane (1995). 
and, more recently, Loavza and Soto (2002), Truman (2003), and the July/August 200-1 special 
issue of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review. The theoretical foundations of inflation 
(forecast) targeting have been covered in various contributions by Svensson (1997, 1999). Svensson 
and Woodford (2001) compare inflation-forecast targeting to alternative instrument rules. The 
textbook by Woodford (2003) also treats inflation targeting in some detail.
in 1990 to 1.4 percent in 1999.2 In most countries that decided to adhere to the new 
regime, instead, the CPI inflation rate showed a discrete, drop in the year after imple­
mentation. A prominent example is Canada (see Figure 2.1), where a substantial drop 
in the 12-month headline CPI could bo observed, from 1991 (5.G percent) to 1992 (1.5 
percent)» equaling approximately the total decrease of inflation in industrial countries 
over the ten-year period.3 Another way of stating this is that the unweighted average 
of the annual Canadian inflation rate was above that of the industrial countries in 
the decade before 1992 (6,0 percent vs. 5.0 percent), and below it afterwards (1.4 
percent vs. 2.2 percent).
This drop coincides chronologically with the adoption of the IT  framework by the? 
Bank of Canada (BoC) and the Canadian Government on February 26. 1991.
The record of other countries that implemented IT  at various time's shows that, on 
average, these countries experienced a drop in inflation compared to non-IT countries 
like the United States, Germany, and France (see the appendix to this chapter, Figure 
A2.1). Given the dispersion over time, the drop in inflation does not seem to stem 
from a particularly recessional environment wit h respect to  the world economy. In fact, 
IT was adopted at very different positions in the business cycle. In the following, I 
will focus on the striking Canadian experience, as well as on two additional economies 
that were among the first countries to adopt IT—-New Zealand (the ’pioneer"), and 
Australia—and ask what effect the introduction of IT  has had on these economies.4
“For country-specific data, see Figure A2.1 in the appendix.
3Note that the Canadian headline CPI misrepresents "true’* inflation in at least two cases: The 
spike over the first half of 1991, and the consistent trough in 1994. The former is explained with the 
introduction of a General Sales Tax (GST) in Canada, which was anticipated to have an effect on 
the CPI change in the order of magnitude of l.o  to 2 percent; see Bernanke ct al. (1999). The latter 
is attributed to a “sharp cut in tobacco taxes designed to curb cigarette smuggling across Canada’s 
border with the United States”; see OECD (1994), p. 25.
4During the late 1980s and especially early 1990s, many (OECD) countries adopted a new mone­
tary policy regime together with other important policy measures in the fiscal and structural sphere 
due to weak macroeconomic performance in the years before the regime change. Selecting such a 
small sample— while intuitive from an empirical perspective— certainly raises the question whether 
the results are biased in one way or the other, e.g., toward "greater change." However, the thrust of
6
Fi gure 2.1: Canada: 12-month CPI Inflation Rato, 1082-99
Source: International Monetary Fund. International Financial Statistics tll-'S).
To invostigato tho impact of IT, I compare in this chapter cointegrated VAR- 
models that dcscrilx; the throe economies over roughly symmetric time periods before 
and after the change in regime. Estimates of long-run relationships and short-run 
adjustments will provide a picture of the underlying structure of the economy. In 
particular, I try to identify (possibly changing) relationships that can be interpreted 
as a monetary policy rule and as a money demand equation to gauge the interac­
tion between tho regime change and the underlying economic structure's of the three 
economies. While a change in the policy rule could be interpreted ns a consequence 
of the change in policy framework, the; reasoning is somewhat less clear with regard 
to money demand. The collapse of a stable* money demand—dt facto  a decoupling 
of developments in money supply and prices—is one of the major reasons for many 
central banks to rely less on the quantity tht'ory of money for policymaking. In that
this chapter is not so much to develop conclusions for a broad set of countries l>ased on this small 
sample. I unload, the analysis should he viewed as in-depth case studies of the introduction of IT in 
the three leading implementers.
i
souse, the adoption of Y1 could have also preempted a change in shape or a complete 
breakdown of such an empirical relationship. The analysis is therefore not so much 
geared towards a normative assessment of IT  as having been successful or not, but 
towards the understanding of ‘‘what has changed,*' along the lines of .luselius (1990)/'
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section -.2 assembles some 
basic facts related to the policy change in New Zealand, Canada, and Australia and 
explores briefly the emerging empirical literature on adopting IT as a monetary policy 
regime. Section 2.3 reviews the main issues in the monetary policy framework adopted 
in the three countries and section 2.1 provides a brief theoretical background. Section 
2.5 delivers the empirical analysis. Section 2.0 concludes, and section 2.7 contains the 
appendices to this chapter.
2.2 Inflation Targeting—The Facts and the Liter­
ature
Building on the extensive theoretical literature praising the1 advantages of rules over 
discretion, a key question is whether setting explicit goals for monetary policy also 
matters empirically. In other words, do central banks with explicit targets experience 
lower inflation (and, at the same time, no disruptive output variability)? In this con­
nection, Fat 5s ct al. (2001) recently investigated the importance of quantitative goals 
for monetary authorities in a panel of 12 countries for the period 1900-2000. Distin­
guishing between monetary growth, exchange rate, and inflation targets, they find 
that having a quantitative (transparent) de jure. target for the monetary’ authority 
(as opposed to " opaque monetary' objectives*'/discretion) tends to significantly lower 
inflation and smooth business cycle's.6 Hitting the target de facto has further positive
Duselius ( 1Q9G) compares the behavior of the Bundesbank in two different periods. For a distinct 
view of Bundesbank policy, sw Clarida and Gertler (19E)7).
fjSee also Atkeson and Kelioe (2001) for a similar argument.
8
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effects. Among the three target types, Fat/is d  al. (2001) identify inflation targets 
as bringing the most anti-inflationary impact. The differences between targets are 
small, however, compared to the presence of any transparent target. With regard to 
output variability—an often contemplated side effect of bringing down inflation— the 
sample does not reveal increased volatility, implying that adopting explicit targets 
comes at little cost-hut. with large benefits: lower inflation.
In practice, the circumstances under which developed countries and emerging 
markets adopted IT  varied widely. A number of them did not have a specific target 
for monetary policy before they adopted IT, others had very precise targets, e.g., for 
the exchange' rate'. Dissimilarities also exist with rc*spect to the speed of adoption. In 
general, central banks (and the academic profession) hold diverging views on whether 
the move from the former regime to targeting inflation in their respective countries 
can be considered gradual or instantaneous. Especially in those countries that chose 
IT  in the aftermath of a currency crisis (e.g., the United Kingdom), adoption was 
immediat e by nature. While1 the regime change occurred under different circumstance's 
in the1 three eexmemiies I foe:us on, memetary policy was rather “eipaque" in all eif theuri 
before they introduceel IT.
In NVw Zealand, the> IieseTve' Bank of New Zealand Act of 1989. wliie-h se't the* stage 
for the' udoptiem of IT. was a proeluct of the consensus that had emeTge'd graelually 
within governmental circles, and the* central bank in particular, in the years follow­
ing the* 1981 electieui. In fact, the* Act was part eif a wiele-ranging reform package*, 
including also fiscal, trade, anel structural issue's. Alsei. the KBXZ did not have a well- 
expressed intermediate target during the perieiel beibre IT was intreieluced. althemgh 
it allegedly looked at the' major monetary aggregate's.1
In Canada, no such legislative mandate aimed at implementing the new frame- 
weak. Despite a three-year campaign te» promote price stability starting with the 
Hanson lecture; by then-Governor Cm v (1988). the pe>licy sliift to inflation targeting *9
r S<*p K B X Z  ( 1 9 8 5 ) .  p .  5 1 3 .
9
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came with little notice to the public on February 2G, 1091. The BoC had suspended 
Ml as an intermediate target in 1982 and had experimented since then with a mon­
etary conditions index (MCI) as a short-run operational target.
In Australia, the broader aggregate M3 served as an intermediate target until 
its abandonment in 1985. After that, Australia had no clear-cut monetary policy 
anchor until early 1993, when the governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) 
projected a numerical target of 2-3 per cent in terms of underlying inflation as a 
desirable outcome.8
Based on the impression that the adoption of the new* monetary policy regime 
in Canada coincided with a drop in the average level of inflation (see above), it is 
tempting to ask whether this is true for other countries, as well, and whether there 
is empirical evidence for failure or success of IT. Visual inspection of the data indi­
cates that in most countries the average inflation rate has come down notably since 
they adopted IT  (see Figure A2.1). Empirically, however, the assessment is com­
plicated by concerns about, economic policy evaluation a la Lucas (197G), impeding 
out-of-sample simulation using within-sample estimation if the model’s parameters 
are policy-dependent. Notwithstanding this, an empirical literature evaluating the 
introduction of IT  is emerging.
Early on, this literature has provided a mimber of interesting case studies; see the 
contributions by Bernanke ct al. (1999) and by Mishkin and Posen (1997). In early 
empirical work, Honda (2000) and Groeneveld ef al. (1998) do not find convincing 
evidence for their claims that IT has had a significant impact on macroeconomic 
variables and that this strategy is superior to intermediate monetary strategies in 
building monetary policy credibility. Nadal-De Simone (2001) investigates the pos­
sible costs of introducing IT  by comparing conditional output variance before and 
after. Consistent with the results in Fatfls et al. (2001), he finds some evidence that 
the decline in inflation variance has not been accompanied by an increase in output
?Sec Fraser (1903), p. 2.
10
variance—with the possible exception of Canada.
More recent contributions to the empirical IT  literature include: Choi ct al. 
(2003), who find using a Markov-switelling model that IT has (i) significantly lowered 
the volatility of the inflation rate in New Zealand anil (ii) led to a structural change 
in real GDP growth rate; Hu (2003), whose empirical results suggest that inflation 
targeting does play a beneficial role in improving the performance of inflat ion and 
output separately, but who only finds limited support for the proposition that the 
adoption of inflation targeting improves the trade-off between inflation and output; 
Ball and Sheridan (2003), who conclude that controlling for regression to the mean 
in core variables, there is no empirical evidence that IT improves economic perfor­
mance; and Kuttner (2001), who calls the empirical evidence so far "rather mixed." 
The July/August 2001 special issue of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Dm is Re­
view contains a number of articles that discuss the success of IT. Broadly speaking, 
these papers attribute some credit in the deflationary experience in many countries 
to the introduction of IT. For example, Ijevin (t al. (2001) document that, in indus­
trialized economies, IT has played a significant role in anchoring long-run inflat ion 
expectations by delinking expectations from realized inflation.
So far, cointegration analysis has rarely been used to identify potential effects of 
IT. This approach, by explicitly considering the long-run aspects, appears to offer an 
additional point- of view almost absent from the empirical IT  literature so far. Among 
the few notable exceptions are: Lee (1999), who finds only scant evidence of regime 
shift effects in Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom; Karainanou (1999), 
who compares Taylor rules for the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom 
using a variety of empirical techniques (including error correction models); and, to 
a lesser extent, Valadkhani (2002), who takes into account the IT framework and 
documents a stable demand for broad money in New Zealand over the period 1988- 
2002 without explicitly addressing the potential effects related to the introduction of 
IT. though.
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2.3 Inflation Targeting as a Monetary Policy Regime
In this suction, the main characteristics of an IT  framework are briefly reviewed, 
outlining the way in which they have been dealt with by the monetary authorities in 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.9
Inflation Targeting has been described by the International Monetary Fund as 
‘•...the public declaration of a quantitative target for inflation in the medium 
run, coupled with a commitment by the central bank to pursue and reach this tar­
get."10 1 This straightforward definition is subject to considerable interpretation in a 
number of direct ions.
First, the central bank is supposed to be (at least instrument.) independent- of the 
fiscal policymaker.11 The move* to increased central bank independence is commonly 
accompanied by improved accountability (to democratic institutions, e.g., the par­
liament) and continuous communication between the central bank and the general 
public in order to foster transparency and understanding of monetary policy issues. 
All three central banks in this study fulfill this prerequisite, including by publishing 
various reports and by reporting to their respective parliament.
Second, there should be no conflicting goal of monetary policy, e.g., an additional
f'See BoC (various issues), RBA (2004, 1997), and the publications related to Svenssoirs (2001) 
review of monetary policy in New Zealand. For an introductory literature overview, see Billmeier 
(1999), who also discusses issues concerning the central bank's transparency and credibility. More 
recently, see Svensson and Woodford (2004).
10See Blejer f t al. {2000), p. 5 (bold in original). A similar definition is proposed by by Bernanke 
f t al. (1999) and accepted by the t hen-Governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand; see Brash 
(2002). Svensson (1997) goes further to point out that inflation targeting implies in fact inflation 
fonçant targeting; that is, the central bank's inflation forecast becomes itself an explicit intermediate 
target.
11 For example, the economy should not show any sign of fiscal dominance. Spill-over effects from 
fiscal to monetary policy might be due to, among other reasons, government borrowing from the 
central bank, or to an underdeveloped taxation system which relies on seigniorage revenues, see 
Debelle (1997) and Masson ct al. (1997). This does not imply that the central lwink must also set 
its own goals (goal independence) which can be assigned by law or by the government, ste Debelle 
and Fischer (1994).
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exchango rate target, in order to guarantee successful IT .1" The countries chosen are 
the only economies that adopted IT  at an early stage and at the same time did not 
form part of an exchange rate arrangement, neither before nor alter its introduction. 
Nevertheless, the exchange rate is of kejr importance for all th r«’ countries.
Third, the monetary' authority has the choice among a variety of price level mea­
sures. In practice, however, only two versions of the CPI have been targeted. A 
number of central banks focus on so-called “core inflation," an index which commonly 
excludes food and energy price's as well as first-round effects of indirect taxation from 
the CPI. This index is, therefore, less volatile and describes more precisely the effects 
of monetary policy by excluding important transmission channels from abroad and 
from the fiscal policy stance. Alternatively, the monetary authority could target the 
"headline* CPI, which is more easily understood by tlie general public. In my sample', 
the IloC has allegedly looked at both rates.11 while monetary authorities in Australia, 
as well as in New Zealand (with some delay), aimed predominantly at the underlying 
rate of inflation. Given the extraordinary effects that blur the picture of the headline 
inflation rate' in Canada (see above, Figure 2.1). the core rate will be used in the 
empirical analysis that follows, while I will haw to employ the lion-corrected CPI in 
Australia and New Zealand for at least two reasons. First, the availability of the time 
series of underlying inflation (for New Zealand and Australia) is basically restricted 
to the period after the introduction of IT . Second, the central banks in both countries 
have chosen to further modify ad hoc published time series, such that it is difficult 
to identify the actual definition of the target variable, also because the composition 
may have changed over time. Both central banks admit that the headline CPI serves
1 - Tliis is the case of Spain, which—while adhering to IT— had to respect at the same time* the 
restrictions given by die ERM, i.e., limited exchange rate fluctuations. In fact, adoption of IT has 
had a insignificant effect on inflation, see Figure A2.1 in the appendix to this chapter.
13Even though the official target is the headline inflation rate, strong case's have been made in 
favor of the core rate, see Dion (1999). This point is of general importance: The Canadian monetary 
authorities often state (e.g., in IVeedman (199.5), p. 59) that although there is only a small number 
of core indicators, the IloC does not limit itself to those but takes an eclectic ("discretionary") view 
when asscsssing monetary policy conditions. *
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at least as a ‘yardstick against which tlie Bank should be assessed.'514
Finally, the target (or more precisely: the ultimate goal) has to be specified nu­
merically and over time. In Canada, for example, the first goal was set in February 
1091 at a target rate of 3 percent for a 12-month CPI increase by the end of 1992. 
Since then, the BoC has gradually scaled down the target to a ±1 percentage points 
band around a yearly inflation rate of 2 percent over the medium term, i.e., 2 -3  years. 
In the pioneer country, New Zealand, numerical targets for inflation are set in the 
contract between government and central bank, the Policy Targets Agreement (PTA). 
In case of breach of the inflat ion target, the RI3NZ governor may be dismissed. These 
PTAs have distinct duration. While the first PTA lasted for only six months, the 
latest is to last indefinitely. In the case (if New Zealand, these contracts also include 
a number of “escape clauses;" that is, references to shocks that should not count for 
assessment, such as changes in indirect taxation.
'fable 2.1 presents a selection of instruments, targets, and goals under various 
monetary policy regimes. The Bundesbank, for example, historically used reserve re­
quirements and, later, central bank interest rates in order to control the medium-run 
target M3, while the ultimate goal was inflation (7r).15 The other countries of the 
European exchange rate mechanism— acknowledging the Bundesbank leadership— 
engaged in the foreign exchange; (FX) market and practically targeted the exchange 
rate to the Deutsche Mark with a view to import low inflation. Other intermediate 
targets include artificially constructed indicators of the monetary environment , such 
as monetary conditions indices (MCIs). Alternative (long-run) goals include GDP 
growlli/the output gap—more generally, an employment goal—or maintaining pur­
chasing power parity (PPP) relative to a benchmark country, for example combined 
with an operational crawling peg target for the exchange rate.
1JKBNZ (1991), p. 17.
1EiFor small open economies with access to international capital markets, often the interest rate 
spread between short and long rates is viewed as crucial, since the long (bond) rate is determined 
exogenously by the world interest rate (plus a risk premium).
M
Tho last line of the table presents the commonly agreed characteristics of 11'. It 
has been stressed in the literature that thinking of IT as a framework without an 
intermediate target is an incomplete perception and that the monetary' authority's 
inflation forecast acts as such.1*’ Under this regime, instruments of monetary policy— 
the interest- rate(s) controlled by the central bank or the interest- rate spread—adjust 
according to the divergence of the inflation forecast from its long-run goal.* 1.
Table 2.1: A Selection of Monetary Policy Regimes
Insh'umcnts Targets Goals
Koserve requirement s Money slock 7T
Interest rates Exchange rate GDP/output gap
UX interventions MCI PPP
Interest rate (spread) (V ) (Core) 7T
Consequently, a reliable model for inflation projections is considered a key ele­
ment for successful IT, given that the effects of monetary policy need some time to 
work through the transmission mechanism (“long- and variable lags"). In Canada, 
for example, this forecast was bast'd primarily on the Quarterly Projection Model 
(QPM) dining the period covered by this analysis. However, other factors, like1 mon­
etary aggregates, are taken into account as well, and the QPM outcome is adjusted 
accordingly. In these tliroe countries— all small, relatively open economies—the ex­
change rate and ties to the rest of the world play a particular role when assessing the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy and domestic inflation. Tho Canadian 
authorities have dealt with this problem in a special way, using an MCI to capture* 
monetary policy effects on aggregate demand stemming from the exchange rate* and 
from the domestic interest rate channel. The MCI indicates the degree* of tightness
1GSee Svensson (1997). The BoC confirms this view, see Freedman (2000). Conversely, during 
the period between 1982. when Ml was dropped as intermediate target, and 1991, when IT was 
introduced, Canadian monetary policy did not have an explicit intermediate target.
l , It has also been recognized that— notwithstanding the terminology— the output gap can play 
an important role in Inllation Targeting, at least in its “flexible" form, set? Svensson (1999).
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in monetary conditions.1* Over time, however, the BoC scaled down the use of the 
MCI because observers and market participants misinterpreted the MCI as a precise 
short-term target for Canadian monetary policy.* 19
2.4 Steady-State Relations
In the subsequent empirical analysis, I will test a number of theoretical economic 
relationships for their data congruency. In economic theory, often equilibrium re­
lationships are derived as solutions to systems of (static) equations. Especially in 
macroeconomics, the introduction of the time dimension provides an important wa­
tershed for such equilibrium relations: the empirical analysis can verify whether they 
hold over time when brought to the data. Hence, empirical analysis has to account 
for the non-stationarity in most of these time series. The Cointegrated VAR frame­
work yields long-run (steady-state) relationships, consisting of integrated series that 
"move together’’ over time. While I briefly explore the possibility of the series being 
integrated of order 2, or 1(2), the basic framework of this chapter, however, will treat 
them as I ( l) .20
All three economies are "small’’ and “open;*’ that is, the effects of foreign variables
^The MCI is constructed as a weighted average (3:1) of the change in a 90-day commercial paper 
rate (relative to a base period, January' 1987) and the percentage change (relative to the same 
base period) in the exchange rate of the Canadian dollar against a currency basket of six count ries, 
reflecting Canadian trade links, and therefore strongly dominated by the USD (85%). No meaning 
is attached to the level of the MCI. Given that the MCI is a linear combination of variables that are 
best modeled as integrated of order one over the period of this analysis, it is highly likely that the 
MCI itself displays the characteristics of an integrated series.
19See Freedman (2000). Another reason for the decline in attention paid to the MCI might be 
due to the fact that, as has been noted by Eika et al. (1996), a meaningful use of an MCI rests on a 
number of assumptions (e.g., strong and super exogeneity of the MCI, choice of the right variables 
in the cointegration analysis) that are hardly satisfied.
•>0Theoretical research regarding the 1(2) model is still ongoing; see, e.g., Nielsen and Rahbek 
(2003) and Rahbek et al. (1999). For recent applications of the 1(2) model, see Juselius (2001) and 
Kongsted (2003).
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are potentially important. I will focus on domestic variables, however.21 Not account*  
mg for international spill-over effects does not prevent the statistical interpretation 
of the results. In fact, the cointegration property is invariant to an enlargement of 
the information set. In other words, an extension to foreign variables would enlarge 
the system but the fundamental conclusions regarding cointegration relations would 
persist.-" Moreover, restricting the analysis to the closed economy case is driven by 
the methodological approach. Larger VAR systems would entail estimating a larger 
amount of parameters, and, hence, less significant estimates for a given data span. 
Since the series1 length is limited by the historical context, I will leave the analysis of 
international spill-over effects for future research.2,3
This chapter focuses on the potential differences between two regimes of mone­
tary policy, and I will pay special attention to the concepts of a central bank policy 
"rule" and of money demand given that: (i) the empirical evidence generally sug­
gests more than one cointegrating relationship; and (ii) in connection with adopting 
a new monetary policy regime, money demand and a policy rule appear the most 
interesting—and empirically relevant-concepts. In the early 1990s, none of the coun­
tries in the; sample made an explicit policy shift from targeting monetary aggregates 
to targeting inflation. However, also the adoption of IT after a period of discretion 
or "opaque monetary policy targets'* should be detectable; in the data—although less 
clearly than the switch from one well-defined target to another.21
The Central Bank Policy  “Rule  ' *
Consistent with Table 2.1, central bank behavior can be; describes! by the way the; 
sliort-term interest rate i8 reacts to possible right-hand-side variables, including the;
- lIn the Canadian case, this is not quite correct since the MCI reflects the effective exchange rate 
toward the six major trading partners (together with a short term interest rate).
"“This does not hold for short-term adjustment and the common trends analysis, however.
•3See, e.g., Juselius and MacDonald (2003), who analyze international parity relationships between 
Germany and the United States.
- 4Soe Fat As ct al. (2001).
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inflation rate, monetary aggregates, a measure of output, and possibly the MCI. In 
accordance with the literature— see, for example, Juselius (1996)—I use the spread 
between short - and long-term interest rates, (ia- i l), as the variable of monetary policy, 
to capture better the transmission mechanism from short to long rates.“5 Therefore, 
I will look for a relation of the following form:
( '*  -  * ') ,  =  7 i ( A f t  -  it' )  +  7 2(m  -  p), +  7 3J/i(+74m c ii)  +  7 .J. +  s lt (2 .1 )
where £lt is a stationary error term, and all variables— with the exception of the 
interest rates— are in logs. For variables that matter, I expect the coefficient 7i to be 
positive; that is, the interest rate spread rises with excessive values of inflation Apt 
(above long-run equilibrium 7r*); with excessive growth of real money balances (m~p)\ 
and of output y  (compared to a simple time trend). The MCI will be included as an 
indicator variable only in the case of Canada. Note that this specification resembles 
an “augmented’' Taylor rule: apart from excessive inflation and a measure of the 
output gap, the rule acknowledges the potential importance of the money stock.20
The adoption of IT  would be expected to impact data patterns that, relate to other 
monetary policy regimes. In Canada, for example, the importance of the MCI—an 
indicator variable under the previous policy regime—should diminish or even disap­
pear. Moreover, real money balances could have played a (limited) role before the 
introduction of IT , although the reserve banks of Australia and New Zealand did 
officially not target a monetary aggregate. After the introduction of IT, one would 
expect the inflation rate to play a prominent role in the monetary policy rule. *26
"5In the cointegration literature, the long-term bond rate has often been found to be important for 
(small,) open developed economies— but also exogenous, possibly reflecting the world interest level; 
see, e.g., Johansen and Juselius (1990), who provide evidence for Denmark, and Juselius (199G) for 
a similar conclusion regarding Germany. Gcrlach-Kristen (2003) also finds that long-term interest 
rates have an explanatory role in the Euro area context, but associates them with inflationary 
expectations.
26Traditionally, Taylor rules are estimated in a stationary environment. See Gerlach-Kristen 
(2003) for a  cointegration analysis of Taylor rules in the Euro area.
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Money Demand
The demand for real balances (m — p) is assumed to be the sum of t he transact ions, 
precautionary, and speculative demand for money and is given by
(m — p)( =  Aiyi 4- \'2&Pt +  A3 (i8 — i !) t +  A^ f- +  £21, (2.2)
where £2t is a stationary error term.2' I expect the coefficients to be: Ai > 0 (due to 
the transaction motive, holding of real money balances increases with economic activ­
ity); A2 < 0 ( the opportunity cost of holding money as opposed to real assets); and 
A3 > 0 (the opportunity cost, of holding monetary assets contained in the definit ion 
of the monetary aggregate—-here M2—as opposed to longer-term bonds).2?
The impact of IT  on money demand is a priori less clear compared to the conse­
quences for the monetary policy rule. There seems to be no strong reason for which t he 
importance of the scale variable y— that is, the transaction motive—should change. 
With regard to the inflation rate, two lines of reasoning are possible. On the one hand, 
the importance of inflation in the demand for money could diminish since effective IT 
delivers a lower rate of inflation, and, hence, agents can disregard the opportunity cost 
of holding real assets. On the other hand, the credibility and communication effect 
of the new monetary policy regime could entail heightened public awareness toward 
the inflation phenomenon and, consequently, strengthen the role of inflation in money 
demand. Finally, the there is no clear reason why the adoption of IT should affect the 
opportunity cost of holding (quasi-)money as opposed to bonds as represented by the 
interest rates and the spread. However, with interest rates— and the spread between 
them—declining substantially in all three economies in the post-IT compared to the 
pre-IT period (see Figures A2.2-A2.4 in the appendix to this chapter), it could bo 
expected that this variable becomes less important, or at least less defined, after the 21
21 See Goldfeld and Sichel (1900) and Ericsson (1999) on t he empirical money demand 
specificat ions.
-*See Coenen and Vega (2001) for a more detailed discussion of money demand parametrization 
issues.
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introduction of IT.
An important prerequisite for both relations to hold is long-run price homogeneity; 
that is, real money balances are integrated of order 1, (m  — p) ^  /(l). Given that 
both prices and nominal money are possibly 1(2), the above formulation implies a non­
test ed assumption, namely that the time series for money and prices cointegrate from 
1(2) to  1(1), in other words: {m ,p }  are CI(2,1). This can cause some confusion since 
the two series do not necessarily cointegrate; in other words, a common 1(2) trend 
might still drive real money, and the 1(1) framework would be inappropriate for the 
analysis. In what follows, I assume that the nominal-to-real transformation effectively 
eliminates possible 1(2) trends in the data.29 To corroborate this assumption, I will 
determine the (reduced) rank of the system in the 1(2) framework to see whether 
there are remaining 1(2) trends in the systems considered.
2.5 Empirical Analysis
This section turns to empirical issues. As a first step, I present the data and briefly 
discuss problems tied to them. The second step will lie to fit VAR models to the data; 
more precisely, I will present six VAR models, two for each country (before and after 
the introduction of IT). The third step consists of a (»integration analysis. Restrict ing 
the (subperiod) VARs allows identification and comparison of the long-run behavior 
of the economies in terms of the variables that were introduced in the previous section. 
The long-run cointegTating relationships and the adjustment coefficients between the 
two subperiods are compared.
The division into subperiods obviously prompts the question of when to break the 
series. In the Canadian case. I take a rather pragmatic approach and simply cut out
29On the nominal-to-real transformation, see Kongsted (2005), Kongsted and Nielsen (2001), as 
well as Juselius and Toro (1999), who provide a detailed discussion in the context of an 1(2) analysis 
of the Spanish transmission mechanism. See also Johansen (1992), Juselius (1991), and Rahbek el 
oL (1999).
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Table 2.2: Sample Splits
Coujitnf Period 1 Period &
Canada 
Australia 
New Zealand
1984:01-1990:12
1980:01-1992:04
1982:01-1989:01
1992:01-2000:05
1993:03-2000:02
1990:01-2000:02
the year of turbulences (1091), such that roughly eight years of monthly observations 
remain before and after the break.30 In the first period, the; only obvious central 
bank target is the MCI, since money targeting (M l) had been abandoned in 1982. 
For the other two countries, New Zealand and Australia, the analysis is conducted on 
a quarterly basis because monthly data is not available. Again, the break is assumed 
to happen when IT is introduced, but no “adjustment period" is introduced. Table 
2.2 presents the sample splits.31
Splitting the sample into two—with the exception of Canada—adjacent subperiods 
begs a number of critical considerations and caveats. First, the notorious lags in 
monetary policy transmission likely imply that also a regime change would take some 
time to affect not only inflation but also the underlying economic relationships. While 
this is in principle correct, the cointegration approach does not focus on effects in the 
months immediately following t he regime change. Instead, t he second subperiod spans 
between seven and ten years depending on the country, enough for a regime change 
to manifest in the data. Moreover, the general public to some extent anticipated a 
stronger anti-inflationary drive, triggered for example by a length}" legislative process 
to prepare for the change (New Zealand), or, as in Canada, by remarks of the tlien- 
Governor of the BoC1 Crow as early as 1988.
This leads straight to the second caveat, namely the difficulty to correctly identify 
the date when to split the sample. While anticipation may have played a role, I
30See Figure 2.1. Juselius (1996) uses a similar approach.
31 Preliminary assessment of the time series extended throughout end-2003 did not lead to signifi­
cantly different conclusions.
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assume that ultimate clarity about the central banks’ objective only came about with 
the public declaration of the inflation targets in the three sample countries.
A third—notionally similar to but practically distinct, from the first—caveat arises 
regarding the speed of transition. Given that changes in economic aggregates are 
influenced by behavioral changes of a large number of economic agents, it is highly 
unlikely that all individual agents will react simultaneously to a change in regime. By 
implication, a regime change is not abrupt, but implies a transitional period. In this 
connection, Leyburne and Mizon (1999) use smooth transition analysis to determine 
endogenously the speed of transition between two different trend paths in prices (all 
items and underlying CPI) for the same country sample analyzed in this chapter. For 
the all-items CPIs, they find that 90 percent of the transition from one trend regime 
in prices to the next takes between about three (Australia) and four (New Zealand) 
years. Similarly, the transition period for the underlying CPI for Canada (which I 
employ also in this chapter) amounts to about four years. However, a slightly lower 
degree of transition, 70 percent, is completed after only 2 -  2.5 years.32 With this in 
mind, transitional effects may well impact the end of the first and the beginning of 
the second sample, but are at the same time only small parts of the subperiods under 
consideration. In addition, the cointegration approach used in this chapter allows for 
some flexibility in short-run dynamics without contaminating the long-run analysis. 
Considering transitional effects more explicitly in the analysis (by either expanding 
the break period or incorporating a transition function) could provide interesting 
results but is left for future research.
A similar argument applies with regard to the fourth caveat: the presence of nom­
inal rigidities, which could—arguably— impede fast adjustment of economic agents, 
for example due to wage contracts or price rigidities. However, all three countries
3~See Leyburne and Mizen (1999), Table 3. Due to the time series properties of the data, the 
authors do not estimate the transition period of the all-items CPI for Canada. Extrapolating their 
results for the underlying CPI, the transition period for the Canadian all-items CPI would be mu eh 
shorter, presumably less than two years.
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dispose of relatively flexible labor markets compared to other OECD countries.33 
Moreover, wage and price setting behavior—if not limited to one-year contracts—is 
usually staggered, such that a substantial amount of contract adjustment is possible 
over a short span of time. Therefore, nominal rigidities are not considered to crucially 
afh'ct the results of the analysis.
2.5.1 Data Description
With the exception of the series on Canadian underlying inflation, the* data used 
throughout this chapter stem from the International Monetary Rind's International 
Financial Statistics (IPS) database, CD-IiOM version, January 2001, in order to 
provide a maximum of data coherence.34 The frequency of the data is monthly for 
Canada, quarterly for New Zealand and Australia. The CATS in RATS procedure 
(together with PcGive/PcFiml) were used for the econometric modelling.35
The preceding introduction set the stage for a more in-depth discussion of data 
issues, especially of those time series mentioned above and necessary for the following 
analysis. For all thr€*e countries, similar time series will be used. I will focus on 
each of the variables in turn, starting with the Consumer Price Index C P It. This 
measure (IFS code ...G1...ZF...) was chosen instead of the preferred measure of con? 
inflation (both the RBNZ and the RBA  define their target in terms of underlying 
inflation) for the simple reason that both agencies did not offer a time series long 
enough to enable empirical assessment. The underlying rate for Canada (starting 
in IDS 1) comes from Statistics Canada/BoC, provided through Datastream. As was 
mentioned above, prices can tend to be described best by 1(2) processes. Therefore, 
the log of the CPI is used in first differences (denominated Ap, or Dp in figures).
33See OECD (2003a, 2003b, 20ai).
34In the appendix, Figures A2.2 A2.1 provide plots of the data in levels anti first differences (CPI).
35See Hansen and Jnselius (1901) and Doornik and Hendry (1997), respectively.
For Canada, the output measure (scale variable) is the industrial production se­
ries I P t (code 15666..CZF...), since measures of GDP are not available at monthly 
frequency. Using t his series is however only a proxy of a broader measure of economic 
activity/income, such as GDP. One solution would be to disaggregate/distribute the 
lower frequency GDP data. Given that GDP and industrial production move approx­
imately one-to-one over the whole period, I will use, instead, the monthly series for 
industrial production, being aware of interprétâtional restrictions.36 In the quarterly 
analysis of New Zealand and Australia, I employ seasonally adjusted real GDP data 
(line 99BVRZF). The series are computed in (log of) real terms, and denominated y.
For all countries, I employ two interest rates when estimating the cointegrating 
relationships. The short rate, U, reflects a short-term bank rate similar across coun­
tries (line 60), while the long rate, /*, consists of a 10-year bond rate (61...ZF). To 
obtain a comparable monthly yield, Canadian rates (short/long) originally compiled 
at a monthly frequency as a yearly return have been modified:
i f 1 =  log 1^ +  ra teaJ l/ 100^ * 100/12.
For Australia and New Zealand, a corresponding transformation is made to obtain 
quarterly yields.
Finally, the money stock variable included in the analysis is seasonally unadjusted 
M2, (the sum of lines 34 (narrow money) and 35 (quasi-money) in the IFS). In 
principle, the definition of the money stock should correspond to the type of short­
term interest rate used in the analysis—the “own rate." However, the literature 
has not been extremely careful to align these two variables for a number of reasons, 
including data availability, comparability across countries, statistical properties, and
3GThe hypothesis of cointegration of the quarterly measures of GDP and IP over the whole period 
in a well-specified VAR (2) was accepted with a ¡> value of 0.91. This fact motivates the assumption 
that the measures cointegrate also on a monthly basis. Experiments with interpolât ion/distribution 
of GDP from quarterly to monthly observations led to unsatisfactory results.
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for robustness tests.3' In this analysis, choosing M2 instead of Ml is driven by the 
ease of comparability and its statistical properties. In fact, money enters the analysis 
in real terms—lo g (^ y ) =  (m2 — p) =  realm2—which implies the assumption of 
homogeneity of degree one in prices. In other words, there is no money illusion, 
individuals demand real balances. Separate tests, not reported here, indicated that 
this assumption holds "best" in most models for M2.
2.5.2 The Statistical Model
In order to analyze the data, I employ a general cointegrated VAR(k) model, written 
in error correction form
A—1
AXt ~  ITA^-i +  TjAX t-j +  <&Dt 4-/¿q + t =  (2.3)
*=i
where X t is a p-dimensional autoregressive process, k  is the lag length, s t is an 
i.i.d. error with mean zero and variance Q, II =  TI* — /, T* =  — H*»
and Dt contains seasonal and intervent ion dummies. Under the 1(1) hypothesis that 
rank(U) =  r < p ,  the decomposition II =  a f t  holds, where a , ƒ? are p x r matrices of 
rank r, and a ,1F/31 has full rank (p—r), where Oj., are the orthogonal complements 
of a, /?, and where T =  The trend is restricted to the cointegrating space, i.e.,
a /1p1 = 0, since quadratic trends are not observed in the data.
The moving average representation of this 1(1) process defines the data-generating 
process for X t as a function of the errors su the initial rallies Aq, and the variables 37
37See, e.g., Ahking (2002), who examines both Ml and M2 aggregates in a cointegration framework 
for the United States using three-month Treasury bill and commercial paper rates as “own rates." 
In fact, contributions to the cointegrated money demand literature often use various combinations 
of monetary aggregates and interest rates. See Knell and Stix (2003) who survey more than 500  
individual specifications in their meta-analysis of empirical money demand studies. For Australia, 
Brouwer (I al. (1003) survey earlier literature and provide evidence for five different monetary 
aggregates, ranging from currency to broad money. Atta-Mensah (1005) provides similar evidence 
for Canada, as does Razzak (2001) for New Zealand.
in D(. It is given by:
= C  [ (£i + $D{) + fi0t j + C* (X) (s* + ¿t0 + fh t  + $A ) + (2.4)
when? C  =  f t ^ LT 0L) <C*(£) is a finite polynomial in the lag operator T. and 
Ao is a function of the initial values.
The cointegTating vectors are estimated by reduced rank regression of A X t on 
corrected for lagged differences and the constant, see Johansen (1990), Theo­
rem 0.2. The vector to be autoregressed is given by X t =  ((m2 — p ) , y, Ap, i s, i l(,
2.5.3 The Empirical Model
2.5.3.1 Misspccification Tests
Fitting the models to the data, the number of lags was “tested down" and set to 
k =  2 for all models, quarterly and monthly. Centered seasonal, as well as a few 
other dummies, were included when necessary to account for outliers.38 Table 2.0 
presents some multivariate misspecification test statistics.39
Apart from some first order residual autocorrelation for the second period in 
Australia and New Zealand, the models seem to be well-specified. Univariate tests 
report for Canada some problems with ARCII effects for the short term interest rate 
in period 1, and a rather low R 2 (.19) for i l in the second period, see Table A 2.1 in
39The limited number of observations calls for a low number of lags. For Canada, the monthly 
model, these outliers include D8406, D8412, D8G02, D9011, D9209, D9309, D9412, D98I0, l)s()(K)2, 
where D is an impulse, Ds a step dummy at yearmonth. After accounting for those outliers, the 
monthly models with two lags became acceptable. For Australia (quarterly), there was no need to 
include dummies. For New Zealand (quarterly), one dummy, D8802 was needed to account for an 
extreme outlier in the monetary aggregate, see Figure A4 in the appendix to this chapter. This is 
probably due to a redefinition of the aggregate.
39Res. AC(1) and Res. AC (4) are tests for autocorrelation in the residuals, first and fourth 
order, respectively, while the test for normality is based on a multivariate version of the univariate* 
Shent on-Bow man test, see Hansen and Juselius (1994).
2G
i.liliihll... J . .......
Table 2.3: Multivariate Misspecification Tests
Country Test Period 1 Period 2
Statistic * 2M p-val. X'2M p-val.
Australia Res. AC(1) 18.2(25) 0.83 42.7(25) 0.02
Res. .4C(4) 29.1(25) 0.26 20.2(25) 0.74
N orm ality 10.3(10) 0.42 6.8(10) 0.74
New* Zealand Res. -4C’(1) 29.1(25) 0.26 38.1(25) 0.04
Res. ,4C(4) 34.1(25) 0.11 27.0(25) 0.36
N orm ality 11.9(10) 0.29 8.G(10) 0.57
Canada Res. ,10(1) 43.4(36) 0.18 34.1(36) 0.56
Res. ylC(4) 44.0(36) 0.17 23.8(36) 0.91
N orm ality 5.6(12) 0.94 14.9(12) 0.25
the appendix. The explanatory power of the system (as measured by R 2) between 
the two periods rises in Australia and falls in New Zealand and Canada.
2.5.3.2 Rank Determination
As mentioned above, the presence of real money (and eventually real GDP or indus­
trial production) in the analysis calls for particular attention to the possible presence 
of remaining 1(2) trends in the syst em that did not ‘‘cancel outv in the nominal-unreal 
transformation. To account for this possibility, the trace test for the cointegration 
rank will be taken from the 1(2) framework using the maximum likelihood procedure. 
Since I include a trend restricted to the cointegrating space, the nonstandard asymp­
totic distributions derived in Rahbek ct al. (1999) apply. In all economies, there is 
no evidence for the presence of a remaining 1(2) root ; see Tables A2.2-A2.7 in the 
appendix to this chapter. Generally speaking, there seems to be somewhat ‘‘less coin- 
tegration” in the data in the second period as compared to the first, independently 
of the country under observation.“10 Table 2.4 summarizes the results from the rank 
determination in the 1(2) framework.
Given that the 1(2) analysis employed here does not allow for dummies, the tables 40
40For example, the hypothesis r < 1 is only borderline rejected for both Australia and New Zealand 
in period 2.
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Table 2.4: Rank Determination
Country Period 1 Period 2
Canada 
Australia 
New Zealand
2
2
2
1
2
2
could be slightly biased. This is, however, not a major concern in the quarterly 
models, since there is (almost) no need for deterministic dummies. In the monthly 
Canadian model, instead, misspecification tests indicated the need to account for a 
few outliers. Based on the finding that there are no 1(2) trends in the system, Table 
2.5 presents the trace statistic for Canada in the usual 1(1) framework, allowing for 
dummies.41
Table 2.5: 1(1) Rank Test Canada
Ho Eigenvalue trace traccilo
period  1 
r =  0 0.64G 207.9 110.0
r < 1 0.443 112.8 82.7
r <  2 0.324 61.8 59.0
r < 3 0.277 38.1 39.1
r <  4 0.143 16.2 23.0
r < 5 0.042 3.5 10.6
period  2 
r =  0 0.495 144.94 110.0
r < 1 0.2G1 92.3 82.7
r < 2 0.176 47.4 59.0
r <  3 0.114 28.2 39.1
r < 4 0.102 16.1 23.0
r < 5 0.05-1 5.4 10.6
Prom Table 2.5, it can be seen that applying the trace test including dummies has 
non-negligible effects on the test statistics: in both subperiods, the rank of cointegra- 
tion seems to rise by one, which is intuitive, since the outliers that were deleted from 
the single series might have obscured the cointegration property otherwise present in
41 Trace90 gives the 90% quantile of the likelihood ratio test for the cointegration rank. Rejected 
hypotheses are in bold.
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the data. However, the rejection of r  <  2 in period 1 is only marginal.42 Comple­
mentary evidence can be gained from the roots in the companion matrix, once the 
cointegration rank is imposed (Table 2.6).
Table 2,6: Roots of Companion Matrix
Country Rank Period, Î Period 2
Canada 3 1 1 1 0.73 0.53 0.32
2 1 1 1 1 0.48 0.14 1 1 1 1 0.69 0.25
Australia 2 1 1 1 0.75 0.75 1 1 1 0.81 0.81
New Zealand 2 1 1 1 0.70 0.70 1 1 1 0.72 0.59
For Canada, it appears that both possible choices—r =  3 and r =  2—would 
be acceptable in the first period, since the next-highest roots do not come close to 
the unit circle. The unrestricted adjustment coefficients (not reported here) indicate 
significant error correction in tliree cointegrating relationships, pointing to r  =  3. For 
both New Zealand and Australia, Table 2.6 confirms that r =  2 is acceptable for both 
periods. Consequently, I set r =  2 for all models in the following, apart from the first 
period in Canada, where I assume r =  3.
2.5.3.3 Weak Exogeneity
The absence of long-run feedback (i.e,, weak exogeneity) for a specific variable offers 
some preliminary understanding of the driving trends of the system. While I refrain 
from a more complete common trends analysis for the sake of brevity, it is interest ing 
to test for weak exogeneity, since a weakly exogenous variable can be considered a 
common 1(1) trend.43
Where univariate tests indicated more than one weakly exogenous variable, this 
has been tested jointly as a zero-restriction on the adjustment coefficient , see Table 
2.7. The test for Australia, period one, distributed as \'2(6) was accepted with a
42Moreover, the hypothesis would not be rejected at a 95%-level, with the critical value being 
62.6.
43See Juselius (1996).
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.1Tabic 2.7: Uni variate Tests for Weak Exogeneity
Country P eriod  Î Period 2
Australia y, r ea lm 2 , i* Ap  (, realm 2)
New Zealand A p, y y , rea lm 2
Canada m ci, y, realrrû i s, i l
p-value of 0.92. In period 2, joint exogeneity of Ap and realm 2  was rejected at 
the 2 percent-level, while the system test of Ap being weakly exogenous gave a test 
statist ic of 2.35 (\,2(2)), with a ]>-value of 0.31. For New Zealand, the joint exogeneity 
hypothesis was accepted with a j>-value of 0.12 (\,2(4): 7.20) in the first period for 
Ap and y, and with the same p-value (y2(4): 7.34) for the second period, relative to 
output and real money, however. In Canada, both interest rates are jointly weakly 
exogenous in period 2 (\*2(4): 3.12, p-value =  0.54). In period 1, the monetary 
conditions index, industrial production and real money can be considered weakly 
exogenous, the likelihood ratio test yields y2 (9)- 13.54, with p-value =  0.14, .. ,<
This preliminary assessment sheds some light on the driving forces (the common 
trends) of the systems before and after the imposed break.
First, it is interesting to see how (radically) different, they are. For example, in t he 
model describing Canada before the introduction of IT , the trend stemming from the 
MCI may reflect some foreign influence via the exchange rate, but there are also two 
domestic stochastic trends, one from the real sector (y , or industrial production), and 
a monetary trend, realm2. In the second period, this finding is completely inverted 
and both interest rates become exogenous. In the Canadian context, this could be 
interpreted as a growing economic and especially financial integration, such that the 
U.S. interest rates are also dictating the Canadian financial markets. f
Second, the output measure is weakly exogenous in four out of six models (New 
Zealand P1+P2, Australia P I, Canada P i ) —an indicator of the “non-affect edness" 
of output by the other variables in the system, or the limited real effects of monetary 
policy in the long run. In other words, output responds in equilibrium more to the 
variables included in the system after the introduction of IT  in both Australia and
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Canada.
Third, the price variable ceases to be a common trend in New Zealand after the 
introduction of IT , but becomes one in Australia. Since both short- and long-term 
interest rates are included in the system, this could mean that monetary policy (as 
expressed by movements in interest rates) became less capable of influencing price 
developments in Australia—a rather worrisome conclusion.
2.5.4 Long-run Identification
In this section, I describe identified cointegrating relationships for the six models, 
preferably money demand and a central bank rule where possible. No restrictions on 
the a-vectors (i.e., no weak exogeneity assumptions) hare been imposed. The corre­
sponding tables in the appendix to the chapter (A2.8-A2.10) report the ¡3—rectors 
in the upper part (standard errors in parentheses), and the adjustment coefficients in 
the lower part (t-values in parentheses).
2.5.4.1 Australia
The Australian data reveal a money demand relationship (/31)writh expected signs 
in period 1 (see Table A2.8). Real money balances are borderline error-correcting, 
the other variables do not significantly adjust to the long-run equilibrium. This 
relationship does not hold up in period 2, where the coefficients to the interest rates 
hare the wrong sign and where “money demand'’ does not respond to the change 
in the price level any more. Furthermore, it seems that the significant adjustment 
of the short interest rate and the large adjustment coefficient to Ap (together with 
significant error correction of real money balances) point to another relationship, 
which could not be identified.
A similar picture emerges for the second relationship, the central bank rule. In the 
first period the interest rate spread (¿s — /*) moves together with the inflation rate
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and real money, with significant adjustment, of the short-term interest rate.44 No such 
relationship can be detected after the introduction of IT. The only meaningful result 
found in the data is given by /?2, and could be interpreted as an IS curve (inverse 
out put-interest rate relationship), with significant adjustment in the correct direction. 
A similar relationship was not present in the first period. The size of the coefficients 
(especially the adjustment coefficients, but also the cointegrating coefficient to i i) cast 
some doubts on the latter result . However, the joint hypotheses on the (3—coefficients 
were comfortably accepted in both periods at the 50 percent-level.
Somewhat surprisingly, from the whole range of possible formulations for the cen­
tral bank rule in the first period (i.e., excluding one or more of the RIIS variables, 
(m2 — p), y, Ap) from the cointegrating space, only two are viable, namely excluding 
y or (m2 — p )—but not both at the same time. All others (especially the exclusion of 
the inflation rate) are either rejected or lead to implausible coefficients. In the second 
period, as described above, no formulation is accepted at conventional levels. This 
could be interpreted as evidence of the fact that the RBA did indeed take strongly 
into account inflation when setting the short-term interest rate already before the 
targeting of inflation was announced. Summing up, there is only a weak case for a 
second cointegrating relationship, see also Table A2.7.
2.5.4.2 New Zealand
The New Zealand analysis proposes a rather similar picture (Table A2.9). The 
/?] —vector can be interpreted as a money demand relationship, with conventional co­
efficients and error-correcting real balances, while in the second period correct signs 
can only be achieved if the coefficient to the long interest rate is set to zero; that is, 
real balances do not respond to the opportunity cost of lidding bonds.
44Note that the coefficient to inflation is not significantly different from 1. It has been shown in 
the context of New Keynesian sticky price models that a coefficient greater than 1 is a sufficient 
(but not necessary) condition to fulfill the “Taylor principle," i.e., to avoid indeterminacy of the 
rational-expectations equilibrium price level, see Woodford (2001) and Taylor (1999). In his seminal 
contribution, Taylor (1993) estimated the inflation coefficient at 1.5.
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The second relationship, the central bank rule, shows the expected signs and 
meaningful coefficients in period 1. Note that the coefficient to inflation is signifi­
cantly below unity, implying a “passive*4 5 behavior of the central bank with respect 
to inflation. The monetary authority seems to react strongly to (inflationary) output 
growth. Imposing the interest rate spread as proxy for the instrument of monetary 
policy in period 2 does not yield meaningful results.45 Therefore, the bond rate is not
J-S
included in the cointegrating space of in the second period. The vector reflects a 
relationship between the strongly equilibrium-correcting short-term interest rate and 
detrended real M2. Just as in the Australian case, also in New' Zealand the inflation 
rate cannot be removed from the cointegrating space before, the regime switch without 
provoking a rejection or implausible coefficients. In the second period, however, this 
is possible. The joint hypotheses on the ¡3—coefficients are borderline accepted in the 
first period, but comfortably in the second.
2.5.4.3 Canada
As indicated above, three cointegrating relationships are assumed in the first period.
mimics again the money demand relation, which is rather similar in both periods 
(Table A2.10). Note that the coefficient to Ap—the opportunity cost of holding 
money instead of real assets—has roughly tripled in the second period. This could be 
viewed as evidence of agents’ increased awareness with regard to inflation, possibly 
triggered by the adoption of the IT  framework. An interpretational problem arises 
from the fact that real balances are not significantly equilibrium-correcting in the first 
period, but do adjust- in the second. The inflation rate, in turn, is strongly adjusting 
in the first period but not in the second.
The policy rule (/32) offers tw'o interesting conclusions. First, the short-term in­
terest rate strongly adjusts to disequilibria in the first, but not in the second period.
4 5 In fact, the univariate test statistic for long-run exclusion of the bond rate (not reported here) is 
non-significant for all choices of the cointegration rank, i.e., the bond rate is not helpful in explaining
the information present in the VAR system.
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This confirms the above analysis, where both interest rates were found to be weakly 
exogenous after the introduction of IT. This could be due to the increasing integrated­
ness of North-American (financial) markets, with a common interest rate determined 
in the U.S. market. Second, CPI inflation can be eliminated from the cointegration 
space in the first period but not the MCI, and vice versa for the second period. This 
is what one could intuitively expect from the described change in the monetary policy 
regime (from targeting "nothing,’’ eventually the MCI, to targeting inflation). In the 
given specification, the interest rate spread rises with the MCI in the first, period and 
with real money and inflation in the second. Note that the coefficient to inflation 
implies an "active" central bank behavior.
The third cointegrating vector in period 1 presents a relationship visible in the 
data, the co-movement of the MCI and the bond rate (sex? Figure A2.-1 in the aj> 
pendix). This comes as no surprise, given the preponderance of an (admittedly 
shorter-term) interest rate over the exchange rate in the construction of the MCI.4“
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter has provided an empirical assessment of the effects provoked by the 
introduction of a new framework for monetary policy in Australia, New Zealand 
and Canada using cointegration theory. The chapter identified long-run relationships 
interpretable as monetary policy rules and money demand functions as implied by 
the data. A number of interesting results emerge from the above analysis.
First, regarding weak exogeneity, the output variable is to a large extent unaffected 
by the other variables in the system, especially the interest rates. Monetary policy 
seems to have limited real effects. However, output is "less exogenous" after the 
introduction of IT. In Canada, the short-term interest rate becomes exogenous after 
the introduction of IT. This surprising finding is interpreted as evidence of increasing
4(3See footnote 18.
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monetary integration between Canada and its large neighbor, the United States. The 
overnight money market rate becomes a common trend of the system—potentially 
driven by the U.S. financial market— instead of the outcome of domestic policy.
Second, the cointegration analysis reveals that especially in New Zealand and 
Australia, money demand but also central bank rule-like relationships are more pro- 
nounced/stable in the first period than in the second. After the introduction of IT , 
an interest rate rule cannot be detected at all in Australia, while in New Zealand, the 
long-term interest rate does not play any role. In both countries, however, the second 
cointegrating relation is only borderline stationary.
Third, for New Zealand and Australia, the inflation rate can be removed from the 
cointegrating space after  the introduction of IT, but not so befoix. One factor that 
might contribute to this rather counter-intuit ive result is that both central banks after 
the regime switch in fact targeted core inflation while the time series employed in the 
analysis refer to the headline CPI due to data availability problems. The implied 
discrepancy between core and headline CPI is not intuitive, however. In Canada, on 
the other hand, the switch to inflation targeting can be clearly detected in the data: 
the MCI plays—as expected—a non-negligible role in the first period, while in the 
second period removing the (core) inflation rate from the cointegrating relationship 
is reject (id on st at istical grounds.
Fourth, the data provide less evidence of cointegration after the introduction of 
IT  in a general sense. In fact, the monetary1' regime switch might have had profound 
effects not only on the policy rule but also on money demand, and equilibrium re­
lationships are therefore hard to detect in the data.47 In this sense, the adoption 
of a new policy regime may have been a preemptive strike to counter the further
A 1 Clearly, the above analysis (not so much for Canada) is also restricted by the rather limited 
number of observations. This is partly due to the fact that New Zealand and Australia do not 
collect/publish data on inflation (and industrial production) on a monthly basis. Svensson (2001) 
harshly criticized this as “striking/’ (p. *1), adding that monthly statistics are “required to bring 
data quality up to international standards" (p. 48). On the other hand, a preliminary assassnient of 
data sets extended thoughout end-2003 did not appear to provide significantly different conclusions.
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disintegration of a stable money demand, a cornerstone of many other monetary pol­
icy frameworks. From a chronological point of view, financial innovation that could 
have triggered money demand instability  ^preceded the introduction of IT b}r some 10 
years.JS
4'See, for example, Freedman (1983). 36
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2.7 Appendices
2.7.1 Tables
Table A2.1: Uni varia te Mi ^ specification Tests
Countn/ Series Period 1 Period 2
AKCH(2) Norm R2 ARCH(2) Norm R2
Australia A p 1.900 0.700 0.723 0.512 0.480 0.011
y 7.G32 4.092 0.380 0.040 0.441 0.707
(m2 — p) 0.005 5.257 0.490 0.411 0.220 0.7G9
ia 6.910 1.088 0.414 2.057 0.996 0.891
il 0.9-18 3.403 0.444 4.718 3.311 0.781
New Zealand A p 2.902 5.047 0.757 2.328 2.028 0.752
y 0.027 1.549 0.504 1.373 3.938 0.379
(m2 — p) 2.115 1.189 0.819 0.589 0.872 0.501
i9 1.108 0.190 0.808 1.790 0.351 0.641
i l 0.191 2.081 0.G3G 1.180 2.018 0.522
Canada A p 0.949 0.429 0.854 0.413 1.279 0.734
m ci 2.007 3.828 0.503 0.084 1.730 0.507
y 1.971 0.477 0.683 1.064 3.150 0.410
(m2 — p) 2.493 0.401 0.857 1.001 0.745 0.523
is 11.493 1.444 0.593 0.991 4.882 0.530
1.080 1.130 0.5G2 1.47G 0.0GG 0.192
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Table A2.2: 1(2) Trace Test Canada, Period 1 (PI)
P -r r Qoct Coo *~V.p—r
6 0 1936.9 523.2 417.5 326.7 251.9 194.3 168.5
5 1
(2G9.2) (233.8)
454.3
(202.8)
348.6
(174.9)
257.8
(151.3)
181.2
(130.9)
123.7
(115.4)
98.33
4 2
(198.2) (167.9)
311.25
(142.2)
228.8
(119.8)
152.2
(101.5)
88.9
(87.2)
60.4
3 3
(137.0) (113.0)
140.36
(92.2)
81.9
(75.3)
64.5
(62.8)
29.4
2 4
(86.7) (68.2)
57.2
(53.2)
25.3
(42.7)
12.9
1 5
(47.6) (34.4)
2.02
(25.4)
2.17
(19.9) (12.5)
p-r-s 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
Note: The number of 1(1) components is s and the number of 1(2) components is 
p ~  r — s. Simulated 95 percent critical values in parenthesis. A test statistic higher 
than the critical value means that the hypothesis is rejected. The table is to be read 
from upper left to  lower right, line by line. Rejected hypotheses are printed in hold.
Table A2.3: 1(2) Trace Test Canada, Period 2 (P2)
p-r r Coo OX’K r,p—r
6 0 665.8 513.3 399.6 304.7 228.2 161.3 128.2
5 1
(269.2) (233.8)
450.6
(202.8)
340.3
(174.9)
246.5
(151.3)
171.6
(130.9)
105.1
(115.4)
73.1
4 2
(198.2) (167.9)
287.4
(142.2)
206.5
(119.8)
139.0
(101.5)
73.0
(87.2)
42.9
3 3
(137.0) (113.0)
170.4
(92.2)
100.4
(75.3)
53.0
(62.8)
24.2
2 4
(86.7) (68.2)
104.0
(53.2)
39.4
(42.7)
12.5
1 5
(47.6) (34.4)
63.7
(25.4)
3.42
(19.9) (12.5)
p-r-s 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
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Table A2.4: 1(2) Trace Test New Zealand, PI
p-r r C'OC r
5 0 718.0 232.0 194.9 169.7 147.8 131.5
4 1
(198.2) (167.9)
252.8
(142.2)
148.6
(119.8)
121.9
(101.5)
98.1
(87.2)
81.8
3 2
(137.0) (113.0)
99.7
(92.2)
74.4
(75.3)
54.7
(62.8)
41.5
2 3
(86.7) (68.2)
45.7
(53.2)
2G.0
(42.7)
12.9
1 4
(47.6) (34.4)
16.9
(25.4)
3.4
(19.9) (12.5)
pr-s 5 4 3 2 1 0
Table A2.5: 1(2) Trace Test New Zealand, P2
p-r r tJOCJ r.a c’oc*^ r.p-r
5 0 294.5 224.6 182.8 151.3 124.C 113.6
4 1
(198.2) (167.9)
195.6
(142.2)
146.9
(119.8)
110.8
(101.5)
84.8
(87.2)
63.7
3 2
(137.0) (113.0)
117.4
(92.2)
79.9
(75.3)
57.0
(62.8)
36.7
2 3
(86.7) (68.2)
63.3
(53.2)
31.0
(42.7)
14.7
1 4
(47.6) (34.4)
34.4
(25.4)
4.3
(19.9) (12.5)
pr-s 5 4 3 2 1 0
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Table A2.6: 1(2) Trace Test Australia, P I
p -r r A'S C’oo^r.v-r
5 0 1076.2 222.4 174.9 1 40 .3 1 1 1 .9 101.0
4 1
(198.2) (167.9)
18G.4
(142.2)
138.0
(119.8)
103 .4
(101.5)
79 .1
(87.2)
G5.1
3 2
(137.0) (113.0)
112.4
(92.2)
7 8 .0
(75.3)
5 6 .1
(62.8)
37.9
2 3
(86.7) (68.2)
44.8
(33.2)
19.9
(42.7)
18.0
1 4
(47.6) (34.4)
27.2
(25.4)
4.5
(19.9) (12.5)
p-r-s 5 4 3 2 1 0
Table A2.7: 1(2) TVace Test Australia, P2
p-r r C’ocr,s 03Ck/- _ _f\p—r
5 0 248.0 194.8 Ì5 7 .1 130 .7 1 0 8 .7 99.4
4 1
(198.2) (167.9)
160.7
(142.2)
132.2
(119.8)
102 .4
(101.5)
8 1 .2
(87.2)
64.1
3 2
(137.0) (113.0)
105.3
(92.2)
76 .4
(75.3)
0 4 .1
(62.8)
36.8
2 3
(86.7) (68.2)
50.8
(53.2)
22.1
(42.7)
18.2
1 4
(47.6) (34.4)
10.6
(25.4)
5.3
(19.9) (12-5)
p-r-s 5 4 3 2 1 0
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Table A2.8: Long-run Structure Australia
period 1 period 2
variable 0i 02 0 i 02
A p 0.198 -1.037 0 0
(s.e.) (0.020) (0.106)
y -1 0 -1 1
(s.e.)
(m2 — p) 1 -3.193 1 0
(s.e.) (0.196)
is -0.124 1 0.140 0
(s.e.) (0.015) (0.011)
i l +0.124 -1 -0.074 0.006
(s.e.) (0.015) (0.011) (0.002)
trend 0 0 -0.003 -0.005
(s.e.) (0.000) (0.000)
Ol a 2 âi -"s.q2
Ap -0.872 0.G55 -13.541 -5.077
(t-rat.) (-0.380) (1.455) (-2.300) (-0.345)
y -0.047 -0.010 0.122 -0.694
(t-rat.) (-1.062) (-1.147) (1.640) (-3.742)
(m2 — p) -0.141 -0.032 -0.553 -0.700
(t-rat.) (-1.943) (-2.219) (-2.496) (-1,263)
Is -2.234 -0.485 -4.013 1.253
(t-rat.) (-1.650) (-2.824) (-5.443) (0.679)
i l 1.138 0.217 -1.762 16.787
(t-rat.) (1.728) (1.677) (-1.147) (4.372)
x'J (3)=3.64 (0.46) XJ (3)=2 .41 (0.49)
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Table A2.9: Long-run Structure New Zealand
period 1 péri a i  2
variable A A À $2
Ap 1.160 -0.391 0.078 0
(s.e.) (0.142) (0.054) (0.010)
y -1 -4.044 -1 0
(s.e.) (0.364)
(m2 — p) 1 0 1 -3.690
(s.e.) (0.583)
is -2.153 1 -0.163 1
(s.e.) (0.080) (0.008)
i l +2.153 -1 0 0
(s.e.) (0.080)
trend 0 0 -0.003 0.028
(s.e.) (0.000) (0.004)
S i S 2 Si s 2
Ap -2.726 -0.437 -13.457 -2.383
(t-rat.) (-4.231) (-3.959) (-5.288) (-2.167)
y 0.006 0.015 -0.041 -0.016
(t-rat.) (0.307) (0.290) (-0.334) (-0.928)
(m2 — p) -0.142 -0.325 -0.556 -0.066
(t-rat.) (-3.287) (-2.984) (-3.583) (-2.820)
i a -0.746 -2.762 -3.800 -0.816
(t-rat.) (-3.004) (-4.409) (-1.908) (-2.698)
i l 0.084 -0.251 -1.748 -0.346
(t-rat.) (-0.459) (-0.541) (-1.504) (-1.961)
X*(4)=7.514 (0.13) X*(3)=2.,55 (0.47)
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Table A2.10: Long-run Structure Canada
period 1 peri-od 2
variable f t 02 f t f t f t
A p 0.56G 0 0 1.448 -2.682
(s.e.) (0.019) (0.157) (0.291)
y -1 0 0 -1 0
(s-e.)
(m2 — p) 1 0 0 1 -1.258
(s.e.) (0.106)
m ci 0 -1.049 -0.599 0 0
(s.e.) (0.179) (0.151)
i s -0.591 1 0 -0.495 1
(s.e.) (0.199) (0.040)
i l +0.591 -1 1 +0.495 -1
(s-e.) (0.199) (0.040)
trend -0.001 0 0 <0.000 0
(s.e.) (0.000) (0.000)
Ql a 2 «3 di d2
A p -1.807 -1.885 -2.990 2.3G3 1.650
(t-rat.) (-8.302) (-1.999) (-2.460) (0.939) (1.215)
y -0.002 0.013 O.OCG 0.085 0.043
(t-rat.) (-0.353) (0.516) (2.109) (1.648) (1.538)
(m2 — p) -0.004 -0.078 -0.121 -0.550 -0.290
(t-rat.) (-0.453) (-2.002) (-2.430) (-3.767) (-3.677)
met 0.001 -0.025 -0.041 -0.08G -0.050
(t-rat.) (0.267) (-1.117) (-1.423) (-1.813) (-1.959)
is -0.010 -0.670 -0.648 0.019 0.005
(t-rat.) (-0.405) (-6.151) (-4.612) (0.107) (0.049)
i l 0.037 -0.004 -0.093 0.221 0.122
(t-rat.) (2.691) (-0.073) (-1.220) (1.561) (1.593)
=11.84 (0.11) V'J (5)=8.74 (0.13)
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2.7.2 Figures
Figure A2.1: 4 -Quarter CPI Inflation Rates in Selected IT and Non-IT Countries, 1980-2000
y — . . 6
Israel (logs) 10 Finland
•1
— 1 1 1--- 1--- 1 ‘ ■ ■ ■ ■__u.
„ 5
O 0
199(1 198(1 1990 2<ìck:i
Source: International Monetar)' Fund, IFS.
1980 1990 2000
Notes: Vertical lines signify the approximate introduction ofIT.
The chart for Israel is on a logarithmic scale due to a period of hyperinflation.
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Figure A2.2: Australia: Macroeconomic Data, 1 980 -2000
Source: International Monetary Fund, IFS.
Note: Quarterly data, in (log) levels, CPI in first differences.
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Figure A2.3: Canada: Macroeconomic Data, 1984 -2 0 0 0
0 8 o.i 198-1 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 199ft 2omo
1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
Source: International Monetary Fund, IFS.
Note: Monthly data, in (log) levels, CPI in first differences
1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
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Figure A2.4: New Zealand: Macroeconomic Data, 1982-2000
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Source: International Monetary Fund, IFS .
Note: Quarterly data, in (log) levels, CPI in first differences.
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Chapter 3
Current Account Fluctuations: 
How Important Are Nominal 
Shocks?
3.1 Introduction
Since the* publication of the Redux paper (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1905), the general 
equilibrium approach to international macroeconomics, often labeled as the “New 
Open Economy Macroeconomics” (NOEM, for short), has gained remarkable mo­
mentum.1 Roughly speaking, this new paradigm marries microfounded economies 
open to international exchange with frictions and rigidities stemming from imperfect, 
competition in product or factor markets. This paradigm, in fact, parallels to some 
extent the closed-economy New Keynesian approach.1 2 Up to the present, the liter­
ature has mainly taken a theoretical perspective, leaving empirical issues aside. A 
central, but so far underdeveloped topic in this line of research is the behavior of the 
current account.
1See Vanhoose (2004) and especially Lane (2001a) for valuable surveys.
2See, e.g., Clarida ( t aí. (1999).
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The emphasis of the theoretical NO EM research program has been on two-country 
models, thus enabling the analysis of international transmission, which occurs mainly 
through the Keynesian expenditure switching effect. In the Redux model, for exam­
ple, an unanticipated, expansionary domestic monetary policy shock (the “Dornbusch 
experiment“3) triggers an instantaneous depreciation and a current account surplus. 
This result is also the outcome of the textbook Mundell-Fleming model of flexible 
exchange rates, where the depreciation triggered by the monetary expansion redi­
rects international demand towards domestically produced goods. In fact, the basic 
Mundell-Fleming model does not foresee adverse current account behavior.4
The NOEM literature, instead, also provides examples of two-country models, 
which predict the current account to be in balance (implying long-run money neu­
trality) or even in deficit in the short run after a monetary shock—see below’.
Theoret ical small open economy (SOE) models, instead, are still relatively rare in 
the NOEM literature. Again, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) provide the starting point 
for t he analysis. In their model however, the current account is always in equilibrium, 
even in the short run. Lane (2001b) presents a SOE model that allows for short-run 
current account imbalances. He offers only limited empirical support for his SOE 
model, though: the analysis of U.S. data reveals a “J-curve effect,v i.e., the current 
account moves from an initial deficit into a prolonged surplus. However, given that 
the United States is clearly not a good example of a small open economy, the issue 
merits further exploration.
This chapter intends to augment the limited empirical evidence on current account 
behavior in the NOEM literature. Using a vector autoregressive (VAR) framework, 
the effect of monetary (or better nominal) shocks on the current account will be 
analyzed for the G-7 countries. To identify nominal shocks, I take advantage of the 
theoretical prediction of this family of NOEM models, namely that in the long-run,
3See Dornbusch (1976); Rogoff (2002) provides an interesting review.
4This said, extensions of the original Mundell-Fleming framework have been proposed that allow 
for adverse effects, such as a J-curve, see Argy (1994), chapter 21.
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there is a zero effect, while the short-run reaction is not restricted. In this sense, I 
do not test a particular prediction for the current account, but take a comparative 
approach, not necessarily related to model fundamentals: What is the role of nominal 
shocks in the determination of the current, account and how does it differ across (G-7) 
countries?
To answer this question, I construct tliree time series for each country, namely 
domestic output relative to ‘test of world*’ (ROW), the current account relative to 
domestic output, and domestic prices relative to ROW. Identification is achieved 
by imposing that orthogonal shocks to the last series have no long-run effects on 
the two former series; these shocks are consequently labeled as “nominal.” In other 
words, I single out idiosyncratic or “asymmetric” nominal shocks. Then, I simulate 
impulse response funct ions (IRFs) for each country, detailing the (short-run) effect of 
a nominal shock on the current account .
The following results emerge from the analysis: First, short-run current account 
imbalances after nominal shocks are significant. Second, countries’ current accounts 
are found to react differently to nominal shocks. The current account surplus pre­
dicted by classical theory is not robust across countries. While Japan, Italy, and 
probably the United States reveal a J-curve effect, other countries manifest purely 
cyclical behavior. Hence, the results obtained by Lane (2001b) cannot be confirmed 
for a broader sample. Third, while the positive effect on the current account (nor­
malized by its standard deviation) is the highest in Canada and Japan, the relative 
contribution of a nominal shock in explaining current account variance is maximized 
in France, the United States, and Italy. There is strong evidence of nominal shocks 
having short-run real effects, but this evidence is heterogenous across countries. Fi­
nally, extending the sample to other (non G-7) OECD countries confirms the conclu­
sion reached for the G-7 economies that there is no consistent reaction of the current 
account to a nominal shock across countries.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: In the next section, I compare 
two major approaches taken in the literature to current account determination—the
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Mundell-Fleming model and the NOEM framework— and review briefly the related 
empirical literature. Section 3.3 discusses the empirical approach taken in this chap­
ter. Section 3.4 compares empirical estimates of the current account adjustment 
following a nominal shock for the G-7 countries and proposes a couple of extensions, 
including to non G-7 economies. Section 3.5 concludes and section 3.G is an appendix, 
containing additional tables and charts.
3.2 A Look at the Literature
In this section, first I briefly review the ‘‘conventional'’ Mundell-Fleming approach 
to current account determination; second, I investigate the various predictions for 
current account behavior stemming from the NOEM literature; and third, I relate 
the econometric approach to the exist ing literature. !
3.2.1 The Mundell-Fleming Approach
The classic treatment of a small open economy dates back to (at least) Mundell 
(19G2, 1963).5 * In truly seminal work together with Fleming (19G2), the role of cap­
ital mobility and the exchange rate regime for the effectiveness of monetary and 
fiscal policy is clarified, 10 years before the actual adoption of flexible exchange rates 
around the world after the breakdown of Brett on Woods. The workhorse model of 
international macro for more than three decades was based on the familiar IS-LM 
framework, augmented by the balance of payments (external equilibrium).■’ In a 
nutshell, a unexpected positive domestic monetary shock shifts the LM curve out, 
leading (in a closed economy) to a rise in income and a (temporary) decrease of the
5 For an investigation into the origins of the ”Fleming-Mundell Model,” see Bought on (2003).
cSee any (macro/international) economics textbook for an exposition, e.g., Burda and Wvplosz 
(*2001), Kenen (1994), or Dornbusch cl al. (2004). For a particularly detailed treatment, see Argy 
(1994).
domestic interest, rate.7 In the open economy, two further effects are at work: due to 
the income expansion, higher imports initially worsen the current account.8 On the 
other hand, with high capital mobility, capital outflows will press for a devaluation 
of the domestic currency to clear the foreign exchange market. This, in turn, will 
trigger an expenditure-switching effect towards home goods, shift the IS curve, and 
boost domestic income even further. In the extreme case of perfect capital mobility, 
no interest rate differentials are sustainable, and monetary policy reaches its highest 
degree of efficiency under flexible exchange rates. The expenditure switching effect 
rests on one major hypothesis: price flexibility in the local currency. This assumption 
is in fact hard to overcome in the traditional Mundell-Fleming setting, since firms’ 
behavior is not. microfounded.
3.2.2 The NOEM Approach
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, 1996) paved the way for explicit microfoundations in the 
recent internat ional macro literature.9 In this literature, the practice has mostly been 
to characterize the model economy explicitly, while equilibrium dynamics are often 
modeled as a linearized approximation around the steady state.10
In parallel to the closed-economy “New Keynesian Approach,*’ real effects of nom­
inal shocks in these models stem from the fact that prices and/or wages are assumed
' The shock considered is supposed to be idiosyncratic or "relative" to the rest of world. A similar 
monetary shock at home and abroad would not create an interest rate differential.
8Note the relationship to the elasticities approach of the current account (or the trade balance 
if we neglect trade in services and investment income flows for a moment): the Marshall-Lerner(- 
Robinson) condition for a positive reaction of the trade balance conditional on a devaluation states 
t hat the sum of price elasticities of domestic and foreign demands for imports has to be larger 
then unity (see, e.g., Kenen (1991), p. 352). In fact, short-run elasticities have been found to be 
significantly lower than in the longer run, contributing hence to an adverse short-run reaction of the 
trade balance; Krugman and Obstfeld (2003) cite corresponding evidence from Artus and Knight 
(1981).
tJFirst traces of micro foundations date back to Svensson and van Wijnbergen (1989).
10Very few papers provide closed form solutions for the dynamics of interest, see, e.g., Obstfeld 
and Rogoff (2000).
to adjust only slowly. One way to impose price rigidity is by having firms set them 
one period in advance, such that they are “predetermined. *’ This, in turn, implies 
that adjustment is completed after one period; that is, persistence effects cannot be 
captured. More elaborated modeling approaches to nominal rigidity in the literature 
have used staggered price or wage setting following Calvo (1983) and Taylor (1979).11 
Most work in the NOEM context has built on the analytically more straightforward 
assumption, namely predetermined prices.
Two-country models in the NOEM literature offer, based on explicitly micro- 
founded behavior of economic agents, a variety of conclusions as to how t he current 
account reacts following a nominal shock—ranging from a temporary current account 
surplus to the opposite conclusion. First, in the Redux paper by Obstfeld and Ro- 
goff (1995), an idiosyncratic12 positive monetar}' surprise in the home country leads, 
due to sticky prices, to a rise in domestic consumption and production and lowers 
the world real interest rate. With nominal depreciation, domestic as well as inter­
national demand will (under standard assumptions) switch to domestically-produced 
tradables, triggering a short-run current account surplus. In this setting, money is 
not neutral in the long run, since the temporary current account surplus implies an 
improvement in the net foreign asset position of the home country vis-à-vis the rest 
of the world. In turn, the net investment inflow allows for a continuous trade balance 
deficit (domestic consumption higher than production), while the current account is 
balanced in the new steady state. Furthermore, the wealth effect stemming from the 
improved net foreign asset position tends to reduce labor supply and, hence, domestic 
output. This wealth effect is only of second-order importance, however, compand to 
the positive demand-side effect on output caused by slowly-adjusting prices.
Second, Betts and Devereux (2000) entitle a fraction of firms to discriminate
11 Closed-economy New Keynesian models that capture persistence effects by making use of stag­
gered price and wage setting have been proposed, e.g., by Gali (2001) and Erceg et a i (2000).
''Similarly to the Mundell-FIeming framework, an equi proportionate money supply increase would 
not have any ternis-of-trade or exchange rate effects, nor would this type of symmetric shock affect 
the current account; see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), p. 683.
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between markets and 13 i4price to market*' by setting a price in the local currency, at 
home as well as abroad (local currency pricing. LCP). In this case, the monetary 
shock still provokes a depreciation of the domestic currency, but no longer triggers 
price adjustment in accordance with the law of one price, which only holds ex ante 
in this environment. Consequently, tlie higher the fraction of discriminating firms, 
the lower the international expenditure switching effect, and the smaller the change 
in consumption of the domestic traded good since relative prices do not change. In 
the limit, home and foreign consumption growlh are completely delinked, and the 
current account is unaffected by a monetary policy shock even in the short run. 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) have criticized this approach; they prefer the assumption 
of producer currency pricing (POP). Others haw sided with Betts and Devereux 
(2000) in assuming local (that is, destination market) currency pricing; s<>e, e.g., 
Devereux and Engel (1998), and Engel (2002).13
Finally, Chari ct al. (2002) obtain yet another prediction for the current account 
in a two-country model. The introduction of capital as a second factor of production 
provides an additional effect of the interest rate decline following the monetary ex­
pansion. An investment boom will (partly) lead to increased imports, and limit the 
positive effect of the expenditure switching on the current account. A strong enough 
investment effect will even lead to a temporary current account deficit.
SOE models, instead, are (so far) rare in the NO EM literature. Obstfeld and Ro­
goff (1995) also provide a SOE version of their two-country model in the appendix of 
the Redux paper.14 They sketch an economy with two sectors, traded vs. non-traded 
goods. While in the former goods prices obey the law* of one price, the non-traded 
sector is assumed to exhibit nominal (price) rigidities to allow for real effects of mone­
tary policy. Furthermore, the non-traded sector produces a differentiated good under
13See also Bergin (2CKM). Koren cl al. (2001) find overwhelming empirical evidence in favor of the 
P C P  asstnnption.
14 See Bergin (2003) for another axample of a SOE model; he focuses on pass-through and local 
currency pricing.
monopolistic competition a la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), while the internationally- 
traded good is homogenous. The world interest rate is exogenous and the endowment 
of tradables taken as given by the domestic economy. Hence, the current account is 
det ermined over time by the consumption of tradables. The crucial feature of this 
model is that consumption of tradables and non-tradables enter the utility function 
log-separably, not allowing consumption of non-traded goods to affect the marginal 
utility of traded goods’ consumption. Therefore, the time path of tradables con­
sumption is flat even after a monetary shock, leading to a current account in perfect 
equilibrium, even in the short run.
The assumpt ion of log-separability in consumption is relaxed by Lane (2001b). He 
also distinguishes between a traded, competitive and a non-traded, monopolistically 
competitive sector. The distinctive feature of this model is a more general formulation 
of consumption behavior, where consumption of tradables and of non-tradables enter 
the period utility function in an aggregated way. Possible spillover effects between the 
non-traded and the traded sector then determine whether a monetary shock affects 
the current account in the short run and in what direction. Under flexible exchange 
rates, a current account disequilibrium goes hand in hand with an opposite capital 
account disequilibrium; that is, net capital imports/exports. In the long run, however, 
the capital account (and hence t he current account) is in equilibrium.15
More precisely, a monetary shock in Lane’s model triggers a temporary boom 
in the non-traded sector (since in the short run firms have an incentive to produce 
more due to the positive mark-up stemming from monopolistic competition, and 
output is therefore demand-determined). Simultaneously, prices of traded goods rise, 
in the short as well as in the long run, and the nominal exchange rate depreciates. 
Whether this short-run boom in the non-traded sector has effects on the traded sector 
as well as real long-run effects in general hinges on the net outcome of two opposite
15This result is not specific to the model proposed by Lane (2001b) but a  very general outcome in 
this literature: A transversality/no-Ponzi-game condition ensures that the long-run capital account 
is balanced, and therefore (under flexible exchange rates) the current account as well.
56
substitution effects: On the one hand, traded goods become relatively more expensive 
due to the monetary' shock (the price for non-traded goods is fixed in the short run), 
and consumers mf rat emporally substitute consumption away from traded goods. On 
the other hand, the ¿niertemporal substitution effect makes consumption today more 
attractive, since price adjustment in the non-traded sector in the next period leads 
to a higher steady-state price level.
If the m/ratemporal substitution effect is relatively strong, consumpt ion of trad­
ables is in fact reduced. This, in turn, leads to an immediate current account surplus, 
and an accumulation of net foreign assets, since production of the traded goods is 
given and hence unchanged. In the long run, interest revenues on net foreign assets al­
low higher steady-st ate consumption of tradables, and hence a permanent net-exports 
deficit. Money is therefore not neutral in the long run. The current account instead 
will be balanced, precisely because net imports will be financed from the net foreign- 
asset revenue.
On the other hand, if the infer temporal substitution effect dominates, higher 
short-run consumption of tradables will cause a temporary' current account deficit 
while in the long run, the economy runs a trade balance surplus, with consumption 
of traded goods below the exogenous endowment to finance the debt service clue to 
the initial current account deficit.
Finally, if the two substitution effects cancel out, no spillover from the non-traded 
to the traded sector manifests, the short-run current account balance is unaffected, 
and the monetary shock does not have (long-run) real effects.
3.2.3 Empirics
Up to now, relatively little empirical work has been done in the NOEM field. From 
a philosophical point of view', two approaches are possible: First, unconditional mo­
ments derived from a calibrated model can be matched with moments of the actual
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data.10 Second, conditional moments can be investigated, for example, in a vector 
autoregressive (VAR) framework.17 Bergin (2003, 2004) and Chari ct a l  (2002. 2000) 
propose the former approach, while examples of the latter include Clarida and Gali 
(1994), Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), and Lane (2001b). The latter family of papers 
focuses on the effect monetary shocks have on the exchange rate in the presence of 
sticky prices. Gali (1999) presents evidence for real shocks.
The empirical approach taken in this chapter was developed by Blanchard and 
Quail (1989). Since then, numerous applications have built on their seminal work. 
The two major modifications adopted here—triggered by the application to the open 
economy— are the inclusion of a third variable, the current account, in the estimation 
process and the particular construction of the "doinest ic*’ time series (i.e., relative 
to the rest of world). In doing so, I follow Clarida and Gali (1994), who investigate 
the effects of nominal shocks on the real exchange rate—as opposed to the current 
account. Prasad (1999) also uses a similar multilateral setup to investigate interna­
tional business cycle propagation. In his contribution, however, he focuses on the 
effects of output shocks on the trade balance.
Finally, Ahmed and Park (1994) investigate the role of the trade balance for a 
number of small open economies in a VAR framework. They do not construct, relative 
time series however; instead, they include U.S. output in all VARs as a proxy for the 
rest of the world. Furthermore, their identification strategy is somewhat different, 
since they postulate a zero long-run effect of a nominal shock on the trade balance. 
This is a special case of my assumption, where the net foreign asset position of a given 
country allowrs for capital flows such that the trade balance can be in disequilibrium 
as long as t he effect on the current account is zero. *1
,6 In the tradition of the computational experiment undertaken by Kydland and Prescott (1982, 
199G).
1‘ The introduction of the VAR framework into macroeconomics is commonly associated with Sims 
(1980).
58
Summing up, there are a number of theoretical papers in the NO EM literature, 
which conject ure alt ernative short-run behavior of the current account conditional on 
a monetary shock. Empirical evidence is limited, however. The next section attempts 
to fill this gap.
3.3 Empirical Analysis
In this section, I first describe the empirical approach taken to identify nominal 
shocks in the VAR analysis. The models described in t lie preceding sect ion share 
one characteristic feature: while the short-run reaction of the current account in 
response to a monetary shock depends on various effects, the long-run effect is zero. 
This theoretical result will be used in what follows as an identifying restriction in 
the econometric estimation. By focusing on the long run, I do not restrict short-run 
behavior: both a current account deficit as well as a surplus are possible. Second, I 
briefly introduce the data and their construction, and, finally, highlight some of the 
time series properties of the data. The results from the empirical investigation are 
presented in the next section.
3.3.1 The Empirical Model and Long-Run Restrictions
The models outlined above present some important conclusions for the conditional 
behavior of the current account, namely that nominal shocks have a zero long-run 
effect, but that there is no prior as to the short-run response. In this section, I 
briefly outline how the framework by Blanchard and Quail (1989) can be used in this 
connection. In accordance with the literature, I focus on time series for output and 
prices, which are relative to the rest of the world. In doing so, I am able to single 
out idiosyncratic behavior. In fact, NO EM models do not foresee any real effects of 
nominal shocks that are common across countries. I
I assume that there are three types of (uncorrelated) disturbances that possibly 
affect the three time series (log) relative output (V/V*), current account (C-A/Y),
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and (log) relative price level (P /P *) , where the * indicates an aggregate variable 
representing the rest of the world. To identify these disturbances, I make the following 
assumptions: no disturbance has long-run effects on the time series employed in the 
estimation, more precisely on the first differences of the original time series (i.e., 
growth rates are stationary). Furthermore, disturbances to (the growth rate of) 
relative output might have long-run effects on the level of all three scries, while 
shocks to the (growth rate of the) current account do not have long-run effects on 
the level of relative output. Finally, disturbances stemming from the (growt h rate of) 
the relative price level, only affect the price level in the long run. These assumptions 
technically identify the shocks. Given the chosen structure, it seems natural to label 
the shocks as supply, real demand/absorption, and monetary/nominal, respectively, 
although the naming convention is irrelevant for the argument, as noted by Blanchard 
and Quah (1989). The authors also show that small violations of the identification 
scheme, for example, lasting effects on output stemming from nominal shocks through 
a “wealth e ffe c ta re  of minor consequence.18 in particular, I am interested in the 
effects of the last shock on the second variable, i.e., a monetary shock on the current 
account.
This set-up is close to the system studied by Clarida and Gali (1994)—but de­
viates from it in three respects: (i) as ‘‘demand” variable, I focus on the current 
account rather than the real exchange rate; (ii) the constructed relative series in their 
paper are bilateral series, that is, they relate the domestic series to only one other 
country whereas I construct an aggregate rest of the world, consisting of the other 
G-7 economies;.(iii) in choosing relative prices as my nominal variable —as opposed 
to, e.g., relative money stocks/growth or the nominal exchange rate as in Clarida and 
Gali (1994)— I ensure consistency with Lane’s (2001b) model in order to reproduce 
his result for the United States before exploring the implications for a larger sample.19
1?In light of recent U.S. data, potential long-run effects of a growing current account deficit on 
the level of relative output also come to mind.
19Moreover, detrending the series would have highlighted the cyclical effects better. Again, I omit
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Let Xt be the stationary vector (A (Y/Y*) ,A (C A /Y ) , A (P/P*))\ and s t -  
(s8,£d^ n ï the vector of disturbances, where A is the difference operator. It follows 
from the assumptions that X  can be written in the following structural representa­
tion:20
Xt — ApSt +  A\£t~\ + ... — =  A (L ) st, V a r ( s t) — J  (3.1)
*■=0
where L  is the lag operator. The sequence of long-run coefficients can be denoted as 
.4(1) -  Ao +  .4] + ... . Element dij(k) of the matrix .4* is the effect of Sj on series 
A i  after k periods, hence the accumulated 2 Î= 0ûo (0  gives the effect on the level of 
series i after h periods. Identification of the shocks is therefore achieved by imposing 
restrictions of the type
oc
£ M O = 0  (3.2)
i=0
for some elements in the 3 x 3  matrix A (l).
For empirical purposes, the starting point is a reduced-form vector autoregressive 
(VAR) representation of X t :
B ( L ) X t = r ilt var(r}t) =  n . (3.3)
Here, D (L) a 3 x 3 matrix of lag polynomials, and t/t the reduced-form innovation. 
Assuming that the roots of the characteristic equation lie outside the unit, circle, this 
expression can be inverted and rewritten in the following moving average (MA) form:
Xt =  C  (L ) i]t =  CoVt +  CiVt-i +  ^2Vt-2 +  — (3.4)
where C(L)  =  B (L)~l and C0 =  I.  Comparing equation (3.1) with equation (3.4),
this step to stay consistent with Lane (2001b).
20In what follows, I omit the constant.
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it follows that Tjt — AoSti as well as Ai =  C^4o Vi. A convenient way to identify Aq 
is by imposing that A (l)  be lower triangular."1 This is where the assumptions about 
the structural shocks made above come in: the restrictions in equation (3.5) precisely 
satisfy this structure.
A (  1) =
XT «h W 0 
ET «mW ET««W
0
0 (3.5)
Neither real demand (element 1,2) nor nominal shocks (element 1,3) have long-run 
effects on the accumulated level of output , and nominal shocks have zero long-run 
consequences for the current account (element 2,3).
3.3.2 The Data
The data I use are quarterly and stem from the IMF’s International Financial Statis­
tics database. In the first step, the sample comprises the G-7 countries. This choice 
is driven by the trade-off between data availability and model congruency. Including 
more countries would stress the underlying small open economy assumption, but, on 
the other hand, make the construction of the relative series much more cumbersome. 
Due to non-availability of consistent Japanese current account data, the observation 
period starts only four years after the breakdown of Bretton Woods and spans from 
1977Q1 to 1998Q4, for a total of 88 obserrations. The last observation is chosen to 
coincide with the introduction of the euro in three of the G-7 countries, acknowledg­
ing the change in policy regime, and providing better comparability with results in 
the literature.
The times series employed in the estimation are:
• (log) seasonally adjusted domestic output volume (1995=100, IFS line 99BVRZF), 
relative to ROW; 21
21 See Blanchard and Quah (1989) or Clarida and Gali (1994) for proofs of this statement.
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• the domestic current account balance (78ALDZF) relative to domestic GDP22 
(line 99B.CZF); and
• the (log) domestic consumer price level (1995=100, line 64...ZF) relative to the 
price level in the ROW.
For each G-7 economy, the ROW is proxied by the other six G-7 countries and is, 
hence, country-specific. The corresponding ROW series are constructed as a weighted 
averages of national series. The weights, in turn, are given by average annual GDP 
in international prices over the period 1973-88, taken from the Penn World Tables, 
mark 5.G.23 The raw current account series has been passed through a X I 1-filter to 
remove remaining seasonal cycles.24
3.3.3 Estimation Issues
In order for the above setup to be valid, the data series can be non-st at ionary in 
levels, but must be stationary as employed in the VAR; that is, in first differences. 
With very few exceptions, conventional unit root tests have confirmed the visual 
impression, indicating non-st at ionarity in levels but not in first differences (see Table 
A3.2 in the appendix to this chapter for detailed results).
The estimation in first differences ignores possible cointegration between the time 
series in levels. To check for this possibility, simple trace tests following Johansen 
(1996) have been implemented. Only Japan and Germany offer signs of cointegration
" T h e  series were converted from USD (as provided in the IFS) into domestic currency by the 
period average exchange rate over the quarter, taken from the IFS as well (line ..AE.ZF).
23See Summers and Heston (1991) for a discussion of mark 5. Table A3.1 in the appendix to 
this chapter presents the relative weights employed. In constructing the weights, I use annual 
observations until 1988 to take into account East Germany, for which no observations are available 
after 1988.
"4Note that for the construction of relative output, seasonally adjusted series have been employed 
where possible. In the extended—i.e., non-G7—sample analyzed further below, some countries do 
not provide seasonally adjusted data, and the X - l l  filter has been used to smooth series (lines 
99BV P..).
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(see Table A3.3 in the appendix).25 Being aware of the problems deriving from the 
omission of the cointegrating relationship as a RHS variable, a VAR representation 
in first differences is chosen for the sake of a consistent specification across countries.
In the same win, The VARs, which were estimated for each country separately, 
included eight lags to obtain a specification free of residual aut ocorrelation and similar 
across countries.
3.4 Results
In this section, I present the results of the estimation. First, (accumulated) impulse 
responses of the current account to nominal shocks are compared across countries. 
Second, t he relat ive importance of supply, demand, and nominal shocks for the current 
account is described with the help of variance decompositions. Third, I extend the 
results to a larger sample by including most OECD economies.
3.4.1 Impulse Responses
To construct the impulse responses, every G-7 country is, in turn, assumed to be 
the “home’’ country; that, is, the rest-of-world aggregates stand for the other six 
large economies. Figures A3.1-A3.7 in the appendix present the accumulated impulse 
responses of the current account to a positive one-standard-deviation nominal shock.26 
There, t he middle line represents the accumulated response, while the upper and lower 
line indicate two standard error bands, calculated by Monte Carlo simulations (500 
replications).
The IRFs yield a few interesting results. First, all responses are strongly sig­
25A rudimentary cointegration analysis offered the following results. In Japan, the hypothesis 
of the current account being cointegrated with the relative price level could not be rejected at 
conventional levels. Furthermore, the price level seems to be weakly exogenous. In Germany, 
cointegration between the three series (and exogeneity of relative output) could not be rejected at 
conventional levels.
26Note the different scale of the graphs.
nificant. The particularly tight shape of the error bands is due to the ‘‘terminal 
condition,“ namely a zero response (and hence zero error) of the current account in 
the long run.
Second, the sliort-nm consequences of a nominal shock on the current account 
are strikingly dissimilar across countries. While Japan, the United States, and Italy 
display a lasting surplus, other countries— such as Canada and the United Kingdom— 
exhibit mere fluctuations around a balanced current account. On impact, the (accu­
mulated) impulse response in France and the United Kingdom is positive, negative for 
the rest. The latter reaction (if leading to a surplus) could be interpreted as a J-curve 
effect. In other words, an initial deficit after a devaluation is due to the immediate 
price effect , adjusting t he value of imports— while the quantity effect with expendit ure 
swit ching in favor of domestic goods manifests only sluggishly. Consistent with results 
in the literature—but contrary to what one would expect— the United States display 
a pronounced J-curve effect. The current account moves into surplus after roughly 
four quarters and remains positive (with the exception of one tick) for roughly four 
years.2, A similar surplus occurs also in Japan, but without initial deficit. Germany 
as well moves almost immediately into a quite persistent surplus, lasting for roughly 
ten quarters. The current account imbalances in Italy (and, to a lesser extent, in the 
United Kingdom) die out surprisingly slowly, indicating probably the lasting effect of 
the ERM exit in 1992.
To facilitate comparison betw’een graphs, Table 3.1 presents key statistics.2S Al> 
solute effects on the current account differ widely. Relative effects instead—that is,
Lane (2001b) finds results for the United States, which are very similar in shape, and only slightly 
more pronounced in size. This difference is due to somewhat different weights in constructing the 
RO W  series.
“?Note: gives the maximum current account surplus in response to a one-standard-
deviation nominal shock (multiplied by 100, i.e., in percent of the ratio current account to GDP). 
The second and third line put this number into context by relating it to the standard deviation of the 
country's current account measure. “Duration CAS'’ gives the duration (in quarters) of the current 
account surplus in which the maximum effect occurs. The last line gives the maximum durat ion of a 
current account surplus, bold indicating the cycle coincides with the maximum surplus. The second 
longest surplus duration is added in parenthesis.
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Table 3.1: Comparing Nominal Shocks
Canada France German}
Country"
Italy Japan UK US
C jW x IOO) 0.0419 0.0834 0.1445 0.1319 0.0345 0.0934 0.0107
& c a (  x 100) 0.4019 1.2313 2.1325 1.8917 0.3373 1.9344 0.2741
Rel. effect (%) 10.44 6.77 6.78 6.98 10.22 4.83 3.90
Duration CAS 4 8 9 oo oo (10) 28
Max. dur. (2nd) 5 (4 ) 12 (9) 9 ( 4 ) 11 (10) 28 (3)
scaled by the standard deviation of the current account measure—are of the same 
order of magnitude for all seven economies. The strongest responses of the current 
account occur in Canada and Japan, while figures for continental European countries 
are surprisingly similar to each other.
In terms of the model presented by Lane (2001b), for most countries no clear 
interpretation can be given since the inter- and intratemporal elasticities of substi­
tution are not meant to be varying over time; in other words, the current account is 
predicted to move only in one direction. The striking exemptions are Japan, and to 
a lesser extent Italy and the United States, where the current account surplus over 
the full time horizon documents a dominating intratemporal substitution effect. The 
spillover between non-traded and traded goods is negative, a consumption boom in 
the non-traded sector does not trigger higher imports. Hence, goods substitution due 
to the devaluation can play in favor of domestic goods, and a current account surplus 
is achieved.
Summing up, the dissimilarity of the current account adjustment across countries 
points to models that do not restrict its behavior (in one direction). It seems that 
different channels of monetary transmission across countries lead to varying degrees 
of expenditure switching. Three possible explanat ions are suggested.
First, some of the G-7 countries analyzed cannot be considered “small.*’ A sus­
tained current account imbalance might have wealth effects on labor supply (and 
hence relative output) triggered by its absolute size. For example, the U.S. current 
account deficit in 2000 amounted to USS 444.7 billion, or 4.5 percent of U.S. GDP,
6G
absorbing some 20 percent of worldwide saving. In an extension (section 3.4.3.2), the 
heterogeneity result will be “tested’’ in an augmented sample (14 additional OECD 
countries).
Second, the extent to which goods are priced in local currency bears heavily on 
the expenditure switching effect and, consequently, on the current account. More 
pronounced local currency pricing (in the partner country) limits the positive effect 
o f a devaluation on the current account (of the home country). In terms of the 
above empirical results, exporters from United Kingdom, Prance, and to some extent 
Canada appear somewhat more likely to price in local (foreign) currency than the 
exporters from the substantially stronger export performers United States, Japan, and 
Germany. In terms of the LCP vs. PCP discussion, this seems a reasonable conclusion 
that, can be explained by a combination of risk aversion on the exporters’ side and 
market power. For example, Donnenfeld and Haug (2003) also find evidence that 
“size matters;’’ that is, the larger the exporter’s country is relative to the importer’s 
country, the higher is the fraction of transactions invoiced in the former national 
currency.
Finally, the procedure implicitly assumes that the equilibrium current account is 
balanced (i.e., zero). It has been shown that this assumption does not necessarily 
hold true for a large number of economies, most notably the Unit ed States, which are 
prone to run a (sizeable) long-run equilibrium deficit.29
3.4.2 Variance Decompositions
In this section, I disentangle the relative importance of supply, absorption, and nom­
inal shocks in explaining the variance of the current account variable. More precisely, 
the outcomes of the variance decomposition represent the share of variance of the 
n-step forecast error of a variable that can be explained by the innoration in another
29A significant amount of research along these lines has been carried out at the International 
Monetary Fund, see Isard and Faruqee (1998) and Isard et d . (2001), as well as Dunaway ct d . 
(2001) for a discussion of the U.S. case. EFN  (2002) provides a brief survey.
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variable. This decomposition is based on the series used in the estimation process; 
that is, on the series in first differences.30 Table 3.2 gives a summary of the long-run 
decomposition (i.e., after 50 quarters) of the current account variable.
Table 3.2: Summary of Current Account Variance Decompositions (Diffs)
Country Std. error ( x 100) “Supply” "Absorption'’ "Nominar’
Canada 0.221 13.23 70.55 16.22
franco 0.G43 24.39 45.63 29.96
Germany 0.880 34.57 50.85 14.56
Italy 0.925 16.69 GO. 29 23.00
Japan 0.093 21.70 73.04 5.25
UK 0.957 15.33 76.37 8.29
US 0.079 33.46 42.71 23.82
Across all countries, shocks to the current account, itself (labeled “absorption’) are 
the most important, in explaining the forecast error, ranging from 76 percent in the 
United Kingdom (after 50 quarters), to 42 percent in the United States. On the other 
hand, the importance of nominal shocks for the CA varies from 5 percent (Japan) to 
30 percent (Prance). Over time— that is once the interaction between the variables 
is felt—the contribution of the nominal shock tends to rise, while the “own effect.” of 
the current account, decreases in all countries. This is particularly the case for France, 
Canada, and Italy. This evidence leads to conclude that shocks identified and labeled 
as “nominal” can explain, at least in some countries and to a noil-negligible degree, 
the unexpected variance of the current account.31
30See Tables A 3.4-A 3.I0  in the appendix of this chapter.
311 am, however, not able to reproduce the result by Lane (2001b), who found that monetary 
shocks contributed almost 50 percent to the variation of the U.S. current account at a horizon of up 
to 20 quarters.
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Table 3.3: Summary of Current Account Variance Decomposition (Levels)
Country Step Std error (xlOO) “Supply“ “Absorption” “Nominal”’
Canada 1 0.158 30.07 59.31 10.02
50 0.399 37.02 15.69 16.09
France 1 0.183 28.01 45.88 26.08
50 1.371 20.77 GG.G1 G.G3
Germany 1 0.721 57.28 41.82 0.90
50 2.201 43.90 44.04 11.10
Italy 1 0.721 6.98 92.62 0.40
50 1.784 18.53 01.42 20.05
Japan 1 0.0743 0.0G 53.03 46.91
50 0.229 38.70 51.15 7.15
UK 1 0.789 8.05 91.33 0.02
50 2.017 7.20 91.25 1.55
US 1 0.0035 0.21 27.72 72.07
50 0.231 30.92 42.90 2G.18
3.4.3 Robustness Checks and Extensions
3 .4 .3 .1  Stationarity of the Current Account
The empirical approach used in this chapter is subject to criticism. For example, 
considering the current account a non-stat ionary variable is an economically ques­
tionable assumption—even though descriptive statistics indicate this property of the 
time series. On theoretical grounds, a convincing case can be made for stationarity 
of the current account. Employment of first differences, and therefore “ovcrdifler- 
entiatioir implies a loss of statistical information. Since in the estimation the first 
difference has been used, the variance decomposition presented above allocates the 
forecast variance of the first difference of the current account to the various shocks. 
For this reason, I reestimated the systems employing the current account in levels, 
which yields the variance decompositions for the level of the current account (Table 
3.3).
A comparison of Table 3.3 with Table 3.2 in the preceding section reveals that for 
most countries, the contribution of nominal/monetary shocks in explaining the fore­
cast error of the current account level is similar to the contribution in first differences.
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The striking exception is France: if calculated for the level, monetary shocks are only 
able to explain about 7 percent of the forecast error at the 50-quarter horizon (instead 
of 30 percent in differences). This result can be interpreted as indirect evidence of 
the non-stationary of the French current account series: since the forecast error goes 
to infinity with the horizon when forecasting a non-stat ionary series, the contribution 
of nominal shocks (which are assumed to have no permanent effect) has to go to zero 
with the forecast horizon. On the other hand, there is no strong a priori- reason to 
believe that the French current account is characterized by weaker mean-reversion 
than the other countries’ series.
3.4 .3 .2  Beyond G -7: TVue Sm all Open Economics
In this section, the criticism of the “small-open-economy assumption’ is explored 
more seriously. In fact, the empirical estimation procedure does not rely on this 
assumption, but since many international economists are still used to thinking in the 
IS-LM framework and compare effective outcomes to those derived in this context, a 
word of caution is warranted. The United States is not a good example of a small 
open economy, nor are Japan and Germany. Therefore, I extend in this section 
the analysis to other OECD (but not G-7) countries.3“ To keep the data gathering 
tractable, I make one important assumption: the ROW series in this section are 
no longer constructed as the preceding section (i.e., excluding only the country in 
question); instead, the G-7 economies together are taken to represent the rest of 
world for all smaller countries.33 This pragmatic approach is motirated and validated
3'N ote that for data availability reasons, we exclude four recent (out of 30) OECD member 
countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovak Republic), as well as Iceland. Furthermore, 
Luxembourg was dropped because no separate trade data is available due to  the currency union with 
Belgium- The construction of a joint (i.e. Belgium and Luxembourg) series for prices and output 
provided little additional insight, given the very moderate weight of the latter in term of GDP in 
international prices (around 4 percent). Greece was eliminated due to missing comparable nominal 
quarterly GDP data (line 99B) on the IFS tape. The same holds for Ireland, where IFS data starts 
only in 1997, Norway is dismissed because it lacks current account data for 1992Q1-1993Q4. Data for 
Switzerland stem partly from the Swiss National Bank. This leaves 14 OECD but non-G7 countries.
33The according weights (in percent) are: Canada 4.37, US 45.93, Japan 15.62, France 8.15, 
Germany 11.19, Italy 7.18, UK 7.56.
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by the observation that the G-7 countries account on average for almost 80 percent 
of the total OECD output in international prices between 1973 and 1988.
In the appendix, Figures A3.8-A3.10 present the current account impulse re­
sponses of these 14 additional countries. The message from the empirical assessment 
is clear: there is no uniform pattern, in particular the J-curve effect found by Lane 
(2001b) for the United States, and confirmed in the previous section, arises in only two 
countries, Mexico and the Netherlands. Other countries, instead, exhibit sustained 
current account deficits after an initial surplus (e.g., Austria, Finland, or Korea), or 
even no significant surplus at all, as in the cases of Australia, Belgium, Portugal, or 
Switzerland. Hence no clear pattern emerges with regard to the pricing-to-market 
discussion in the broader sample.
3.5 Conclusion
Do nominal shocks have real effects, for example on the current account? If if so, are 
they similar to what Mundell (1963) predicted? To answer this question, the chapter 
investigated empirically whether relative nominal shocks have a short-run effect on 
the current account, imposing a long-run neutrality restriction A la Blanchard and 
Quail (1989) to identify structural shocks.
In the first part of this chapter, I reviewed theoretical contributions to the current 
account literature, including the fundamentally Keynesian expenditure switching ef­
fect in the classic Mundell-Fleming paradigm and the NO EM literature which enjoys 
growing support.
The empirical investigation in the second part builds on constructed time series 
that represent the economy's state relative to the rest of the (G-7) world. Due to the 
long-run identifying restrictions, “nominal shocks*’ can be separated from “supply’ 
and “real demand/absorption" shocks. I find that, the reaction of the current account 
is profoundly different across countries, ranging from a J-curve effect (United States.
Japan, Italy) to purely cyclical movements (United Kingdom, Canada). Furthermore, 
the importance of nominal shocks in explaining the current account varies across 
countries. However, it is never the main explanatory component. Extending the 
sample to other small OECD countries confirms the heterogeneity result.
From this exercise, the need emerges for microfounded (SOE) current account 
models that, stress country-specific particularities. One direction of future research 
would lead to a more elaborated modelling of nominal rigidities in general. Espe­
cially integrating the wage-setting process, which has been found to be particularly 
heterogenous across countries, could shed further light on the question why current 
account reactions are so different across countries. A second line of research could 
investigate further the somewhat inconclusive evidence regarding the interaction of 
producer vs. local currency pricing and the current account, by integrating the small 
open economy framework better with the pricing-toinarket paradigm to yield empir­
ically testable implications, for example along the lines of Bergin (2001). Choudri ct 
a l  (2002), and Monacelli (1999, 2003).
3.6 Appendices
3.6.1 Tables
Table A3.1: G DP Weight s for ROW Count ries
Relative weight of G-7 partner country"
Home country" Canada US Japan France Germany Italy UK
Canada 0.480 0.103 0.085 0.117 0.075 0.079
US 0.073 0.274 0.158 0.216 0.129 0.151
Japan 0.052 0.544 0.097 0.133 0.085 0.090
France 0.048 0.500 0.170 0.122 0.078 0.082
Germany 0.049 0.517 0.17G 0.092 0.081 0.085
Italy 0.047 0.495 0.168 0.088 0.121 0.081
UK 0.017 0.497 0.169 0.088 0.121 0.078
Note: Weights are construc ted  using d a ta  on per-capita GDP in international prices and 
population figures for th e  period 1973-88, taken from the Penn World Tables, mark 5.G. 
G erm any includes figures for E ast and West.
Tabic1 A3.2: Time Series Properties of the Data (Stationarity)
Canada France
(
Germany
Country
Italy Japan UK US
Levels
lo g (Y /Y ') -1.95 -2.78 -2.13 -3.97* -2.07 -3.51* -1.53
(C A /Y ) -2.22 -3.10 -1.79 -3.37 -2.63 -1.76 -1.76
lo g (P /P ') -0.74 -1.99 -2.69 -3.12 -2.47 -2.80 -3.96*
Differences
àlog  (Y /Y ’ ) -3.16* -3.96** -2.92* -3.75** -4.35** -3.37* -3.62**
A (C A /Y ) -5.99** -4.16** -3.53** -3.93** -4.27** -4.31** -3.44*
d lo g (P /P ’ ) -3.08* -2.94* -2.87 -2.67 -3.69** -2.97* -3.27*
Note: T he series were te s ted  for a u n it root using augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, imple­
m ented in PcGive. The null hypothesis is th a t  of a  unit root. In th e  error correction 
specification, this is rejected if the coefficient on the  lagged variable is negative and signifi­
cantly  different from zero. In  the table, the  test statistics of the coefficients are displayed. 
1 o r 2 s ta rs  exhibit significance a t the 5 o r 1 percent level. The critical values do not follow 
the conventional t-d istribu tion . For the  estim ation in levels, where a constan t and a trend  
have been included, the critica l values a re  -3.47 (5 percent) and -4.08 (1 percent). For the 
unit roo t test of first differences, only a constant has been included, and th e  corresponding 
critical values are -2.90 (5 percent) and -3.52 (1 percent).
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Table A3.3: Cointegration Properties of the Series in Levels
//o Canada France
Con
Germany
ntry
Italy Japan UK US Trace95
r =  0 25.25 22.34 39 .78 28.87 35 .93 20.75 21.78 29.4
r  <  1 13.74 9.71 10.46 11.68 11.41 6.14 5.16 15.3
r  <  2
Eigenva lues
4.41 3.07 4.51 2.06 0.22 1.75 0.07 3.8
0.148 0.160 0.331 0.212 0.288 0.183 0.20G
a2 0.121 0.088 0.079 0.125 0.144 0.059 0.068
^3 0.059 0.041 0.0G0 0.028 0.003 0.024 0.001
Note: T he trace s ta tis tic  seeks to identify how m any eigenvalues a re  significantly different 
from zero, in o ther words the num ber of dim ensions of the co in tegrating  space. J /o (r )  in ­
d icates the null hypothesis, the alternative being H\{r +  1). Here, Ai gives the eigenvalues 
o b ta in ed  in th e  process of the m axim ization of th e  likelihood function. They correspond 
to  squared canonical correlation coefficients and  indicate, roughly speaking, the degree of 
correlation between th e  stationary  p a rt o f the system  and th e  po ten tia lly  stationary  coin­
teg ra tin g  vector. A*f A =0.148 indicates therefore a  correlation of approxim ately 38 percent. 
Values in the tables ind icate the test s ta tis tic  from the PcFIM L o u tp u t (rejections in hold), 
an d  Trace95 gives the critical value, m ore precisely the 9o-pcrcent quan tile  of the likelihood 
ra tio  test for the cointegrating rank, taken  from Johansen (1996), Table 15.3.
Table A3.4: Variance Decomposition of the Current Account. (Canada)
Step Std. error ( x 100) “Supply" "Absorption'’ “Nominal'’
1 0.165 0.71 96.19 3.10
2 0.170 5.17 91.73 3.10
3 0.172 6.10 89.32 4.58
4 0.177 6.17 89.51 4.31
5 0.187 7.85 87.02 5.13
6 0.196 7.88 81.42 10.70
*7
t 0.202 12.47 76.83 10.70
8 0.202 12.44 76.92 10.65
9 0.205 13.67 75.32 11.01
10 0.211 13.27 74.53 12.2
50 0.221 13.23 70.55 16.22
Note: In Table A3.4-A3.10, the variance decom position of th e  G-7 curren t accounts are 
presented. To preserve space, the tables have been trunca ted  once reasonable convergence 
to  th e  long-run value was reached. For fu rther elaboration , please see tex t, section 3.4.
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Table A3.5: Variance Decomposition of the Current Account (Prance)
Step Std.error (xlOO) "Supply*' "Absorption" "Nominal”
1 0.484 18.14 69.44 12.42
2 0.5G3 18.55 53.95 27.48
3 0.570 18.08 53.93 27.98
4 0.584 21.01 51.90 27.08
5 0.592 20.96 51.08 27.94
6 O.G07 23.26 48.56 28.17
7 0.621 23.68 47.55 28.76
8 0.624 23.58 47.87 28.53
9 0.G2G 23.80 47.77 28.43
10 0.G28 23.59 47.37 29.04
50 0.G43 24.39 45.G3 29.96
Table A3.C: Variance Decomposition of the Current Account (Germany)
Step Std. error (xlOO) "Supply' "Absorption” "Nominal'’
1 0.654 25.75 69.47 4.77
2 0.G93 25.80 63.51 10.68
3 0.697 26.21 62.88 10.90
4 0.705 25.90 62.30 11.79
5 0.708 26.19 61.85 11.95
6 0.742 32.40 56.31 11.28
7 0.760 32.18 53.70 14.11
8 0.770 33.91 52.33 13.75
9 0.812 31.16 55.42 13.41
10 0.818 31.28 54.51 14.21
50 0.880 34.57 50.85 11.56
Table A3.7: Variance Decomposition of the Current Account (Italy)
Step Std. error (xlOO) “Supply*' “ Absorpt ion’ “Nominal"
1 0.722 6.17 76.20 17.62
*2 0.789 8.29 67.30 24.40
3 0.798 9.8G 66.08 24.04
4 0.831 16.26 61.04 22.69
5 0.832 16.35 60.97 22.67
6 0.831 16.35 60.82 22.82
7 0.835 16.30 60.81 22.87
8 0.841 16.40 60.72 22.87
9 0.8G9 15.43 62.89 21.67
10 0.887 14.80 62.31 22.88
50 0.925 16.69 60.29 23.00
Table A3.8: Variance Decomposition of the Current Account (Japan)
Step Std. error ( x 1ÜÜ) “Supply’ “Absorption’ “Nominal*’
1 0.0784 6.17 93.74 0.08
2 0.0835 12.39 8o.84 1.76
3 0.0863 15.19 80.49 4.31
4 0.0869 16.13 79.32 4.54
5 0.0875 15.93 79.53 4.53
6 0.0877 15.85 79.53 4.61
7 0.0892 17.86 77.44 4.69
8 0.0908 20.03 74.90 5.06
9 0.0912 19.86 75.10 5.02
10 0.0919 20.43 74.51 5.05
50 0.0934 21.70 73.04 5.25
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Table A3.9: Variance Decomposition of the Current Account (UK)
Step Std. error (xlOO) "Supply*7 "Absorption*7 "Nominal*7
1 0.794 8.39 90.88 0.71
2 0.82G 9.00 90.16 0.83
3 0.827 9.07 90.08 0.83
4 0.843 9.23 8G.93 3.83
5 0.873 13.G5 81.18 5.16
G 0.875 13.71 81.15 5.13
7 0.88G 14.61 79.83 5.54
8 0.893 14.47 79.76 5.75
9 0.92G 14.41 78.98 G.59
10 0.932 14.31 79.17 6.51
50 0.957 15.3 3 7G.37 8.29
Table A3,10: Variance Decomposition of the Current Account (US)
Step Std. error (xlOO) "Supply*7 "Absorption"7 "Nominal*7
1 0.0G68 33.72 45.06 21.21
2 0.0G91 34.33 45.52 20.14
3 0.0707 34.18 45.65 20.16
4 0.0738 34.44 43.16 22.40
5 0.0747 33.82 43.47 22.71
6 0.0752 33.65 43.09 23.26
7 0.0772 34.13 43.81 22.06
8 0.0780 33.59 43.25 23.15
9 0.0782 33.42 43.33 23.24
10 0.0787 33.48 42.93 23.59
50 0.0791 33.46 42.71 23.82
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3.6.2 Figures
3.G.2.1 G-7 Countries
Figure A3.1: Accumulated Impulse Response of the Canadian Current Account to a
Nominal Shock
Impulse response of current account
Accumulated nominal shocks. Canada
Note: In F igures A3.1-A 3.7, the m iddle line represents th e  (accum ulated) response of 
th e  curren t account to  a one standard  deviation nom inal shock as identified by the long-run 
restric tions. T he  two o u te r lines are ±  2 standard  error bands, ca lculated  by M onte Carlo 
sim ulations (500 replications).
Figure A3.2: France 
Impulse response of current account
Accumulated nomina/ shocks. France
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Figure A3.3: Germany
Impulse response of current account
Figure A3.4: Italy 
Impulse response of current account
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Figure A3.5: Japan
Impulse response of current account
Figure A3.6: United Kingdom 
Impulse response of current account
Accumulated nominal shocks, UK
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Figuro A3.7: United States
Impulse response of current account
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3.6 .2 .2  Extended OECD Sample
Figure A.3.8: Impulse Responses for Axistria, Australia, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, an South Korea
Nftptttat m p « n k «  of currant occow* imputa* fM pona* of currant account
Figure A3.9: Impulse Responses for Mexico, The Netherlands, New Zealand.
Portugal, Spain, and Sweden
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Figure A3.10: Impulse Responses for Switzerland and Turkey
Im pul» rvapOTt« of currant account bn puli« r ttp o n « * of currant account
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Chapter 4
Is the Output Gap Useful for 
Economic Policymaking?
"The quantification of potential output—and the accompanj’ing mea­
sure of the 'gap' between actual and potential—is at best an uncertain 
estimate and not a firm, precise measure."
(Arthur M. Okum 19G2)
4.1 Introduction
The output gap—which measure's the deviation of GDP from its potential—is a 
frequently-used indicator of the cyclical position and the degree of slack in the econ­
omy. Defined as the difference between actual and unobservable potential output, the 
output gap is itself an unobserved variable. There are numerous ways to calculate 
potential output, and, consequently, the corresponding output gap. In this chapter,1 
I investigati* how to calculate the output gap, whether outcomes are different across 
methodologies, and whether eventual differences matter. To this end, various mea­
sures of the* output gap—akin to different methodological approaches to determining
1A version of tin’s chapter was circulated previously under Billmeier (2001a).
potential output—are discussed for a small sample of European countries—Finland, 
France, Greece, Italy, and the United Kingdom.2 3*
Information on the cyclical position is important for a number of analytical rea­
sons. First, variations in output, when assessed relative to potential, have1 distinct 
implications for inflationary pressures in the economy.'1 Consequently, assessing the 
output gap is pivotal in the discussion of monetary policy, such as in the Taylor rule 
or in the inflation targeting (IT) framework (see chapter 2). Second, the cyclical 
position—as expressed by the size and sign of the output gap— is an important com­
ponent of calculating the "structural fiscal balance,'’ which aims to gauge the thrust 
of fiscal policy. Third, the magnitude of the output gap is relevant for assessing eco­
nomic growth and its components— that is, it helps to evaluate whether variations in 
actual growth can be attributed to cyclical factors (such as slow growth in trading 
partner economies) or to a longer-term change in potential growth. , • ,
The use (and abuse) of the output gap in policymaking and -prescribing is man­
ifold. In the field of monetary policy, much of the discussion over the last decade or 
so has focused on the advantages of rules (as opposed to discretion) and all major 
monetary policy regimes rely—at least implicitly—on some form of the output gap. 
In a seminal paper, Taylor (1993) proposed a simple instrument rule that tracks U.S. 
monetary policy surprisingly well during the 1980s and early 1990s. In the simplest 
form of the rule, interest rates are adjusted according to deviations of inflation from 
a target level and of output from its trend—-that is, the output gap. Since then, 
uncountable papers haw investigated related issues.1 Although the Taylor rule is a
"In other words, this sample of countries represents a relatively heterogenous set of small and 
large European economies, including the European G-7 economies with the except ion of Germany 
due to data problems.
3This is particularly obvious in the definition of potential output contained in Okun (1902): 
"...the maximum production without inflationary pressure; or, more precisely, a point of balance 
between more output and greater stability."
■* Svensson (2003) provides an extensive survey. More specifically, the cousc(|uenccs of output gap 
uncertainty for the Taylor rule are discussed by Smets (1998) for the United States, and bv Ehrmann 
and Smets (2003) and Eleftherion (2003) for the Euro area.
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simplistic—and fundamentally descriptive— policy framework, the output gap is, in 
fact, regarded as important in gauging the outlook for price developments in the Euro 
area and the United States.0 It has also been recognized that—notwithstanding the 
terminology—the output gap plays an important role in Inflation Targeting, at least 
in its "flexible" form, see Svensson (1990). For the Euro area. Gerlach and Svensson 
('2003) attribute greater importance to the output gap than to money growth as an 
indicator for future inflation.
He garding fiscal policy matters, the concept of the output gap has acquired 
operational—but not legal— status in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) of the 
European Union to calculate annual fiscal balances, and much public attention has 
Ih'ou dedicated to the enforcement of t he Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP)/' In fact, 
there is a growing discussion on the need to recast the SGP in terms of “structural" 
instead of “medium-term" fiscal balance; see, for example, Begg cl al. (2002). The 
crucial question, therefore, is whether commonly computed output gap measures form 
a solid basis for calculat ing structural balances.
Prom a growth accounting perspective, potential output is a combination of vari­
ous factors of production, including technological progress/the Solow residual.5 67 Since 
this is not the focus of the chapter, I will not explore this argument further.
The main results of this chapter are that output gap measures can yield wry 
different outcomes, depending on the met hod used to determine potential output and 
that care should be exercised when dealing with output gap measures—and devising 
policy recommendations based on them. Moreover, there appears to be no a priori 
reason to prefer one measure over another (absent methodological issues, such as
5See, for example, ECB (2000) and FRB (2001). For a similar statement regarding monetary 
policy in New Zealand, see Claus (2000).
6T he report of the Economic Policy Committee acknowledges the output gap as an essential— 
but so far only intermediate— input for assessing the progress made by member countries towards 
achieving the goal of medium-term fiscal balance; see European Commission (2001). Moreover, the 
report specifies that the production function approach be the one used for policy assessments by the 
Commission.
' See Solow (105G).
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inconsistency of a particular method with economic priors).
As a corollary, and to gain further insight, an econometric evaluation is carried 
out by a simulated out-of-sample forecasting exercise in a Phillips curve framework, 
which relates the inflation rate to the output gap. If the output gap, in fact, measures 
domestic inflationary pressures, then a simple autoregressive inflation forecast could 
be improved by taking into account the information stemming from the output gap. 
For the forecast period 1990-2002, models are estimated recursively with (real-time) 
data up to the last year of forecast period—that is, the last observation increases by 
one year with every iteration—and the one-year-ahead predicted inflation is compared 
with actual inflation.8 Based on this evaluation, the output gap is not always a useful 
measure to gauge domestic inflationary pressures, and no specific measure (in this 
sample) consistently dominates all other measures or a univariate forecast.
From an empirical perspective, the analysis of output gaps using quarterly (or 
higher frequency) data would constitute an exercise more consistent with the setup 
of monetary policy making, because policy decisions are frequent: monthly for the 
European Central Bank and the Bank of England, and roughly every seven weeks for 
the Fed's FOMC. However, employing quarterly data comes at a cost that is often 
overlooked. In fact, data revisions, in particular to quarterly GDP data, are common 
and sometimes substantial. To minimize the impact of data revisions, I focus in what 
follows on annual observations.9 Consequently, the results reported below will be
?The evaluation period, 1900-2002, is economically rather interesting in Europe: Finland experi­
enced a major crisis after asset prices collapsed, and Italy and the UK exited from the ERM.
9 Alternatively, real-time datasets could be analyzed, see Orphan ides (2001). Gerlach (2001) offers 
vet another way to circumvent the data revision problem related to output gaps. He suggests that 
in line with his reading of the editorial remarks routinely issued by the EC B 's Governing Council, 
frequently-revised output gaps could be substituted by an economic sentiment indicator, which (i) 
is not subject to revision and (ii) appears to be a leading indicator of two output gap measures in 
the euro area. While intriguing from a pragmatic perspective, this approach does not tackle another 
issue addressed in this chapter: the inconsistency of indicators. Different sentiment indicators can 
be, a priori, as dissonant as the gap measures employed in this chapter. Moreover, Orphanides 
and van Norden (2002) show that ex-post revisions of output gap estimates for quarterly U.S. GNP 
data are of the same order of magnitude as the gap itself. The bulk of the revisions is attributed
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more relevant in the context of fiscal—rather than monetary—policymaking.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the 
literature. Section 4.3 reviews briefly the various output gap measures, and section 4.1 
compares them descriptively. Section 4.5 provides the empirical evaluation. Section 
4.6 concludes, and section 4.7 contains the appendices to this chapter.
4.2 A Look at the Literature
General research on the output gap started probably with Okun (1902) and has bœn 
abundant ever since.10 Koughly speaking, two broad approaches have bœn followed in 
the literature to estimate potential output and the output gap. The first is based on 
the statistical properties of the underlying GDP series. The second, instead, estimates 
potential output on the basis of an economic model. As argued in Scacciavillani and 
Swagel (1999), these different techniques can be viewed as akin to different, economic 
concepts of potential output.
Under the first approach, potential output is driven by productivity shocks, and 
temporary deviations of actual output result from private agents' decisions to re­
allocate resources in response to these shocks. Given this (neoclassical) reasoning, 
potential output coincides with the underlying trend of actual output, and the chal­
lenge in estimating the output gap is to separate longer-run changes in the trend 
from short-lived (temporary) movements around potential. The univariate statistical 
measures described in Section 4.3 to identify potential output can be traced back to 
the familiar contribution by Hodrick and Prescott (1997), as well as to Corbae and 
Ouliaris (2002). The latter authors use frequency domain methods to extract infor­
mation on the business cycle (and, by implication, the underlying trend) properties
to unreliable end-sample estimates, however, not revisions of published data. Finally, the ex-post 
correspondence of output gap measures and a sentiment indicator in the euro area may have been 
an empirical coincidente anti may not hold in a different sample.
10 See, for example, Kuttner (1994) and Cot is ( i al. (forthcoming) for reviews.
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of GDP.
Under tho second approach—somewhat closer to the Keynesian tradition—business 
cycle swings and hence the gap between actual and potential output reflect demand- 
determined actual output fluctuating around a slowly moving level of aggregate su]> 
ply. Tlius. any measure of the output gap should account for underemployed re­
sources. in particular in the labor market. This can be done by using an underlying 
model t hat describes relevant aspects of the economy. The model-based approaches 
in the next section relate to Blanchard and Quah (1980), and to the large strand of 
the literature that focuses on the production function approach to potential output. 
Contributions include early research done at the IMF such as Art us (1977) and, more 
recently, De Masi (1997). Proietti, ct al. (2002) evaluate unobserved components 
models based on the production function approach for the Euro area as a whole. 
The implementation of the production function approach follows closely the latent 
variable approach, developed in Kuttiler (1991) and further refined by the European 
Commission,11
While this selection of output gap measures is by no means exhaustive, it brings 
together some of the most well-known approaches and—given the results—suffices for 
the purposes of this analysis,1 2
In Section -1,5, the various output gap estimates are compared in an inflation- 
forecasting framework similar to Stock and Watson (1999), who investigate forecasts 
of U.S, inflation at the 12-month horizon, using information from 108 additional indi­
cators of economic activity including output gap estimates. In this chapter, however, 
I focus exclusively on output gap measures and the spirit of the analysis is, therefore, 
more related to comparative output gap studies such as Scaeciavillani anti Swagel
11 See, e.g., Denis et al. (2002).
12For example, we do not analyze the class of factor-based forecasts; see the series of papers by 
Stock and Watson (1989, 1991, 1999). Another common decomposition, pioneered by Beveridge and 
Nelson (1981), is omitted due to insufficient data.
(1900), Cerra and Saxena (2000), Claus, ct a l. (2000), Bolt and van Els (2000), and 
Ross and Ubide (2001), who, respectively, compare measures for Israel, Sweden, New 
Zealand, euro area countries, and the euro area as a whole. Recent contributions that 
evaluate inflation forecasts for the United States and Australia based on real-time es­
timates of the output gap include Orphan ides and ran Xorden (2002) and Robinson 
ct al. (2003). Finally, the statistical test of forecast performance used below is based 
on Diebold and Mariano (1995).13
4.3 Output Gap Measures
The four measures considered decompose a time series (here output, yt) additively 
into a cyclical component , y\ and a trend component, y*:
vt = y rt +  !/(. (4.1)
The trend component is assumed to coincide with potential output, that is the amount 
of output that can be achieved under normal capacity utilization and given the con­
straints in the labor market, in particular given the natural rate of unemployment. 
Accordingly, the output gap measures the relative distance of actual output from 
trend (the "smoothed" series), that is, the cyclical component:
gapt = V t  -  V t  
V t
Vt_
V't
(4.2)
The gap measures fall into two broad categories: (univariate) statistical filters, and 
more theory-related measures based on an underlying economic model.14 Statistical
13An inflation-forecasting framework is clearly not the only way to conijiare output gap measures. 
Alternatively, one could ask whether they have predictive value for certain types of tax revenues or 
cyclical expenditure items. Moreover, the gap should probably correlate with firms7 pricing/mark-up 
strategy. While interesting, these hypotheses are not explored in this chapter.
14 The output gap measures considered differ is the amount of parameters estimated. The issue of 
]>arameter instability due to the relatively short estimation period is acknowledged, but not pursued
filters can extract information either in the conventional time domain—exemplified 
by the version of the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter used below— or in the frequency 
domain. The frequency domain approach is represented by a filtering method recently 
developed by Corbae and Ouliaris (2002), drawing on earlier results by Corbac ct al. 
(2002).
Among the many measures of potential output that rely to a larger extent on 
economic theory, this chapter evaluates the permanent-transitory decomposition by 
Blanchard and Quail (1989) and the production function approach. In the cast? of the 
Blanchard-Quali routine, the economic reasoning is tied to the conventional distinc­
tion of “demand” versus “supply” shocks, whereas the production function method­
ology is based on a model of the aggregate production structure of the economy.
4.3.1 The Hodrick-Prescott Filter
The Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter is probably the most well-known and most widely 
used statistical filter to obtain a smooth estimate of the long-term trend component of 
a macroeconomic series. This is chiefly due to its simplicity, but also to the fact that, 
for the United States, business cycle movements can be extracted using this filter 
that resemble the NBER-backed definitions (see Canova (1999)). The HP filter is a 
linear, two-sided filter that computes the smoothed series by minimizing the squared 
distance between trend (?/*) and the actual series (yt), subject to a penalty on the 
second difference of the smoothed series:
r - i
— 2/t*)2 +  ^
t~2
(4.3)
The penalty parameter, A, controls the smoothness of the series by setting the ratio 
of the variance of the cyclical component and the variation in the second difference
further.
of the actual series. A higher value for A implies a smoother trend (and, hence, more 
volatile gaps). In the extreme case of A —► oo, the trend is a straight line. The 
standard value in the literature is A =  100 for annual data, which is also assumed as 
a base case in what follows.15
In a policy-related context, the traditional Ilodrick-Prescott measure; poses a sul> 
stantial problem: the filter as described above is fundamentally a twosided filter, 
that is, computation of the underlying trend at time f is based on observations before 
and after  period i. Economic policymakers, instead, will—at the time of decision- 
making—only dispose of an estimate of the output gap that is based on a purely 
backward-looking evaluation of potential output. To avoid this inconsistency, this 
chapter uses a "real-time5 output gap series, H P.rt, that is constructed based on 
the conventional IIP filter. This new scries consists of “last observations,” that is, 
real-time estimates of the underlying trend in the last observation period t given the 
information set in period t.
This way to proceed is subject to two important caveats. First, an observation for 
output produced in period t has to be a prediction while the economy is still in period 
t and will bo finally observed only in t +  1 (for example, data on 1900 GDP is only 
issued (at best) in the course of 2000). Second, data may be revised in later periods. I 
abstract from these important details, since the empirical analysis will build on yearly 
observations, implying that by the end of a given year, the first three quarters of the 
yearly figure for output have* already been observ'd and provide a sound footing for 
an end-year estimate. Annual data are also less likely to be affected by substantial 
data revisions since these revisions usually occur in the periods immediately following 
the (quarterly) observation, hence, mostly before the end of the calendar year. In 
addition, revisions due to seasonal factors are limited for annual data.
15This follows Ilodrick and Prescott (1907) and was already implicitly argued by bums and 
Mitchell (1 9 1G); see Section 1.5.3.1 for a robustness check regarding the value of A. Itoss and Vbide 
(2001) discuss alternative approaches to determine the parameter X endogenously.
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Other prominent drawbacks of the HP filter (in the version described above) have 
been documented in the literature and include the possibility of finding spurious 
cycles for integrated series, the somewhat arbitrary choice of A, as well as the neglect 
of structural breaks and shifts.16
4.3.2 The Frequency Domain Approach
Economic fluctuations occur at different- frequencies (displaying, for instance, sea­
sonal, or business cycle duration). Starting from the classical assumption contained 
in Burns and Mitchell (1046) that the duration of business cycles takes between G and 
32 quarters, the approach to extracting those cycles from a stationary time' series is 
relatively straightforward from the frequency domain perspective. The original series 
should be filtered in such a way that fluctuations below or above a certain frequency 
are eliminated.
This can be achieved with the help of an exact band-pass filter (B IT * 1). An exact 
B P F  acts in principle as a double filter: it eliminates frequencies outside (that is 
below and above) a specified range, here the business cycle frequency. For estimation 
purposes, however, these filters are. usually spelled out in the time domain, since 
integrated series—such as real GDP— could traditionally not be handled by frequency 
domain approaches.1' However, transformation of the exact band-pass filter back into 
the time domain results in a moving average process of infinite order. For this reason. 
Baxter and King (1990) and others have provided time domain approximations to
10See, e.g., Harvey and Jaeger (1993), King and Rebclo (1993), and Cogley and Nason (1995) 
for overviews of (he shortcomings. Bilhneier (200-lb) provides an illustration of another problem 
of the HP filter, the end-sample bias. The discussion of the optimal A is circumvented here by 
comparing three values, see section 1.5.3.1. Ravn and Uhlig (2002) argue a value of 6.25 for annual 
observations, based on the assumption that A — 1000 is the optimal value for quarterly data (which 
is not necessarily true for our sample). Artis d  al. (2002) argue the superiority of the band-pass 
version of the llP-filter.
l ‘ As Corbae and Ouliaris (2002) explain, this is due to a "leakage problem:" the frequency 
responses generated by the discrete Fourier transform of an 1(1) process are dependent across fun­
damental frequencies.
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the exact band pass filter capable of dealing with integrated series. Their method 
involves a trade-ofi between the quality of approximation and the ability to smooth 
the series at the extreme points of the sample, since every additional lag employed in 
the estimation process improves the filter but translates into one lost observation at 
either end of the series. This, in turn, substantially diminishes the attractiveness of 
this class of filters for policy-related analysis. Alternatively, the estimation can take 
place directly in the frequency domain. According to Baxter and King, pre-filtering 
of the non-stationary series is required to remove stochastic trends and, hence, avoid 
the leakage problem with integrated series. They argue that upfront detrending of the 
series in order to apply discrete Fourier transforms involves a discretionary choice of 
th«' detrending method, whereas the symmetric moving average approximation would 
successfully remove any deterministic or stochastic trends up to second order.
In this context. Cbrbae and Ouliaris (2002) provide a frequency domain fix for the 
leakage problem and, hence, a consistent band pass filter for non-stationary data. In 
addition, the filter does not involve a loss of observations at either end—a property 
highly relevant ior policy making.1S In the base case econometric evaluation in Section 
1.0.2, a business cycle duration between 2 and 8 years is assumed,KJ
While the major advantage of the frequency domain approach and, indeed, other 
statistical methods not mentioned here such as arithmetic detrending is their simplic­
ity, they are subject, to the criticism of lacking foundat ion in economic theory. Thus, 
the next two sections turn to t hinny-based models of trend GDP and the output gap.
4.3.3 The Blanchard-Quah Decomposition
The appeal of the approach by Blanchard and Quail (1989) to the identification 
of structural shocks in a VA11 stems from its compatibility with a wide array of
,? See Corbae and Ouliaris (2002) for a technical description of tin* filter and its small sample 
properties, and Corbae f t al. (2002) for the analysis of the asymptotic case.
^Robustness checks are contained in section 4.5.3.1.
theoretical models. In a bivariate system, structural supply and demand shocks are 
identified by assuming that the former have a permanent impact on output , while the 
latter can only have a temporary effect. In particular, two types of (uncorrelated) 
structural disturbances are postulated, which possibly affect two time series, (log) 
real GDP and the unemployment rate. The following assumptions identify these 
disturbances: no disturbance has long-run effects on the time series employed in the 
estimation, more precisely on the first differences of the original time series (i.e., 
growth rates are stationary). Furthermore, disturbances to (the growth rate of) real 
GDP may have long-run effects on the level of both series, while disturbances to the 
unemployment rate are restricted to not having long-run effects on the level of output . 
These assumptions technically identify the shocks. Given the chosen structure, it 
seems natural to label the shocks as supply and demand shocks.20
In the present context, potential output is associated with cumulated supply 
shocks, whereas the output gap reflects cyclical (temporary) swings in aggregate 
demand. This approach, hence, benefits from explicit economic foundations. Fur­
thermore, the gap— identified as the demand component of output—is not subject to 
any end-sample bias. However, the identification scheme employed may not be appro­
priate under all circumstances, in particular if the variable representing demand (here 
the unemployment rate) does not provide a good indication of the cyclical behavior 
of output. Finally, given the orthogonality assumption on the structural shocks, the 
amount of variables also determines the number of shocks present in the system. Con­
versely, there are clearly shocks that, have a supply as well as a demand component, 
for instance, public infrastructure investment .
The VAR models estimated include, in addition to a constant , up to four lags of 
the endogenous variables, as indicated by information criteria. No residual autocor­
relation was present in the specifications chosen.
20The empirical set-up has been documented numerous times in the literature, see, e.g., the 
previous chapter and the literature cited therein for a more detailed description of the approach in 
the context of a three-variable model.
4.3.4 The Production Function Approach
A way to circumvent the problem of assigning shocks to demand or supply origins 
is to start from a growth-accounting perspective. The production function approach 
describes a functional relationship between output and factor inputs. While the 
method as such is not new, recent focus on the input factors, in particular labor, has 
triggered new interest in the subject. I describe both issues in turn.
4 .3 .4 .1  The In p u t-O u tp u t Relationship
Output is at its potential if the rates of capacity utilization are normal; that is, 
labor input is consistent with the natural rate of unemployment and technological 
progress/total factor productivity is at its trend level. A convenient functional form 
is the Cobb-Douglas type, where output Yt depends on labor L t and capital K t , as 
well as the level of total factor productivity T F P t:
Y, =  T F P tK?L%. ('1.4)
Assuming constant returns to scale implies that a + f i  = 1; under perfect competition, 
a  corresponds to the share of capital income, and ¡3 — 1 — a  to the share of labor. 
Since total factor productivity is not observable, it is usually derived as a residual 
from the above equation:
tfpt = V t -  Oikt -  (1 -  a )lt (4.5)
where variables in small caps are in logs. Log trend T F P , t fp % is then obtained by 
appropriately smoothing this residual series, for instance by a HP filter. Potential 
labor input L* is taken to be the level of employment consistent with the (time- 
varying) natural rate of unemployment UR*:
L*t =  L F t (1 -  UR't ) (4.6)
97
where L F t is the labor force. Potential output can be written (in logs) as:
y*t =  a k t +  (1 -  a)l*t + (4.7)
The most important advantage of the production function approach lies in its 
tractability together with the possibility to account explicitly for different sources of 
growth. For instance, the dynamic growth of the Finnish ICT sector during the second 
half of the 1990s had been mostly driven by potential growth from a productivity 
point of view and, hence, had resulted in a rather small output gap (see Section 
4.4.2). Moreover, the strong movements of the unemployment rate since the Finnish 
crisis in the early 1990s convey valuable information on labor market conditions. 
Important shortcomings of the approach include the dependence on a number of 
crucial assumptions, e.g., (constant.) shares of capital and labor, and the functional 
form of the production relationship (number of input factors, returns to scale). In 
addition, data requirements can pose significant problems; for example, the capital 
stock is difficult to measure consistently, in particular at a frequency other than 
annual.
4.3.4.2 Factor Inputs and the N A W R U
A crucial feature of this approach is the reliance on filtered factor input series, in 
particular the trend total factor productivity and the natural rate of unemployment. 
Given the assumption that capital is always employed at. full potential, however, 
no capacity adjustment is usually made to the capital stock.21 The natural rate 
of unemployment can be derived in a number of ways, for example by IlP-filtering 
the observed unemployment rate.22 However, the approach can also be implemented
21 hi other words, the full-capacity stock of capital is usually approximated by the actual stock of 
capital. Art us (1977) provides an early attem pt to  account for capacity usage. For a more recent 
approach, using French data on capital operating time, see Everaert and Nadal-De Simone (*2003).
22Of course, the choice of a filter to detrend the unemployment rate and T F P  adds an element of 
discretion.
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more flexibly by using more sophisticated filtering procedures, including those that 
incorporate themselves structural assumptions based on economic theory. Here, the 
calculation of the output gap using the production function approach emphasizes the 
derivation of the NAWRU (non-accelerating wage inflation rate of unemployment) 
as a latent variable following Kuttner (1994).23 Prom a conceptual point of view, 
however, this approach rests on the premise that a natural rate of unemployment 
exists, in other words that the Phillips curve is vertical at said natural rate. This 
holds true for the countries in the sample (see appendix 4.7.1).
Under the latent variable approach, the natural rate of unemployment—defined 
here as the NAWRU— is computed using a Kalman filtering process on the observ­
able unemployment rate to extract the cyclical component. The procedure employs 
a bivariate model, where the observables ‘'unemployment rate” and “change in wage 
inflation” (that is, second differences of wages) play the role of endogenous vari­
ables. While the first equation contains a simple decomposition of the observed un­
employment rate in trend and cyclical component, the second equation—in principle 
a Phillips curve—relates the wage inflation to a number of regressors, including lags 
of wage inflation and the cyclical component of unemployment. Given the error term, 
wage inflation is assumed to follow an ARM A process. The trend unemployment 
rate, in turn, serves to determine the (full-employment) stock of labor entering the 
production function. Estimation takes place in the state-space form, some exogenous 
regressors (such as a variable reflecting terms of trade) are added for some countries 
to (marginally) improve the statistical fit.2*1 234
23This approach was recently adopted by the European Commission, see Denis et al. (2002) and 
Planas and Rossi (2003). In the Commission’s work, the new methodology substitutes for more 
"traditional'’ approaches— such as the Hodrick-Prescott filter—and, at the same time, unifies the 
Commission's efforts toward a consistent representation of business cycles in the member countries,
24A more detailed description of the model set-up can be found in appendix 4.7.2. In the ter­
minology of the European Commission, the NAWRU model is known as the “GAP model.'’ In a 
related paper, Billmeier (2004b), it is shown that both the assumed representation of wage inflation 
and the inclusion of additional regressors can have substantial impact on trend unemployment .
99
4.4 Comparing Output Gaps
In this section, the output gap measures are compared descriptively. The data on 
real GDP for the five countries in the sample (Finland, FVance, Greece, Italy, and 
the United Kingdom) are annual and stem largely from the European Commission's 
database, as does the unemployment rate representing the demand side-related vari­
able in the Blanchard-Quail decomposition. The same holds true for the variables 
used to determine the NAYVRU and, ultimately, the output gap according to the 
production function approach. The price indices used in the in flat ion-forecasting 
exercise in Sections 4.5.2 and 4.5.3.3 come from the International Monetary Fund’s 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) database.25
4.4.1 Descriptive Priors
Descriptively, the mean of the gap measure should be close to zero over longer time 
horizons. Also, an extended period—say, more then 15 years— of expansion or con­
traction would run counter to the concept of the business cycle per se. Finally, the 
measure should capture a number of stylized facts, in line with traditional descrip­
tions of economic activity in the respective country. In Finland, for example, the 
measure should reflect, the low-inflation boom in the late 1980s and the subsequent 
overheating; the near-collapse of economic activity during the crisis j>eriod 1990-93; 
and, again, the period of strong economic growth during the late 1990s, driven, at 
first, by the economic recovery and, later, by the information and communication 
technology (ICT) boom. In both Italy and the United Kingdom, a major recession 
preceded the exit from the EMS in the early 1990s. Most, approaches—albeit to 
varying degrees—reproduce these stylized facts,
25The CPI corresponds to IFS line 61...ZF, the G DP deflator to line 99BIRZF.
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Table 1.1. left panel, presents descriptive statistics for the four standard output gap 
estimates considered above (and reproduced graphically in Appendix -1.7.4). In the 
right panel, a correlation matrix, statistics below the main diagonal represent simple 
correlations of the main gap measures in levels to gauge the similarity of gap measures. 
Tlw* upper triangle, instead, offers correlations of first differences, which indicate 
whether the gap measures convey the same directional message, that is. whether 
the economy is improving or not. A number of observations can be made. First, 
most gaps—with the possible exception of the one based on the BQ decomposition— 
are centered around zero. Maxima and minima seein to be in a reasonable range 
and speak—together with the standard deviation—of the more or less bumpy road 
the sample countries have travelled down. Particularly interesting in this context 
is France, where the consistently lowest variation in the sample reflects relatively 
smooth economic growth, close to potential. The opposite is represented by Finland. 
Bot h t he extrema and the surprisingly high standard deviation reflect the boom-bust 
cycle in t he early 1900s, when a period of strong expansion ended and an economic 
downturn, unrivaled among OECD countries after WWII, set in.2e
Another striking feature of the table is that the 2002 gap estimates are not consis­
tently positive or negative for any single country. This intrinsic uncertainty regarding 
the output gap is also reflected in the sometimes surprisingly low correlations between 
the various measures. Across countries, the BQ decomposition seems to yield an out­
put gap measure that is somewhat “distinct*’ from the other three. This is true for 
correlations in levels and first differences.
Figures A l.l-A l.d  in the appendix present the output gap measures for the five 
countries in the sample. The above-mentioned boom-and-bust cycle in Finland in the 26
4.4 .2  Descriptive Assessment
26See Berger ami Billmeier (2003) for a more detailed evaluation of the Finnish experience. 
Output gap in 2002.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Output Gap Statistics, 1960-2002
Sam ple s ta tis tic s  Correlations
M ean Min Max SD G a p -7 HPlOOrt P F BQ FD2-8
HPlOOrt 0.08 -7,44 5.77 3.20
F in lan d
-0.25 1 0.94 0.44 0.83
P F -0.08 -6.49 6.43 3.00 -1.55 0.82 1 0.48 0.87
BQ -0.38 -9.52 4.00 3.27 1.06 0.09 0.27 1 0.48
FD2-8 0.00 -5.32 5.06 2.61 -1.42 0.57 0.70 0.35 1
HPlOOrt 0.07 -2.74 2.81 1.41
F rance
0.46 1 0.90 0.18 0.88
P F -0.13 -2.72 2.81 1.43 0.07 0.81 1 0.01 0.79
BQ 0.22 -1.11 2.70 0.99 0.66 0.36 0.26 1 0.17
FD2-8 0.00 -2.44 2.07 1.01 -0.90 0.66 0.50 0.08 1
HPlOOrt 0.00 -5.04 5.40 2.36
G reece
2.78 1 0.96 -0.05 0.95
P F 0.69 -3.19 4.65 4.83 0.42 0.77 1 0.09 0.91
BQ -0.43 -8.13 8.59 3.23 -0.12 -0.32 0.12 1 -0.09
FD2-8 -0.04 -3.89 5.19 1.84 0.61 0.68 0.62 -0.12 1
HPlOOrt -0.07 -7.12 3.33 1.95
Ita ly
-0.28 1 0.78 -0.17 0.83
P F -.34 -4.76 3.02 1.85 -0.81 0.66 1 0.32 0.72
BQ 0.96 -5.51 5.54 3.98 0.22 0.11 0.20 1 -0.30
FD2-8 -0.00 -4.14 3.57 1.53 -0.53 0.55 0.50 -0.08 1
HPlOOrt 0.06 -3.79 5.21
U nited  Kingdom  
1.86 0.00 1 0.98 0.55 0.92
P F -0.09 -4.18 5.32 1.99 -0.78 0.92 1 0.47 0.89
BQ -0.38 -9.32 4.00 3.27 1.06 0.64 0.57 1 0.54
FD2-8 0.06 -3.09 4.57 1.47 0.44 0.70 0.64 0.43 1
Notes: HPlOOrt, real-tim e H odrick P resco tt filter; PF, production  function approach; 
BQ, B lanchard-Q uah decom position; FD 2-8, frequency dom ain filter. In the right 
panel, th e  lower triangle gives level, the u p p er triangle first-difference correlations.
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early 1990s is clearly visible, as are the causes and consequences of exiting the EHM 
for Italy and the United Kingdom. For most countries, the dispersion of gai» measures 
seems to increase toward the end of the sample period, with Greece lx*ing a partic- 
ularly good example. The generally low correlation of the Iilanchard-Quah-basc*d 
measure is clearly visible, especially, again, in Greece. The figurt's and corn^xHiding 
cross-country correlations (not presented here) also document the role of G rew  and, 
to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom as outliers from the "European" business 
cycle.2S *
An additional descriptive statistic—measuring the consistency of gap signals— 
yields broadly similar results (See Table B4.1 in the ap]x*ndix). This measure is 
constructed as the share of total observations in which two gap measures givi* the 
same cyclical (i.e., boom or bust) signal.29 Similar to the correlation statistics, the HQ 
measure again displays the lowest consistency with other measures for most count ries.
Summing up the descriptive statistics, it does matter how the out ¡nit gap measure 
is constructed. In fact, there appears to be a surprising heterogeneity across gaps for 
a given country. In addition, there is no a priori reason to rely on one six*cific 
measure as opposed to another. From a policymaking perspective, this is bad news: 
Diverging quantitative information on the output gap could be taken into account in 
more gradual policy responses, but if it is not clear whether the gap is ]x>sitive or 
negative, few policy recommendations can be derived from such a measure.
2-For both countries (and across all gap measures), the degree of business cycle integration did not
increase substantially after 1990 when compared to pre-1990 (with the except ion of the U.K.-Finnish
cycles). While an interesting subject in itself, the issue of business cycle synchronization is beyond
the scope of this paper.
29This measure differs from the first difference of the gap considered above in that two measures 
could signal an improvement (Agap > 0 )  but not necessarily the same cyclical |>ositioti (negative 
vs. positive gap).
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4.5 A Corollary: Using Output Gaps to Forecast
Inflation
As a corollary, I use a simple forecasting exercise to gauge the quality of the out­
put gap measures as indicators for inflation. While not intended as a full-fledged 
inflat ion-forecasting model, the set-up is common in the literature to evaluate infla­
tion indicators.30 The approach clearly offers shortcomings compared to more elal>- 
orate inflat ion-forecasting frameworks, in particular those relying on a broader set 
of variables.31 * In particular, the usefulness of the output gap measures themselves 
may depend on other information included in the forecasting exercise.33 As such, 
this approach cannot be expected to provide the best inflation forecast possible and 
should, hence, be only taken as one possible way to evaluate the quality of output, 
gaps as indicators for inflation and as an illustration of the results in Section 4.4.
Moreover, due to the policy perspective taken in this chapter, I abstract from 
one important issue: short-run inflationary pressures— as measured by the output 
gap— may only be one out of many competing factors that contribute to inflation. 
Longer-run, supply-side shocks are in principle neglected in the present, framework 
or, to be more precise, affect potential output, that is, the denominator of the gap 
measure. While of paramount importance, those long-run issues do not take center 
stage in (monetary) policy circles, which are much more concerned with the short- to 
medium-run horizon.
30See, e.g., Orphanides (2001), Orphanides and van Norden (2002), Robinson et al. (2003), or 
Stock and Watson (1999).
31 See Stock and Watson (1999), who find that an aggregate of the 168 time series they have at
their disposition is the best indicator for U.S. inflation.
3'See Chadha and Nolan (2004).
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4.5.1 Remarks on the Methodology
At this stage, several remarks about the empirical strategy appear appropriate. First, 
predictability tests can be based on the in-sample fit of a model or on the out- 
of-sample fit. obtained from a sequence of recursive or rolling regressions. In the 
context of inflation-forecasting, the latter set-up mimics the data constraints faced 
by a policymaker in real time, and appears to be, hence, a more Appropriate evaluation 
technique.
Second, the tools used by practitioners for ranking models are tin1 same whether 
the forecasting models are nested or not. In applied work, forecasting models arc* 
often chosen (or dismissed) on the basis of their root (predictive) mean square error 
(RMSE) compared to a base forecast or a derivative thereof; a well-known example is 
Meese and RogofT (1983). However, using relative RMSEs for model selection—ns it 
is also done below—comes at the drawback that there is no straightforward measure 
of significance.
Third, the output gap is not directly observable and all the standard econometric 
caveats about two-stage estimation apply. In principle, inference; about second-stage 
inflation forecasts needs to deal with underlying parameter uncertainty of the* output 
gap measure estimates in the first stage; see West (199G). Instead, a te*st statistic 
proposed by Diebold and Mariano (1995) has become erne of the more* common ways 
to compare alternative forecast paths to the true series—anel is also applied further 
below. This test provides information on whether forecast i is significantly U*tter 
than forecast j  but does not take parameter uncertainty into account. In fact, only 
two of the gap measures examined, the production function approach and the? HQ 
filter, are affected by first-stage parameter uncertainty. The other two filter's (IIP and 
frequency domain) are baseel on assumptions for the crucial parameters anel suffer 
“only” from the conventional sampling uncertainty. Furthermore. West (1990) shows 
that under the assumption that OLS provides consistent estimates of the* parameters 
(such as in the VAR used to estimate the BQ decomposition) one can safely ignore
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parameter uncert ainty when testing for different iable functions of parametric forecasts 
and forecast errors such as the mean square error.33 Consequently, the Diebold- 
Mariano test statistic is applied to shed some hurt her light on the usefulness of the 
output gap measures chosen in predicting inflation.
Fourth, the forecasting exercise conducted below intends to evaluate the output 
gaps, but is by no means a full-fledged inflat ion-forecasting model. It tries to capture 
the aspect of price developments that, is triggered domestically by the cyclical posi­
tion of the economy; for example, the price adjustment in factor markets according 
to the factor's marginal rate of utilization. Many other inflation theories are available 
that capture other variables crucial for price developments, for example the exchange 
rate.34 More comprehensive models will undoubtedly lead to firmer results, in partic­
ular to a better performance of the forecast relative to the benchmark, the univariate 
model. For example, factor models, which take into account a much richer variable 
set, have proven to yield promising outcomes; see Stock and Watson (1999). In the 
present context however, less emphasis is put on the construction of a well-performing 
model from a forecasting perspective than on the simple assessment of various output- 
gap measures in an inflation-forecasting context.35 *
4.5.2 Econometric Evaluation
The output gap is often considered a useful instrument to gauge (domestic) inflation­
ary pressures. Consequently, the information stemming from an output gap measure 
could increase the precision of inflation forecasts. These forecasts, stemming from
33The same holds true for a limited number of other cases, including the one of a large estimation 
sample size relative to the prediction sample size; see, e.g., Diebold (2001). McCracken (2000) 
points out that under the same conditions, parameter uncertainty is not necessarily irrelevant for 
the moments of nondifferentiable functions of parametric forecasts and forecast errors such as the 
mean absolute error.
34 A substantial amount of research effort has been dedicated to the exchange rate pass-through 
into domestic prices; see, e.g., Goldberg and Knetter (1997) for a review.
35 An obvious drawback of factor models in a policy context is the enormous amount of data needed
and the sometimes tedious variable handling, see Cotis ct al. {foiihcoming).
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the gap measures constructed above, are compared using a simulated out-of-sample 
methodology. The forecasting model is a variant of the Phillips curve:
^t+1 — i — q +  p(L)gapt +  ')(L)A7Ti +  et (4.8)
where 7ri+ ]  denotes the one-year ahead inflation in the price level at period t. 7Tt is 
the actual inflation in period t, gapt denotes the output gap measure (in levels), L is 
the lag operator. A is the difference operator, and ct an i.i.d. error.36,31
This specification of the forecast equation mirrors a classic Phillips curve, with 
the output gap measure substituting for the unemployment rate.3S,3y The sample 
data starts in I960, the evaluation period spans from 1990 to 2002, and observations 
are annual. The simulated out-of-sample procedure consists of the following steps. 
F irst, a model is estimated for the period 19G0 through 1989 with data available up 
to 1989. Lag length selection of each estimated model up to a maximum number of *39
30This version of the model is chosen following Stock and Watson (1999). Proietti et al. (2002) 
find that the first difference of the output gap (but not the level) is a significant predictor of inflation 
in the Euro area. Selected experiments have been performed with differenced output gap measures. 
These experiments yielded results close to the ones presented and have, hence, been omitted; see 
also the rather similar correlations between gaps in levels and differences in Table 4.1.
3< The literature on the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) has reignited the the dabate over 
the correct, formulation of the Phillips curve; see Gall and Gertler (1999) and Chadha and Nolan 
(2001 ). Shordone (2002) argues that the NKPC is an appropriate framework to predict inflation if 
the output gaps measures capture well firms' marginal cost.
3*As Stock and Watson (1999) point, out, this specification assumes that (i) the inflation rate is 
integrated of order one (1(1)); (ii) a-* is 1(0); and (in) both are, hence, not cointegrated. Moreover, the 
constant intercept implies that the “natural rate” of the output gap is constant. In this literature, 
inflation is commonly modeled as an 1(1) process. Hesults not reported here have continued this 
assumption for wage and CPI in the sample countries; for Finland see also the discussion in the 
appendix t-o this chapter. While the output gap may seem to behave like an integrated process over 
limited periods of time, it is clearly mean-reverting from a theoretical perspective.
39Given that a main ingredient of the output gap hast'd on the production function approach— the 
natural rate of unemployment—is derived from a similar framework, the evaluation could expected 
to  lie bias«*! in favor of this approach. This, however, does not hold true for at least two reasons: 
(a ) the framework described in appendix 4.7.2 is based on wage inflation whereas the evaluation 
measures performance in forecasting CPI inflation; and (1)) the natural rate of unemployment is 
only one building block of potential output according to the production function approach—with 
total factor productivity being quantitatively much more important most of the time.
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lags is based on minimization of the Akaike information criterion. Due to the low 
frequency of the data and the limited number of observations, a maximum of two lags 
is chosen.40 Second, a one-year-ahead forecast for inflation in 1990 is made. Third, 
this value is compared to the actual inflation, yielding the forecast error. Next, the 
same procedure is repeated including data until 1990. This exercise is computed 
recursively, that is, for every year until 2001, the model is re-estimated according 
to the new information criteria, and the forecast error is computed. This procedure 
yields a unique series of forecast errors for each output gap measure considered.41
Table 4.2 presents two statistics: in addition to the cumulative root mean square 
error (RAISE), the so-called U statistic proposed by Theil (1971) is given. The latter 
consists of the RAISE of a specific inflation forecast standardized by the RAISE of the 
naive forecast of “no change" (NC) in inflation. A value smaller than unity stands 
for a smaller RAISE than under the naive hypothesis. The obvious advantage of 
this statistic lies in its ease of comparability across countries.42 As additional—and 
often more challenging—benchmarks, the models were also estimated without any 
output gap measures, that is, as a univariate inflation forecast ( “AR") and under the 
classic Phillips curve specification, which includes the unemployment rate as a RHS 
variable ( “UR*’).43 In the table, specifications that “beat" the univariate model, a 
very common benchmark in the literature, are in bold.
The results can be summarized as follows:
40Section -1.5.3.2 examines the robustness of this assumption.
41 Parameter estimates of equation (8), while not reported to  conserve space, are broadly in line 
with expectations. In particular, $  is estimated to be positive and frequently significant.
4"In other words, cross-country' comparison is not biased by the quality of the benchmark. Using a 
different comparator, say, the autoregressive forecast, statements such as “gap x performs Y percent 
better than the benchmark in country z '  would depend on the quality of the benchmark forecast. 
The “quality'* of the no-change forecast depends solely on the volatility of the series itself.
43The order in the autoregressive forecast and number of lags in the classic Phillips curve speci­
fication is given by the maximum number of lags used in the model estimation; that is, two in the 
base case analyzed in this section. See also section 4.5.3.2.
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Table 4.2: Evaluation of Forecast Performance I 
HPlOOrt P F  BQ FD2-8 NC AH
Finland
1.14
UK
o •»RMSE 1.90
Theil\s U 1.24
RMSE 0.G4
TheiTs U 0.93
RMSE 2.93
TheiTs U 1.20
RMSE 1.11
Theirs II 0.98
RMSE 1.53
Theirs U 0.G7
1.71 1.18 1.52
1.11 0.77
France
0.99
1.24 0.55 0.54
1.81 0.80
Greece
0.78
1.99 3.24 2.50
0.81 1.33
Italy
1.02
1.00 0 .8 7 0.9G
0.88 0 .77 0.85
United Kingdom
2.0G 1.99 1.84
0.91 0.87 0.81
1 0.74 1.45
0.53 0.78
1 0.77 1.13
2.23 2.07
1 0.91 0.85
0.93 0.94
1 0.82 0.84
1.73 1.87
1 0.7G 0.82
Notes: sec Table 4.1; NC, assum ption of no change; AR, autoregressive 
estim ate; UR, unemployment rate (Phillips curve specification).
• No output gap measure yields better results than a univariate inflation forecast 
in Finland and France. In Finland, the disappointing performance of the output 
gaps in improving the inflation forecast is most likely due to the high volatility 
of output itself (see Table 4.1), hampering the determination of a statistically 
satisfying measure of potential output.
• In both Finland and France, the classic Phillips curve featuring the unemploy­
ment rate fares much worse than the naïve forecast, whereas this does not hold 
true to the same extent in the other three countries. This indicates that in these 
countries, the unemployment rate is not a particularly good indicator for infla­
tionary pressures stemming from the labor market. In fact, large-scale active 
labor market policies reduce the amount of dc fa cto  unemployed in Finland by 
up to 10 percent, see Feldman et al. (2003).
• In Greece, adding eit her a production-function-based output gap measure ( “PF'! ) 
or the unemployment rate (i.e., the classic Phillips curve specification) improve 
the inflation forecast performance.
• In Italy, the gap measure based on the Blanchard-Quah decomposition ( WBQ*’) 
and particularly the frequency domain approach assuming a business cycle 
length between two and eight years ( “FD2-8‘?) seem to provide a better grip 
on the data than the univariate model.
• The United Kingdom is the only country in the sample where the very popular 
HP filter in its real-time version for A =  100 ("HPlOOrt,” together with the 
Blanchard-Quah decomposition) delivers good results.
Taken together, these results imply that (i) the univariate inflation forecast is not 
necessarily improved by adding an output gap measure and that (ii) if a forecast- 
improving output gap exists, it usually varies by country.44
To explore the significance of these results, the inflation predictions are assessed 
using a simple version of the test proposed by Diebold and Mariano (1995). This 
test assesses whether— conditional on the true series— the inflation path predicted 
by adding a measure of the output gap is significantly better than the benchmark 
autoregressive forecast. Consider the original inflation series, {7r}^, two forecasts, 
{7rJ}i and  {7rJ , and the corresponding errors, and ■ The loss function
associated with a specific forecast t, l(7rt, 7r[), will be in many—but not all—cases 
a direct function of the forecast error, l{e\). The null hypothesis of equal forecast 
accuracy for the two forecasts can then be expressed as: r
f
E[dt] =  0, ‘ (4.9)
where d =  [/(e|) — l( e t\ is the loss differential. In other words, under the null, the 
population mean of the loss-differential series is zero. Under the alternative, forecast 
i is better than forecast j .  Empirically, the Diebold-Mariano statistic is simply the
44Chadha and Nolan (200-1) provide similar evidence on the weak performance of a traditional 
Phillips curve framework to forecast inflation and suggest to augment the framework by explicitly 
modelling factor markets.
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"t-statistic" of a regression of d on a constant with heteroskedasticity autocorrelation 
consistent (IIAC) standard errors; see Diebold and Mariano (1905) for details.
Table 4,3 presents the Diebold-Mariano (DM) test statistics (and the correspond­
ing p-values) for the forecasts to be equally accurate. The loss function is specified 
as
In other words, d is the sample mean loss differential. As the benchmark forecast, the 
autoregressive inflation forecast is considered (as opposed to Table 1.2, in which the
gap measure does not provide a better inflation forecast than the simple univariate 
model.
The results obtained by applying the Diebold-Mariano procedure mirror those
RM SE ratio indicated a few output gajvbased forecasts that could beat the autore­
gressive forecast in Greece, Italy, and the United Kingdom, the DM statistic reveals 
that none of these forecasts is significantly better than the AR process. In fact, the 
null hypothesis of similar forecast prediction accuracy cannot be dismissed for any 
ga]>-based inflat ion forecast at conventional significance levels (of 5 or 10 percent).
Then; an; at least two simp It1 explanations for the lack of significance of the es­
timates, First, domestic inflationary pressures (as captured by the output gap) may 
not lx* the main driver of CPI inflation. This obs£*rvation is particularly relevant for 
relatively open economics that do not peg their exchange rate to their major trad­
ing partners and that are. therefore, more directly affected by fluctuations in the 
exchange rate.1. In the sample, this holds true for the United Kingdom (belonging
4 5This is true under the assumptions that the relevant priee index, e.g.. the CPI. contains imported
( 1. 10)
base case is "no change*’ ). Failure to reject II0 implies that the inclusion of the output
anticipated in Table 4.2—but go beyond them in one important aspect. While the
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Table 1.3: Evaluât ion of Forecast Performance II
HPlOOrt P F BQ FD2-8 UK
DM statistic 2.10
Finland
1.51 0.49 2.79 2.36
(p-value) (0.98) (0.93) (0.69) (0.99) (0.99)
DM statistic 0.66
Fi'ance
2.87 0.89 0.18 1.91
(p-value) (0.75) (0.99) (0.81) (0.57) (0.97)
DM statistic 1.02
Greece.
-0.81 1.32 0.77 -0.27
(p-value) (0.97) (0.21) (0.91) (0.78) (0.39)
DM statistic 1.89
Holy
2.13 -0.90 0.26 0.15
(p-value) (0.97) (0.98) (0.18) (0.60) (0.56)
DM statistic
United Kingdom  
-0.56 1.13 0.94 0.39 0.55
(p-value) (0.29) (0.87) (0.83) (0.65) (0.71)
more to the U.S. cycle), and, to some extent, also for Finland and Greece. Whereas 
Finland’s trade patterns shifted toward Europe only after the implosion of the Soviet 
Union, Greece is trading less and less with EU countries—while slowly becoming a 
hub for the countries in the Balkan. For Italy and France, however, this explanation 
does not prove satisfactory because both countries’ major trading partners were, at 
least for most of the sample period, linked to Italy and France through a stable peg. 
Second, the analysis suffers from a lack of observations. Basing the forecasts on an­
nual observations is beneficial in that some of the data revision issues are avoided, 
but it also comes at the cost of a significantly reduced sample.46 While the alter­
native approach—basing the forecasts on quarterly observat ions— would probably be 
more relevant from a (monetary) policymaker’s perspective, the lack of significance 
using annual observations clearly shows that the output gaps used in the prediction 
exercise do not fully capture the business cycle— at least not from the perspective of
goods and that the exchange rate pass-through is positive.
4 6 This effect would be even more noticable if the forecast took estimator uncertainty into account 
when using a  different criterion, e.g., the mean absolute error; see section 4.5.1.
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inflationär}' pressures arising in an overheating economy.
From a fiscal policy perspective, these results also cast doubt more broadly on 
using output gaps to calculate a fiscal balance corrected for the cyclical position of 
the economy. First, none of the gap measures (which are arguably an indicator of the 
cyclical position of the economy) seems to capture domestic inflationary pressures 
well. Second, it is not a priori clear which measure of the output gap should be 
used since there are many and they would result in widely different estimates of an 
“adjusted*’ deficit (or surplus).
4.5.3 Robustness Checks
In this section, the results presented above are checked for robustness in three dif­
ferent dimensions. First, for those gap measures that are subject to a crucial single 
assumption in the first stage, this assumption is modified. This concerns the jK'iialty 
parameter A used in the HP filter and the assumption on the business cycle length 
in the frequency domain filter. Second, the results are tested with respect to a mod­
elling choice in the second step, namely the maximum number of lags in the predict ion 
model. Finally, to minimize the effects of exchange rate fluctuations and changes in 
indirect taxation on the inflation measure, the consumer price index is substituted 
with the GDP deflator.
4 .5 .3 .1  Output Gap Parameters
Generally speaking, IIP filters based on differing assumptions on A find a qualitnt ively 
similar pattern of t he output gap, that is, their turning points coincide clironologically 
The assumption on the smoothness of the trend has, however, strong implications for 
the magnitude of the gap, in particular at the end of the observation period. Since 
the “real-time" constructs in the previous section consist, after 1900. of a series of 
“last observations," the choice of A becomes even more critical. Here, the exercise 
is repeated for A — 20 ( “HP20rt") and A =  200 (**HP200rf‘), generating a more 
volatile (IIP200rt) and a less volatile (IIP20rt) gap measure. Moreover. I flag for
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comparison the results for the traditional (two-sided) IIP filter ( ‘‘HP100,*’ “HP20,” 
“IIP200'’ ) to gauge the importance of the ‘Teal-time'’ construct . A similar argument 
applies to the frequency domain filter. To corroborate the above results, the filter 
has been re-estimated assuming business cycle durations between two and six years 
(“FD2-6") and between two and ten years ( “FD2-10*’). To increase comparability 
with the results described above, the maximum lag length has been held constant (at 
two).
Results for the alternative parametrization at the first, stage (reported in Ta­
ble B4.2 in the Appendix) confirm to a large extent the outcome obtained above. 
Again, the estimated output gaps do not improve on the univariate prediction for 
both Finland and France. For Greece, only one parametrization of the two-sided HP 
filter (IIP200) produces a slightly but insignificantly smaller RMSE than the autore­
gressive forecast. For Italy and the United Kingdom, the results from varying the 
parameters are somewhat more encouraging. For Italy, the output gap measure im­
proves the inflation forecast if a shorter cycle (between two and six years) is assumed 
in the frequency domain approach. More importantly, this version of the frequency 
domain is the only forecast- that is statistically significant at the 5 percent level in 
the Diebold-Mariano sense, that is, with a test statistic of d =  —1.97, it significantly 
improves upon the autoregressive forecast (p-value 0.02). For the United Kingdom, 
instead, the real-time HP filter seems to be the best way to capture inflationary 
pressures—almost independently of the assumption regarding the trend smoothness 
(A). In fact, both alternative real-time specifications produce smaller RMSEs that 
the autoregressive forecast. In the Diebold-Mariano test, however, none of the U.K. 
real-time measure is statistically significant, at conventional levels.
An interesting corollary derives from the comparison of the real-time IIP filter with 
its common, two-sided version. The additional information on the relative position 
in the cycle stemming from future observations could be expected to improve the 
quality of the gap measure, and hence the forecast performance. This conjecture 
is rejected for the countries in the sample. For all countries but one (Greece), the
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real-time versions of the HP-filtered gaps provide better forecasts. This observation 
is both intriguing and reassuring. Consider the following situation: a country has a 
consistently positive output gap, coinciding with derated inflation for ail extended 
period with the exception of one year in the middle of the sample, when, clue to 
an exogenous shock, the output gap is negative, resulting in somewhat lower-than- 
avorage inflation in that period and the following one. The twosided HP filter, 
in principle, smooths over the outlier, and predicts, consequently, relatively high 
inflation. With the forward-looking information missing, instead, the real-time filter 
picks up the drop in inflation to a larger extent, resulting in a reduced smoothing 
effect and, hence, a more accurate prediction of inflation. From a policy making 
perspective, this is reassuring since the two-sided IIP filter is, of course, not available 
(or based on forecasts). In Greece, though, the two-sided filter yields better inflation 
forecasts than the real-time variant. Both are dominated, however, by another gap 
measure, namely the one stemming from the production function (in addition to the 
Phillips curve1 prediction using the unemployment rate),
4.5.3.2 Forecasting Model Param eters
The second-stage robustness check is related to the setup of the forecasting model. 
Determination of the optimal lag length for the recursive inflation prediction models 
requires tlie specification of a maximum number of lags of the HIIS variables in equa­
tion (8), that is, the output gap and inflation. With the total number of observations 
being rather small due to the annual frequency of the data, this limit was set at two 
in the previous section. Changing this assumption can have a strong impact, on the 
degrees of freedom, and implicitly, on the precision of the estimates.
Most of the results obtained above for a maximum of two lags are robust to a 
higher or lower limit, see Tables B1.3-B1.5 in the appendix. In particular, for all 
models evaluated (between one and four lags), no output gap measure yields bet-
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Itor results than a univariate inflation forecast in Finland and Franco.4, In Greece, 
both the production-function-based output, gap measure and the classic Phillips curve 
specification improve the inflation forecast performance at all levels—but not signifi­
cantly so.* 4* In addition, if a maximum of one lag is allowed, the BQ filter product's an 
inflation forecast that is significantly better than the autoregressive estimate at the 
10-percent level. In all countries but Greece, instead, the unemployment rate does 
not provide any useful information when compared to the univariate specification, 
and hence, is not a good indicator for domestic inflationary pressure's. Again, the 
performance of the unemployment rate is particularly disappointing in Finland and 
France. The results are the least robust for Itafy. While for short lag limits (one 
and two), the frequency domain and the Blanchard-Quah measure yield the best re­
sults, the production function approach (and the real-time IIP filter) prevail with a 
maximum of throe and four lags. At three lags, the gap measure based on the pro­
duction function provides a significant improvement over the autoregressive inflation 
forecast. For U.K. data, the IIP filter perforins well for three and four lags—but 
remains insignificant.
4 .5 .3 .3  Inflation Measure
If the consumer basket measured by the consumer price index contains imported 
goods, the price of these goods is likely to change to some* extent if the exchange rate 
fluctuates—an effect not related to domestic price pressures and, hence, not captured 
by measures of the output gap.4“'1 A similar argument can be made for changes in 
indirect taxation. They are not caused by domestic economic, developments, but have'
■*’ For a maximum of one lag, the frequency domain approach is just as good ns the univariate 
forecast.
4^The production function approach is almost significant for a maximum of one and three lags, 
indicating some scope for a better performance of a refined gap estimate based on the production 
function.
4i,This obviously depends on the degree of exchange rate pass-through. For the .sake of the argu­
ment, it is sufficient if the pass-though is non-zero.
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an impact on the CPI level. To isolate these effects, the forecasting exercise was 
repeated with the GDP deflator instead of the CPI.
Compared to CPI inflation, results for the GDP deflator are equally disappointing 
regarding the basic set of output gap measures (see Table B4.G in the appendix). In 
terms of the RMSE, some output gap measures produce an inflation forecast that is 
marginally better that the univariate forecast (for PVance, Greece, and the United 
Kingdom), but no measure succeeds in establishing a significantly better forecast 
according to the Diebold-Mariano statistic.
4.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, I compared a number of commonly used output gap measures in an 
inflation-forecasting exercise for a small set of European countries. The measures 
evaluated included variants of t he IIP filter, the Blanchard-Quah decomposition, the 
production function approach, and a frequency domain filter. Reflecting domestic 
inflationary pressures, the unobservable output gap could, at least in theory, provide 
some information for one-ycar-ahead actual inflation and, hence, improve a univariate 
forecast. So
So is the output gap a good indicator for inflationary pressures? Judging from the 
sample countries Finland, France, Greece, Italy, and United Kingdom, the answer is 
clearly -'it depends." In some countries (Finland, France), the widely used output gap 
measures evaluated in this chapter do not provide any improvement over a univariate 
inflation forecast. In other countries, however, inflation forecasts are better if some 
measure of the gap is included (Greece, Italy, United Kingdom). The best measure 
to be included varies by country, but is, where applicable, robust to alternative ways 
of computing the measure (Italy: frequency domain method; United Kingdom: IIP 
filter), and modeling assumptions in the inflation forecast exercise (with the possible 
exception of Italy). Unfortunately, few of these forecasts perform significantly better 
than the autoregressive forecast in a statistical sense as documented by the Diebold-
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Mariano test. From a policymaking perspective, the conclusions are that (i) various 
measures of the output gap should be taken into account when assessing the cyclical 
position of the economy; (ii) it is hard to significantly improve on an autoregres- 
sive inflation forecast using the simple output gap measures presented above; (iii) a 
broader set of indicators may be needed to capture (domestic) inflationary pressures 
well; and (iv) assessing the fiscal stance based on a structural balance is tricky if the 
gap measure is to reflect the business cycle well.
The failure to identify output gap measures that improve consistently and signif­
icantly upon the univariate forecast in all countries—but, in particular, in Finland 
and France— could also be due to the limited number of observations, given the choice 
of annual frequency. In principle, this choice is well-motivated by seasonality issuers, 
data revision considerations, and, to some extent, by the availability of data (mea­
sures of the capital stock and the natural rate of unemployment in the production 
function approach). Nevertheless, a quarterly assessment may (where possible) yield 
additional insights.
Thus, directions for future research in a similar empirical model include: analyz­
ing real-time data series at a quarterly frequency to mimic better the policymaker's 
decision-making process; extending the analysis to a larger sample of countries; and 
including “optimized"’ versions of the IIP  and the frequency domain filters—as op­
posed to the “conventional*’ robustness analysis with regard to the crucial parameters 
undertaken above. Further insight could be gained by exploring competing output 
gap measures in a different set-up. From a fiscal perspective, for example, the out­
put gap could help predict certain cyclical expenditure items. Moreover, the New 
Keynesian literature has spent considerable energy on finding a suitable measure for 
real economic activity; exploring the robustness of some of these models with re­
gard to competing empirical specifications of the output gap could lead to interesting 
results.50 50
50See Gall and Gertler (1D99J.
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4.7 Appendices
4.7.1 Is There a Long-Run Phillips Curve?
A modeling framework based on a (time-varying) NAWRU—understood as the nat­
ural rate of unemployment underlying the economy—implicitly assumes that the 
Phillips curve is vertical at said natural rate, i.e., the unemployment rate is iiKl<-|wn- 
dent of (wage) inflation. In other words, empirical inference along these lines rules 
out the existence of a long-run non-vertical Phillips curve, and, lienee, an underlying 
long-run relationship between inflation and the unemployment rate. This prior has 
been questioned recently by a number of authors (see, for instance, Heyer and fanner 
(2002), and Schreiber and Woltcrs (2003)), who found empirical evidence against the 
vertical Phillips curve assumption in U.S. and German data. resj)e<t ivcly. As the 
latter argue, the existence of the NAWRU can lie rejected if both the unemployment 
rate and the rate of (wage) inflation are non-st at ionary and cointegrated. indicating 
a long-run relationship, similar to a Phillips curve. In results not reported here. I 
have not found strong indications against the vertically assumption. I demonstrate 
the approach for the case of Finland, the other countries in the sample yield similar 
outcomes. ,.
In the case of Finland, simple tests indicate that, while both wage inflation {tlnwy ) 
and the unemployment rate (in*) are non-st at ionary, then* is no sign of cointegratioii. 
a result conducive to the NAWRU approach.51 In fitting a bivariate VAR to the basic 
data, the lag length was chosen according to the Schwarz and the Haiman-Quinn 
information criteria, which both propose three lags in levels (Table A 1.1)/'■
Due to the lack of strong priors in favor of a trend restricts! to the cointegrating 
space, a VAR system with an unrestricted constant was estimated. Likelihood ratio
51 Note that these conclusions also hold for CPI inflation (results not report«! hen*).
52 With three lags, no significant residual autocorrelation emerged, whereas more imrsimoniou-' 
models reveal problems of autocorrelation at the first lag.
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Table A TI: Las Lensth Selection
lags Schwarz Hannan-Quinn
4 -G.0 -G.5
3 -G.4 -G.8
2 -G.2 -6.5
1 -5.0 -6.0
tests of the time series properties (distributed as X2{dg ƒ), where d g f  stands for degrees 
of freedom) reveal that both series appear to be non-st at ionary.53 Moreover, the 
unemployment rate can be considered weakly exogenous from a statistical point of 
view (Table A4.2).
Table A4.2: Time Series Properties54 5
d g f  dw age ur
LR test for exclusion 
1 5 .02  7 .0 3
LR test for stationarity 
1 7 .03  5 .02
LR test for weak exogeneity 
1 4 .9 7  0.72
Based on this, the analysis indicates no cointegration between the unemployment 
rate and wage inflation: the null hypothesis of r =  0, that is no reintegrating re­
lationship, cannot, be rejected at conventional levels (Table A4.3). Hence, the data 
cannot provide evidence of a long-run relationship between wage* inflation and the 
unemployment rate.
53On theoretical grounds, the unemployment rate is bounded by the interval (0:1) and hence 
not truly 1(1). The fact that it cannot grow out of bounds in the long run, however, does not 
preclude it from behaving like an integrated process in the shorter run, as evidenced by the test 
statistics. The stationarity tests presented above do not allow for a structural break in the series 
analyzed. The strong rise of the unemployment rate in the early 1900s— as described above— could 
he viewed as such a break. This proposition is not investigated further since a stationarity result 
for the unemployment rate when allowing for a break in the series even underscores the case for the 
XAWRU approach, see Schreiher and Wolters (2003).
54Bold test statistics indicate significance at the 5 percent level, the critical value with one degree 
of freedom being 3.84.
55L-max and Trace are the maximum eigenvalue and trace test statistics; L-max90 and TraceOO,
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Table A4.3: Coint egrat ion Test St at ist icsw
Null L-max Trace L-max90 'IVaceOO
r =  0 8.67 10.23 10.60 13.31
r <  1 1.56 1.56 2.71 2.71
To confirm further the applicability of the NAWRU approach to the Finnish data, 
a number of additional considerations are of interest. The lack of cointegration be­
tween the two series could be due to a structural break in the cointegrating relation­
ship during the observation period, in particular given the sharp rise in unemployment 
during the early 1990s. However, experimenting with various dummies did not soften 
the evidence against coint egrat ion. Moreover, the limited number of observations 
used in the empirical assessment may introduce a small sample bias. Correcting for 
the bias, for instance along the lines of Cheung and Lai (1993), introduces even higher 
critical values, such that the hypothesis r =  0 would be accepted even more easily.
instead, give the appropriate 0()-poreent critical values for r  cointegrating vectors, see .Johansen 
(1995), p. 215.
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4.7.2 The Baseline NAWRU Model
The filtering process yielding the NAWRU is bast'd on the unobserved components 
approach used by the European Commission, see Kuttner (1901), Denis ct a i  (2002), 
and Planas and Rossi (2003). In what follows, I outline the procedure for Finland 
as an exemplary case.56 The starting point for the first component of the bivariate 
model is the definition:
which decomposes the observable unemployment rate Ut in a cyclical component, 
Ct, and a non-cyclical, or trend component, l\. Additional exogenous regressors— 
M <  3— are assigned to the latter component, such that
M
f . - r .  +  E a ^ ,  (152)
m = 1
where Tt represents the underlying long-term trend, or NAWRU. Without, additional 
exogenous regressors, i.e., M  =  0, the non-cyclical component and the NAWRU-trend 
coincide.
The trend component is modeled according to its statistical properties, i.e., no 
economic information (e.g., on structural breaks) is included. The most general spec­
ification (see further below) is given by a random walk (RW) with drift, where the 
drift term ¡it is itself a random walk (and the trend Tt, hence, a second-order random 
walk):
Vt = C t +  Tu (B Í)
i h  =  / h - l + 2 ‘2t.
Tt — ßt T  Tt—\ -t- Z\t, with (B3a)
(B3b)
56See the appendix of Billmeier (200-4b) for more <letails. including the technical restrictions on 
the optimization technique.
Both errors, zit, are n.i.i.d; if V ar(zu ) — 0, the model collai>ses to a first-order random 
walk with drift. On the other hand, the cyclical component in fill) is sixrified an 
AH(N) process:
N
Ct =  + (IU i
r*=]
where N <  2, and i/t is i.i.d. To guarantee stationarity of the* cyclical component. it 
must hold that <f>ri < 1.
The second component of the generic model is given by
A 7 r “  =  f l
L
+ ^ 2  p i x u
S
+  Y ,  O A x f - .
NL U 1—  v — L « =  - 1
i+7(i-irt/,.,1
+ y ^ r O - r
. r-0
+ bt , where = ••
"V“
d
This Phillips curve relationship links the change in wage inflation to (a) exogenous 
determinants of wage inflation, X t, such as (changes in) lalxir productivity or (changes 
in) the terms of trade, with 0 <  L < 10 in the empirical application; (M autoivgre s^iw* 
terms of the wage inflation (with 0 < S  < 2); (c) the ;>-th difference of ih<’ lagg l^ 
observed unemployment rate l/t; (d) tlie cyclical unemployment component f |. (with 
0 <  R  < 4), and (e) an error term, which can have a MA(I) structure, I < -1.
In fitting the model to the Finnish data, the most generic model is us«l. with 
respect to equation (B l), the specification chosen is a bivariate autoregresshc njod* h 
with the trend expressed as a second order random walk, hence, 1 /lr(*w) ^  ^ 1,1 
equation (B3a). Furthermore, an AH(2) specification is selected for the c\* li<al tom 
ponent in (B l), as indicated by preliminary tests (not retried  lien*)- Kximtihh nt* 
with additional exogenous regressors in (B2), i.e., M > 0, resulutl in » 4 let« riorati
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of the statistical fit.
Regarding (135). the second difference of the lagged first variable (A 2?/^), as 
well as the contemporary cyclical component of unemployment were included, that 
is, d = 2 and It  =  0. The choice of a 2mi order RW specification in (B3) implies 
for equation (Bo) that d — 2, i.e., the lagged unemployment series regressor enters 
in second difference in order to obtain a stationary regressor. In (135). no exogenous 
regressors were employed/'7
In the Finnish case, the impact of different assumptions regarding the ARMA 
structure of the Phillips curve equation (135) on the key parameters of the model is 
substantial. Only the ARMA(2,2) and (2,3) specifications yield a reasonable statis­
tical description: normality assumptions on both equations an? not violated at a 10 
percent level. The estimated /?0 (in equation (135)) indicates whether changes in wage 
inflation respond to the general economic environment as represented by the cyclical 
component of unemployment. This coefficient is significantly negative in both mod­
els, in accordance with the prior of a dampening effect of rising unemployment on the 
size of wage increases. Increasing the number of moving average terms in (135) raises 
the t-value (in absolute terms). At 8.3 percent. the NAWRl' derived for Finland 
in 2002 (in both specifications) is about 0.8 percentage points lower than observed 
unemployment.
For Finnish data, the final specification of the first component of the bivariate 
model (equations (B l) , and (B3)) is, hence:
annealing algorithm is slower than a Newton-type algorithm, it is more likely to identify a global 
maximum. Since our experiments showed that local maxima posed a problem using the Newton-type 
algorithm, the simulated annealing algorithm was applied throughout .
Vt =  Tt + Ct (B(ia)
Tt =  /q + Tt-\ +  z\t w ith \it =  +  z2u V ar (z2t) ^  0 (13Gb)
2
Using the ARMA(2,3) model, the final specification of (B5) is:
2 3
=  /i +  6sATr™_8 +  'yA2Ut~i +  ß QCt +  5 3 £i-i‘
a=—1 i=  0
(B7)
4.7.3 Tables
Table B4.1: Gap Signal Consistency
HPlOOrt PF BQ FD2-8
Finland
HPlOOrt 1
P F 0.81 1
BQ 0.46 0.51 1
FD2-8 0.79 0.71 0.59 1
France
HPlOOrt 1
P F 0.8G 1
BQ 0.62 0.57 1
FD2-8 0.79 0.71 0.54 1
Greece
HPlOOrt 1
P F 0.G7 1
BQ 0.4G 0.4G 1
FD2-8 0.71 0.64 0.38 1
Italy
HPlOOrt 1
P F 0.83 1
BQ 0.73 0.65 1
FD2-8 0.7G 0.76 0.C5 1
United Kingdom
HPlOOrt 1
P F 0.81 1
BQ 0.73 0.78 1
FD2-8 0.74 0.G2 0.68 1
Note: Statistic gives ratio of "same signs’* ;
see section 4 .5 .‘2 for gap abbreviations.
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Table B4.2: Forecast Performance for Alternative Gap Measures
IIP20rt IIP200rt HP 100 HP 20 HP 200 FD2-C FD2-10
RMSE 1.97 1.91
Finland 
1.94 2.12 1.57 1.37 1.30
TheiFs U 1.29 1.26 1.27 1.38 1.03 0.89 0.89
DM 2.31 2.12 1.82 1.55 1.70 1.35 1.99
(p-value) (0.99) (0.98) (0.97) (0.94) (0.96) (0.91) (0.98)
RMSE 0.00 0.74
Fiance
0.85 0.72 0.87 0.54 0.52
Their s U 0.87 1.07 1.23 1.04 1.26 0.78 0.75
DM 0.G7 1.15 1.46 1.31 1.68 0.30 -0.12
(p-value) (0.75) (0.87) (0.93) (0.91) (0.95) (0.02) (0.45)
RMSE 3.08 2.73
Greece
2.26 3.00 2.17 2.39 2.72
Theil!s U 1.26 1.11 0.92 1.23 0.89 0.98 1.11
DM 1.77 1.04 0.04 0.87 -0.11 0.25 0.97
(p-value) (0.90) (0.85) (0.52) (0.81) (0.46) (0.60) (0.83)
RMSE 1.07 1.24
Italy
1.20 1.25 1.24 0.69 1.11
Theil’s U 0.95 1.09 1.14 1.11 1.10 0.61 0.97
DM 2.23 1.48 1.89 2.14 1.48 -1 .97 1.21
(p-value) (0.99) (0.93) (0.97) (0.98) (0.93) (0 .02) (0.89)
RMSE 1.51 1.01
United Kingdom  
1.84 2.14 1.87 1.86 1.97
Theil’s U O.CG 0.71 0.81 0.94 0.82 0.82 0.86
DM -0.64 -0.37 0.51 1.01 0.61 0.44 0.73
(p-value) (0.20) (0.3G) (0.70) (0.84) (0.73) (0.67) (0.77)
Note: Bold estimates indicate a (significantly) better performance than the 
univariate forecasting model; see section 1.5.3.1 for gap abbreviations.
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Table B4.3: Evaluation of Forecast Performance (max. 1 lag)
HPlOOrt PF BQ FD2-8 NC AR UR
Finland
RMSE 1.01 1.87 1.19 1.48 1.14 2.62
Theil’s U 1.24 1.22 0.78 0.97 1 0.74 1.71
DM 2.33 1.99 0.60 2.60 1.71
(p-value) (0.99) (0.98) (0.72) (0.99) (0.96)
France
RMSE 0.61 0.92 0.55 0 .5 3 0.53 0.66
Theirs U 0.88 1.34 0.80 0 .7 6 1 0.77 0.96
DM 0.67 1.59 0.62 -0.33 0.96
(p-value) (0.75) (0.94) (0.73) (0.37) (0.83)
Greece
RMSE 2.96 1.78 1 .58 2.47 2.23 1.94
Theirs U 1.21 0 .73 0 .67 1.01 1 0.91 0.79
DM 2.06 -1.25 -1 .4 7 0.85 -0.47
(p-value) (0.98) (0.11) (0 .0 7 ) (0.80) (0.32)
Italy
RMSE 0.97 1.00 0 .84 0 .8 1 0.90 0.91
Theil’s U 0.86 0.88 0.75 0 .71 1 0.80 0.80
DM 1.18 1.04 -0.72 -0.77 0.02
(p-value) (0.88) (0.85) (0.24) (0.22) (0.51)
United Kingdom
RMSE 1.81 2.00 1.99 1.84 1.65 1.87
Theil’s U 0.80 0.88 0.87 0.81 1 0.73 0.82
DM 0.57 1.12 1.19 0.63 0.79
(]> value) (0.72) (0.87) (0.88) (0.74) (0.79)
Note: Bold estimates indicate a (significantly) better performance than the 
univariate forecasting model; see section 4.5.2 for gap abbreviations.
Table B4.4: Evaluation of Forecast Performance (max. 3 lags)
HPlOOrt PF BQ FD2-8 NC AR UR
Finland
RAISE 2.12 2.36 1.18 1.56 1.14 2.20
Theirs U 1.38 1.54 0.77 1.01 1 0.74 1.43
DM 2.54 2.33 0.49 2.67 2.35
(p-value) (0.99) (0.99) (0.69)
France
(0.99) (0.99)
RAISE 0.61 1.31 0.57 0.54 0.51 0.78
Theils U 0.93 1.91 0.82 0.78 1 0.74 1.13
DAI 0.85 3.04 0.58 0.82 1.86
(p-value) (0.80) (1.00) (0.72)
Greece
(0.79) (0.97)
RAISE 2.93 1.65 3.46 2.50 2.23 2.13
Theil’s U 1.20 0 .67 1.41 1.02 1 0.91 0 .87
DAI 1.92 -0.94 1.47 0.77 -0.14
(p-value) (0.97) (0.17) (0.93) (0.78) (0.44)
Italy
RAISE 1.09 0.86 0 .9 5 1.10 1.01 1.05
Theirs U 0.9G 0.7C 0 .84 0.98 1 0.89 0.92
DAI 1.23 -1.32 -0.95 0.54 0.18
(p-value) (0.89) (0 .09 ) (0.17) (0.71) (0.57)
United Kingdom
RAISE 1.53 2.07 1.99 1.84 1.73 1.88
Theil’s U 0.C7 0.91 0.87 0.81 1 0.76 0.83
DAI -0.56 1.15 0.94 0.39 0.59
(p-value) (0.29) (0.88) (0.83) (0.65) (0.72)
Note; Bold estimates indicate a (significantly) better performance than the 
univariate forecasting model; see section 4.5.2 for gap abbreviations.
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Table B4.5: Evaluation of Forecast Performance (max. 1 lags)
UPlOOrt PF BQ FD2-8 x c AR UR
Finland
RMSE 2.27 1.8G 1.47 1.52 1.3G 2.24
Theil’s U 1.48 1.21 0.9G 0.99 1 0.89 1.16
DM 2.14 1.72 1.15 1.31 2.14
(p-value) (0.98) (0.9G) (0.87) (0.91) (0.98)
France
RMSE 0.G4 1.3G 0.57 0.54 0.51 0.7G
Theirs U 0.93 1.97 0.82 0.78 1 0.71 1.11
DM 0.85 2.99 0.5G 0.82 1.72
(p-value) (0.80) (1.00) (0.71) (0.79) (0.9G)
Greece
RMSE 2.93 2.21 4.49 2.50 2.23 2.13
Theirs U 1.20 0.90 1.84 1.02 1 0.91 0.87
DM 1.92 -0.03 2.23 0.77 -0.14
(]>-value) (0.97) (0.19) (0.99) (0.78) (0.44)
Italy
RMSE 0 .9 7 0.9G 0.95 1.39 1.01 1.05
Theil's U 0.8G 0.85 0 .84 1.22 1 0.89 0.92
DM -0.45 -0.5G -0.5G 1.58 0.18
(p-value) (0.33) (0.29) (0.29) (0.94) (0.57)
United Kingdom
RMSE 1 .5 3 2.0G 1.99 1.84 1.73 1.88
Theil’s U 0.G7 0.90 0.87 0.81 1 0.7G 0.83
DM -0.5G 1.13 0.94 0.39 0.59
(p-value) (0.29) (0.87) (0.83) (0.65) (0.72)
Note: Bold estim ates indicate a (significantly) better perform ance than the 
univariate forecasting model; see section 1.5.2 for gap abbreviations.
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Table B4.6: Evaluation of Forecast Performance (GDP deflator, max. 2 lags)
HP lOOrt PE BQ FD2-8 NC AR UR
Finland
RMSE 2.82 2.88 2.39 2.86 2.34 2.99
Thed's U 0.71 0.76 0.G3 0.76 1 0.62 0.79
DM 1.08 1.93 0.04 1.58 2.66
(p-value) (0.8G) (0.97) (0.26) (0.94) (0.99)
France
RMSE 0.45 0.61 0 .49 0.48 0.49 0.80
TheiFs U 0 .70 0.9G 0.7G 0.75 1 0.76 1.25
DM -0.52 0.80 0.21 0.12 2.74
(p-value) (0.30) (0.79) (0.58) (0.52) (0.99)
Greece
RM SE 1.44 3.55 3.GG 3.84 3.56 6.31
TheiEs IT 1.44 1.15 1.19 1.24 1 1.15 2.05
DM 2.81 -0.03 0.15 1.5G 3.86
(p-value) (0.99) (0.19) (0.5G) (0.94) (0.99)
Italt/
RMSE 2.05 2.18 1.97 1.83 1.42 1.50
TheiEs U 1.07 1.14 1.03 0.96 1 0.74 0.79
DM 2.45 2.G8 1.5G 3.25 0.29
(p-value) (0.99) (0.99) (0.89) (0.99) (0.G1)
United Kingdom
RMSE 1.33 1.3G 1.43 1.02 1.21 1.18
TheiEs U 1.18 1.21 1.27 0.90 1 1.08 1.05
DM 0.42 0.G2 1.18 -0.61 -0.09
(p- value) (0.6G) (0.72) (0.88) (0.27) (0.4G)
Note; Bold estim ates indicate a  (significantly) better perform ance than the 
univariate forecasting model; see section 1.5.2 for gap abbreviations.
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4.7.4 Figures
Figure A4.1: Output Gap Measures, 1980-2002
(In percent o f  potential)
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Figure A4.3: Output Gap Measures. 1980-2002
(In percent o f  potential)
Sources: IM F IFS, European C om ission: and author's calculations.
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